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Abstract 
There have been many opportunities to study protest events over the last six years. From Occupy 
to the Arab Spring and 15M. After the financial crash, citizens of the world crafted their own 
original responses. What they shared – from New York to Cairo and Madrid – was a desire to take 
to the streets in political protest. In the UK the enemy was ‘austerity’. One of the first policies of 
this new era proposed a rise in Higher Education tuition fees. Students took to the streets in 
dissent. A host of political, institutional, technological and social transformations occurred. More 
specifically, it saw the birth of a digital platform designed to help protesters navigate during 
protests. It was called Sukey. This thesis interrogates the impact and legacy of the Sukey platform; 
over, and beyond, these tumultuous years. It does so through the lens of ‘disruptive cartography’, 
arguing that the platform was deployed to disrupt the smooth running of both so-called ‘A-to-B’ 
demonstrations, and police containment tactics colloquially referred to as ‘kettles’. I contend that 
the platform did so by providing up-to-date navigational information regarding active 
phenomena, such as police movements. In this thesis I undertake an aesthetic, interactive and 
mobile analysis to investigate the navigational dimensions of the project. I do so through an 
automobile metaphor in which I look ‘under the bonnet’, ‘through the windscreen’, and ‘on(to) 
the road’. In its absence, I argue that protesters have lacked the requisite navigational knowledges 
to perform unpredictable manoeuvres, during protest events. As a result, they have returned to 
using institutional forms that limit the navigational possibilities brought-into-being by the Sukey 
platform. I conclude by speculating on three possible ‘failures’ of the platform regarding its ability 
to faithfully ‘capture’ live events, provide a navigational ‘correspondence’ between cartographic 
‘signposts’, and to protect participants from data-driven policing.     
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Chapter 1 | Introduction  
Fig 1.1 | Westminster Bridge, December 9th 2010. Source: Jon Cartwright (2010)  
 
‘Disruption comes in many wondrous forms’  
(Scott 2012, xviii)  
 
2010 was unequivocally a turning point in the UK: politically, socially and technologically. For the 
first time in 13 years, the UK was waking up to a Conservative government, albeit in the form of a 
historic coalition with the Liberal Democrats. New Labour – that curious beast – was in many ways 
in decline. With the 2007/08 financial crash still to be resolved new political, social and 
technological forms, dynamics and assemblages were emerging in response to global turmoil. The 
days, weeks, months and years since have seen the explosion, development, critique, and 
consolidation of a range of political models, protest tactics and novel means of communication.      
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2015 marked an anniversary, then. For student activist groups such as the National Campaign 
Against Fees and Cuts (NCAFC) it was already their fifth birthday. In many ways they represent the 
ideology of the wider anti-austerity movement that has, for example, grown from being an outside 
protest group to a body with members on the National Union of Students’ (NUS) National 
Executive Committee. The NUS is the primary union for students in the UK. Other groups, like UK 
Uncut, opposed to growing concerns such as corporate tax evasion were also born in 2010. The 
People’s Assembly Against Austerity (PA) – ‘a national forum for anti-austerity views’ (People’s 
Assembly Against Austerity 2013) – took until 2013 to arrive on the scene and in just two years of 
formation organized the largest anti-austerity demonstration since 2010. Needless to say, then, 
that this period has been characterized by the birth of new social movements and new political 
organizational forms. In doing so they have challenged the existing, perhaps even ‘sclerotic’ (Scott 
2012, xvii) state and institutional mechanics of power in the UK.  
Yet 2010 was not entirely without precedent. Many groups took to the streets in protest using 
tactics devised and deployed in varying actions over the previous 10 years. The Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) – the UK’s main trade union federation – continued to organize demonstrations 
like it has done through its 147-year history. Others in opposition to the G8 and their various 
summits around the world organized protest events and anti-capitalist carnivals, whilst the 
environmental movement continued to organize flash demonstrations and occupations in art 
galleries and public spaces across the capital. This combination of old and new, enduring and 
embryonic movements is what has defined UK political protest since 2010, with a mix of 
‘majoritarian’ (Gerbaudo 2012, 10) and ‘minoritarian’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986) forces. Yet this 
was far from a rosy relationship. 2010 became a year of tension – not just between austerity 
ideologues and anti-austerity campaigners, the state and anti-capitalist protesters, but also 
between these old and new political formations as each battled to have their voices heard.   
- 
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Now, in 2016, with new electoral and parliamentary forms of politics taking hold, what can we say 
about one of the most intensive periods in British protest history? This thesis hones in on one 
particular dynamic that defined these years. During the winter of 2010 student protesters 
opposed to a tabled House of Commons bill to increase the cost of Higher Education (HE) – from 
£3,290 to £9,000 a year – took to the streets of London to voice their discontent. Their doing so 
led to a series of conflicts between protesters and the London Metropolitan Police (Met) in which 
the latter deployed a number of spatial tactics designed to restrict the movements of the former: 
As the debate and vote came to its fateful conclusion, things accelerated outside 
Parliament. At 11am students gathered at the protest start point in Malet Street outside 
UCL [University College London]. Another group started to gather outside Parliament as 
Clegg and his Lib Dem ministerial colleagues attended a meeting at Downing Street before 
heading to the House of Commons where Vince Cable, the Business Secretary, began the 
debate. At 1.30pm, a breakaway group of students headed towards Buckingham Palace, 
where workmen’s [sic] barriers left in the road were used as weapons. An hour later, the 
order was given to kettle the protesters as flares and fireworks were thrown at the police. 
(Bloom 2012, 64) 
This account of the day of the tuition fee vote mirrors many during this period; of police and 
protesters engaged in pitched battles. On the day itself, however, there was far more to come. As 
freelance journalist Dan Hancox recalls in Kettled Youth: 
Along with around a thousand (mostly) young protesters I was imprisoned there, on 
Westminster Bridge, outdoors in sub-zero temperatures for over two hours. Some were 
not released for four hours – by which time it was almost 1am. We were held in such a 
tight space by the Metropolitan Police that some protesters suffered respiratory 
problems, chest pains and the symptoms of severe crushing…With the walls on either side 
of Westminster Bridge barely waist-high, it is also tremendously lucky no one was 
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squeezed out into the still, icy depths of the Thames below, where death would have been 
inevitable and horrific. This is the tenor of modern protest in Britain. (Hancox 2011a, 1)   
One of the ‘spatial manoeuvres’ that became emblematic of the student protests was the practice 
of containment, colloquially known as ‘kettling’. Far from a cheap metaphor, the kettle came to 
be the most accurate and visceral account of the tactics on display. As Dan Hancox wrote in two 
other publications at the time, it both ‘radicalized Britain’s youth’ (Hancox 2011b) and ‘fired up a 
generation’ (Hancox 2011c). On the same day, and in response, protesters developed an ‘anti-
kettling’ mapping application designed to enable them to be kept ‘safe, mobile and informed’ 
(Sukey 2012, n.p.) during demonstrations. It was called Sukey.  
 
Disruption, Mobility, Safety, Legacy  
This thesis is an attempt to interrogate the rise and fall of this anti-kettling platform through the 
lens of ‘disruptive cartography’. That is, to tackle a mapping enterprise that, at its heart, 
attempted to generate a new way of doing politics through a mobile, navigational platform. The 
‘disruption’ itself comprised of a number of techniques that radically re-interpreted the way that 
activists were able to arrest change in the world. ‘Under communicative capitalism’, as Jodi Dean 
(2016, 13) suggests, ‘the democratic claim for the crowd reinforces and is reinforced by the 
hegemony of ideals of decentralization and self-organization’. Sukey offered the tantalizing 
possibility of furthering both these ideals.   
For years the so-called ‘A-to-B’ demonstration has dominated public forms of protest in the UK. 
Such demonstrations typically consist of a start point (‘A’) and an end point (‘B’), with participants 
marching along a pre-determined route; hence the phrase ‘A-to-B’ demonstration. Yet for many 
activists, its disruptive capacity has been radically reduced in recent times, with all manner of 
restrictions imposed, including attempts to charge event organizers for traffic management and 
road closures (Doward 2015, Evans 2015). For activists, this was labelled as but another ‘death 
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knell for A-to-B marches’ (Sketchley 2015, n.p.), with others in favour of ‘A-to-B-to-C-to-D’ actions 
(Asquith 2015, n.p.). Sukey, however, was designed for neither of these linear activities.       
But this disruption did not aim to transform a pre-existing cartographic market. It was not 
launched to challenge Google Maps, to displace the UK Ordnance Survey or even to usurp 
OpenStreetMap (OSM). It was not a commercial start-up, a new state-funded enterprise nor even 
a mass open-knowledge project. Instead, Sukey was a more specific mapping platform designed 
to deal with a particular kind of scenario. The scene I’ve just set – of student activists kettled during 
protests in central London – was repeated on multiple occasions from 2010-2015. Yet it was never 
quite the same each time. The containment’s unpredictable nature generated a continuously fluid 
protest environment.  
Yet it was also an opportunity. December 10th 2010 was therefore a watershed. Not only did it 
culminate in the most visceral, physical and bodily moment of state power in the form of the 
Westminster Bridge kettle; but it also sowed the seeds of a novel, radical counter-force. That this 
counter-force was cartographic in nature is important. Maps have long been deployed for critical 
use – as counter-maps, tactical maps, autonomous maps and much more. So too had digital 
technologies been deployed for activist purposes. Moreover, maps have long been used in 
demonstrations: as navigational tools, in information leaflets, and as planning documents. But 
never before had they come together to provide a platform to aid both disruption and safety in 
the middle of a protest event. Never before had activists been able to utilize the power of a digital 
platform that could crowdsource the navigational knowledge of those protesting, and distribute 
it to the assembled crowd in minutes. That it did so with minimal resources and in little time is 
perhaps even more surprising.  
But what, precisely, was this all for? If its efforts were not to commercialize geographic data, to 
provide overwhelmingly comprehensive cartographic data, or to universalize the data-collection 
process what exactly did it do? In short, it aided protester mobility. 2010-2015 was unmistakably 
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a period defined by mobile forms of protest best encapsulated in the idiom ‘cat-and-mouse 
games’. Dating, allegedly, from 1675, the term variously refers to ‘the act of toying or tormenting 
something before destroying it’ or alternatively ‘a contrived action involving constant pursuit, 
near captures, and repeated escapes’ (Merriam-Webster 2016, n.p.). Cat-and-mouse games are 
similarly defined elsewhere as a ‘series of cunning manoeuvres designed to thwart an opponent’ 
(Oxford Dictionaries 2016, n.p.) and a ‘relationship in which two parties closely monitor and 
challenge one another in a suspicious or self-protective manner, often because each party is 
attempting to gain an advantage over the other’ (Wiktionary 2016, n.p.). Just like in the Tom and 
Jerry cartoon, protesters and police would spend their time engaged in constant battles 
throughout central London, with neither sure of who might have nominally ‘won’.   
Fig 1.2 | Cat-and-mouse games. Source: The Real Social Network (Fales et al. 2012) 
Each of these definitions bring an element of this mobile protest to the fore. As Dan Hancox recalls, 
once again: 
Eventually, just before 9pm, the kettle appeared to open. At last! Freedom. And a pint. 
And a toilet. And some goddamn dinner. For about 60 seconds we walked south from 
Parliament Square towards the bridge, thinking it was over. But this was the most crushing 
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of false dawns: we were, it quickly became clear, merely being herded onto Westminster 
Bridge (the Germans call this kind of forced-march kettle a wanderkessel) – with lines of 
riot cops positioned halfway across the bridge, the others aggressively chased up the rear, 
closing us into an unhealthily confined space. Already exhausted, and increasingly angry 
and confused, this was when things got potentially life-threatening. (Hancox 2011a, 3) 
This false dawn, as Hancox writes, is akin to ‘the act of toying or tormenting something before 
destroying it’. Yet in other cases, these games were far more about ‘constant pursuit’ through the 
streets of London, as visualized perfectly in an unreleased film on the protests, The Real Social 
Network (Fales et al. 2012). As the frames show, the red pushpin narrowly avoids capture before 
making its escape down a side street and leaving the mass of police officers out of shot completely. 
Indeed, ‘cunning manoeuvres’ from both sides would repeatedly emphasize the importance of 
navigational knowledge. Some moments, such as the ‘Heddon Street split’ (see; chapter 9) 
demonstrated the pitfalls of being lost. Others, such as the second of two ‘rhizomatic actions’, 
illustrating the effect of such cunning. Throughout, the ‘two parties’ – of the activists and the 
police – would hold a deep suspicion of the other. That this was never quite resolved is the essence 
of the cat-and-mouse game.        
But the platform wasn’t just about disruption or mobility. It was built to ensure the safety of 
activists. In the weeks leading up to the tuition fee vote there had been numerous protests in 
London, Leeds, Sheffield, Edinburgh, Manchester and other cities around the UK (Coughlan 2010). 
In many of these local police forces had used containment manoeuvres to prevent widespread 
disorder. Increasingly, protesters were finding it necessary to have up-to-date information on the 
presence of police officers as well as the location of particular containments. It was then that the 
Sukey developers realized that some kind of navigational platform might be of use. If protesters 
became aware of containments forming at specific locations, whilst on the move themselves, they 
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would have the ability to change direction and avoid being kettled. In essence to avoid the 
exhaustion, anger and confusion experienced by those contained at previous demonstrations.      
That Sukey came to a muted end only four years after it launched – even before the celebration 
of NCAFC’s fifth birthday – is perhaps of the greatest surprise. The Guardian (Kingsley 2011), the 
BBC (Hudson and Price 2011), WIRED (Geere 2011) and The Economist (2011) all ran articles during 
its launch. As Patrick Kingsley wrote at the time ‘[a] group of young computer geeks is wielding a 
new weapon in the fight against controversial police tactics at demonstrations’ (Kingsley 2011, 
n.p.), whilst Alex Hudson and Peter Price suggested that ‘new technology’ such as the Sukey 
platform was ‘threatening to change protests forever’ (Hudson and Price 2011, n.p.). The 
technology press, equally as enchanted by its emergence, was quick the push its ‘open’ values 
‘meaning that people around the world could adapt it for their own protests’ (Bryant 2011, n.p.), 
whilst still ‘opening a line for dialogue between protesters and the authorities’ during such 
demonstrations (Doctorow 2011, n.p.). This was, as many had it at the time, to be a radical new 
way of communicating and doing politics.     
But there was no final, rousing fanfare nor parting words from its developers. October 20th 2012 
saw the roll-out of an entirely new version – Sukey 3.0 – that was designed to take a more 
wholesale approach to mapping protest events; entailing not just the communication of police 
containments but also the posting of funny banners and signs. Despite an extensive re-brand, it 
was to be Sukey’s final hurrah. Those involved quietly left to pursue other projects, still in a similar 
activist vein, but still radically different from the live, mobile, digital mapping of protest events.   
As such, this thesis is also an interrogation of the risks that were taken to develop the project and, 
ultimately, the so-called ‘failures’ that lead to its demise. Yet this is not to be a tale of sorrow; of 
how a revolutionary mapping project came to be so short-lived. Instead, it is an unpacking of the 
situated-ness of digital mapping ideology, and the struggles inherent to any technological project. 
These struggles are many. Some are cartographic in nature: not only how can one ‘capture’ 
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movements, less still map them; but also how one can map them fast, reliably, and accurately. 
These devilish issues would never quite disappear; always lingering around ready to cause a 
nuisance yet again. Others were epistemological in form concerning the flow of navigational 
knowledges: what or who could be trusted to communicate the correct information? Again, these 
issues would never quite vanish completely. Further still, some were bodily: how could one stay 
safe – both in physical and identity terms – and still protest? What would it mean to be 
compromised in such a situation? The risks, for developers and collaborators, were contingent 
and nonetheless real for it.   
The years 2010-2015 have been dominated by an unprecedented proliferation of digital, mobile, 
technologies that have changed how we navigate and conceive of space and place. Along with this 
they have radically re-arranged our ideas on (and responses to) privacy, security, identity and 
action. These years have been dominated by an array of platforms, applications and services that 
have pushed these very concerns to the far-reaches of acceptability – as much technological 
innovation does. Few survive. Yet despite the general acknowledgement that the capitalist world 
is fierce and competition is strong, little attention is paid to those that fall by the wayside. 
Occasionally we mourn their loss in nostalgic fits (what happened to the Walkman? Betamax?) 
but we do not cast critical attention for much longer than this. It is in these sustained critical 
interrogations that we are able to move beyond an array of tricky formations – such as binary 
modes of thought, speculative hyperbolism and blind optimism – that threaten a clearer 
understanding of these digital technological endeavours.  
The guiding interest throughout this thesis is how to ‘reanimate’ the recent cartographic past, 
whilst broadly furthering a non-representational approach to cartographic phenomena that takes 
into account the material, practiced engagement with digital mapping technologies. This has 
required the development of some rather novel techniques (see; chapter 6). It has required 
looking at pretty much everything other than the map itself, in some ways. Although this might 
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sound perverse to some, it has been entirely necessary in order to trace the connections and flows 
through and beyond cartographic representation. There is nothing particularly radical about 
looking beyond the map, however. Establishing its production and use has required researchers 
to do that for a considerable length of time, but with the rise of digital, mobile technology it has 
required this to be done so continuously, with attention cast to multiple locations often at the 
same time. ‘Dynamism’ is the defining term for this age.  
But like many things it is only when this dynamism stops – intentionally, momentarily, abruptly, 
or accidently – that we discover its true working. In order to comprehend this dynamism, then, it 
is not only possible to approach it after the thing has run its course, but also entirely necessary to 
do so. Put otherwise: attending to the long-tail of technological development and demise is critical 
to an interrogation of its force and impact on wider social and political life. Whilst much of the 
empirical work undertaken for this thesis was done after the end of the Sukey project, this is not 
to say it is uninformed by the time in which it did operate. Sukey never formally and publically 
ended. There were no consumers to address or investors and shareholders to contact. There was 
no delisting, no outcry or even a last hurrah. Instead, it quietly slipped away. This thesis is an 
extension of work undertaken during an MSc. in Geographical Information Science (GIS) at the 
University of Manchester, carried out at the zenith of its operation, when Guardian reporters 
spent a day in their hackspace, the technology media proclaimed the start of a revolution and BBC 
News were keen to speculate on its rise. Since then, the thesis has – by necessity – taken a 
dramatically different turn from the direction one would have imagined at the time.    
Some would call the ending of such a cartographic project a ‘failure’. Indeed, that was my initial 
thought back in October 2012 when the platform was launched for the final time. Chapter 10 deals 
with this apparent ‘failure’, without diametrically opposing it to ‘success’. Yet it is often valorized 
as a necessary state through which all – people, projects, things – must travel. This is immortalized 
in Samuel Beckett’s quote ‘ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail better.’ Yet, to the 
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student activists kettled on Westminster Bridge in cold, wet and dark conditions in December 
2010, ‘failing better’ would ultimately result in yet more police containments, more cold, wet 
nights without reason; yet more ‘preemptive’ arrests; and yet more ineffective protests. 
Thus, failure must be conceived as neither of these states. Neither as an antonym consisting of a 
‘lack’ of success, nor as a desirable state indicative of an entrepreneurial ideology. Instead, failure 
must be considered more radically; with success and failure co-constitutive. In every success there 
is failure, and vice-versa. Thus, it is necessary to envelope any mention of ‘failure’ in this thesis 
with the requisite quotation marks. Allison Hui’s use of the phrase ‘intermittent accomplishments’ 
(Hui 2012, 206) is more than apt to deal with this co-constitution. Digital technologies are not 
defined either by their initial success nor their final failure. Sukey not only ‘threaten[ed] to change 
protests forever’ it actually did so.           
This is why Sukey has to be interrogated. Firstly, its impact lives on: in new technologies, new 
political engagements and new activist identities. In short, there is a cartographic legacy that 
needs to be addressed. Secondly, there was no ‘failure’ in the common meaning of the phrase as 
a ‘lack’ or an ‘absence’ of sorts. Failure is as productive as success itself, providing space for new 
ideas, things and opportunities. But that is not to say that it did not reach the limitations of 
cartographic thought and action. Indeed, it did just that. But still, it was no failure. This thesis is 
an attempt to answer how and why it can be considered in this way.   
 
Thesis Outline and Research Questions 
As a general aim, the PhD thesis interrogates the impact of digital mapping technologies on 
protest events in the UK. The main case study – a now-defunct ‘anti-kettling’ digital mapping 
platform called Sukey – operated between 2010-12 in order to keep protesters ‘safe, mobile and 
informed’ (Sukey 2012, n.p.) during student and anti-austerity demonstrations in London. It is still 
the only ‘live’, collaborative, mobile mapping platform developed for, and deployed within, an 
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urban protest environment. This cartographic uniqueness was the source of its demise, yet despite 
much media coverage at the time, its impact – on protest, on mapping, on forms of urban play, 
on concepts of risk and on the digital – is at yet significantly under-theorized. 
In order to interrogate the impact of the Sukey platform, I employ an automobile metaphor as a 
methodological framework. Conceiving of a digital mapping assemblage as a multitude of 
interlocking, mutually-dependent parts goes some way to aiding the description, analysis and 
evaluation of its form, function and force. As I have already noted interrogating the map involves, 
for the most part, exploring everything but the map. Through the deployment of the automobile 
metaphor, I argue that it becomes possible to comprehend all various parts in the mapping 
assemblage without recourse to binaries between production and consumption, mappers and the 
mapped, object and practice. Instead, the metaphor brings all these into play – maybe not all at 
once, but certainly on occasion. As such the empirical chapters are split according to their 
function: as ‘engine’, ‘windscreen’ and ‘wheels’ of the metaphorical automobile.  
The reason for using a metaphor as a structural device in the thesis is manifold. Firstly, the 
integrated and ‘holistic’ form of the automobile helps to explain the necessarily integrative form 
of the mapping assemblage. In this, the map is not disconnected from the device upon which it is 
viewed, and neither is its production shorn from its use. Mapping practice, thus, is equally both 
the capturing of geographic data and the collaborative deployment of such for navigational 
purposes. Secondly, the ‘mobility’ of the car emphasizes the ‘manoeuvrability’ of activists and 
police officers during protest events. Despite being a slightly unwieldy term, ‘manoeuvre’ is the 
most appropriate to describe the collective, practiced, honed and executed movements 
performed both by activists and police officers during demonstrations. Thirdly, the double 
definition of the car windscreen as an ‘interface’ – both selective shield and aesthetic medium – 
allows one to tie the visualization and subsequent calculation of geographic data to the practice 
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of navigating and, ultimately, moving. The interface enables the execution of decisions on how 
and where to move. This is a critical part of the thesis.     
Accordingly, the thesis asks three specific research questions: 
 What aesthetic and interactive elements underpin the digital mapping enterprise? How 
do they power it? 
 How are navigational knowledges generated through calculative, cartographic practices?  
 How does/did the platform facilitate ‘disruptive activities’ during protest events?    
However, to consider these questions requires an unpacking of their constituent parts. Akin to 
taking apart a motor vehicle, this genealogical, conceptual and tactical approach will aim to 
explore the forms and flows that, I argue, comprise the digital mapping assemblage otherwise 
called Sukey. Only in the methodological chapter will these forces come back together under their 
umbrella terms – as engine, as windscreen and as wheels.    
To understand these ‘disruptive activities’, chapter 1 explores the recent history of public order 
policing in the UK, as well as the development of activist manoeuvres. A plethora of techniques 
have been exercised by the police over the last 30 years, and are characterized by two recent, 
distinct operational phases: a territorial switch and a ‘data-driven’ shift. The first of these arose in 
the 1990s as the benefits of containing (‘kettling’) usurped the benefits of dispersing protesters 
during demonstrations. The most recent of these, increasingly dominant since the mid-2000s, has 
seen public order policing exercise ‘anticipatory’ techniques to minimize the potential for future 
disruption at demonstrations. Only in tracing these shifts can one start to contextualize efforts by 
protesters to disrupt urban life beyond the routed, ‘A-to-B’ demonstration. Then, three activist 
manoeuvres will be detailed: the occupation, the ‘splinter’ and the ‘rhizome’. I argue that each 
has been devised as a particular response to (a) containments and (b) A-to-B protests.    
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Appropriately, in the next chapter I develop the term ‘disruptive cartographies’ to grapple with 
these recent data-driven shifts. Whilst necessarily situated in a wider discourse on disruptive 
technologies and disruptive platforms (such as the ridesharing application Uber), it also is 
primarily grounded in legal definitions on the tactical, territorial and spatial nature of public order 
policing in the UK. In other words, ‘disruption’ is a key dynamic through which any potential 
protest mapping platform must operate. Nevertheless, it takes inspiration from and works 
through a range of other critical cartographic terms in order to augment this argument, with 
‘tactical cartography’ and ‘autonomous cartography’ deserving of particular attention.   
 
Fig 1.3 | A-to-B  
In chapter 4, I look to how the digital mapping interface has enabled this disruptive activity to be 
performed. Firstly, through a re-purposing of an ‘8-bit’ aesthetic that playfully positioned the 
platform as an independent, counter-cultural project rather than a slick, modern tool. Then 
secondly, through its operation as a mobile interface inviting or ‘affording’ particular kinds of 
interactions such as strokes, taps and double-taps. These coherent elements – aesthetic and 
interactive in nature – combine to streamline the ordering of cartographic phenomena.  
Yet the disruptive activities undertaken during protest events to evade police manoeuvres are not 
carried out risk-free. In fact, ‘risk’ is a state variously exercised, calculated, advanced as well as 
celebrated, intensified, mitigated against or sometimes ignored by activist navigating through 
protest events. To understand it, chapter 5 considers the concept of ‘calculable territory’ (Hannah 
2009, 66); a process through which geo-carto-territorial ambitions are realized. Yet little work has 
| 30 
 
been done on the calculable practices of non-sovereign bodies. This chapter seeks to change this 
by considering Sukey as a platform for generating ‘event-based knowledges’ (Hannah 2009, 68). 
Going further, however, I argue that disruptive cartographies operate through an anticipatory 
logic, working to calculate future as well as present situations that may threaten its efforts to map 
territory.   
In the methodology chapter I detail the interviews conducted, protest events attended and textual 
analysis undertaken in order to do justice to the digital mapping assemblage. I do so with the help 
of an automobile metaphor that looks variously at the ‘engine’, ‘windscreen’ and ‘wheels’ of the 
assemblage to think through how each becomes integral to its operation. In this, I aim to translate 
the conceptual chapters before – on manoeuvres, disruption, interfaces, risk and failure – into on-
the-ground empirical evidence as manifested in the words, gestures, actions and materials 
produced during and after the platform was live. 
Thus, the empirical chapters are divided according to this metaphor. In the first of these, I look 
into the ‘engine’ of the project comprising of various material and discursive elements both 
cartographic and para-cartographic in nature that ‘fuelled’ navigational possibilities. I evidence 
this with reference to promotional videos, platform logos, a ‘survival guide’ produced in the build-
up to one protest event, the platform’s shifting basemap, and the desired communication format 
as specified by the developers. Each, I argue, contributed significantly to the ongoing existence 
and utility of the platform.  
The second of these empirical chapters looks to how the platform enabled users to comprehend, 
calculate and make decisions regarding various phenomena. The navigational knowledges 
generated through it can be, I argue, divided into three ‘anticipatory layers’ each requiring a step-
change in efforts to map them. Sukey, I contend, relied on the pre-existing mapping of the built 
environment (buildings, streets) and temporary features (metal barriers, fences) put in place to 
manage crowd control during a protest event. Its primary role, therefore, was to capture and 
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communicate ‘active phenomena’. That is, to map collective manoeuvres performed both by 
police and other activists. This required a great – and perhaps impossible – degree of anticipation. 
In its absence ‘second-wave’ student activists became reliant on institutional knowledges ill-
equipped to deal with these active phenomena.    
The last of the empirical chapters explores four manoeuvres I refer to in turn as: ‘occupations’, 
‘splinters’, ‘rhizomes’ and ‘containments’. Whilst each entail very specific spatial forms and 
engagements, only one of these I argue was especially bound up in the deployment of a disruptive 
cartographic platform – the rhizome. In essence, the manoeuvre’s ‘cat-and-mouse’ nature (with 
protesters and police engaged in running, roving altercations) furthered a more mobile, playful 
kind of protest during the array of student and anti-austerity events in question. In any case, I 
illustrate each with reference to one or two moments witnessed during two protest events.  
By way of conclusion, I unpack three different failures of the Sukey platform. The first of these 
concerns the cartographic capture of phenomena, and the difficulty of anticipating future 
manoeuvres. The second points towards the inability of the platform to enable a continued 
‘correspondence’ between cartographic ‘signposts’ within demonstrations. The final failure, in a 
narrative emergent from interviews with developers and strategists in the Sukey team, concerns 
an overarching ‘crypto-cartographic’ failure that struggled to comprehensively deal with 
cartographic privacy necessitated by activists’ subjection to (or, at least paranoia of) data-driven 
anticipatory policing. In short, I suggest that this particular period of cartographic deployment is 
never to quite repeat itself again, due to the ‘consolidation’ of various data-driven techniques and 
approaches to managing street protests. Nevertheless, I posit what a ‘carto-future’ may look like 
in light of such revelations.    
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Chapter 2 | Manoeuvres   
 
In this chapter I explore the performance of collective, choreographed movements or ‘spatial 
manoeuvres’ practiced by both police officers and activists during a series of protest events in the 
UK, from 2010-2015. I do so in order to contextualize, historicize and situate the development of 
the Sukey platform.      
Since 2001, the containment or ‘kettle’ has risen to prominence as the most infamous public order 
policing manoeuvre deployed during protest events. First devised by the German police, it was 
used against anti-nuclear demonstrators in Hamburg in 1986 (Sørli 2012, Wood 2014). However, 
up until 2001, public order policing in the UK was focused strictly on dispersing protesters. 
Following the Poll Tax Riots (1990) there was a gradual switch in operational emphasis to the 
containment of protesters during demonstrations, in order to prevent possible outbreaks of 
disorder (Waddington 2009). I argue that the manoeuvre is part of a much longer ‘paramilitary 
drift’ (Northam 1988, 29) in public order policing in the UK stretching back 30 years.    
The containment has many forms. It can be deployed statically as an immobile enclosure, as a 
moving mass facilitating a mobile protest, in a ‘hyper’ form in order to compress protesters, or 
can be used with the help of physical infrastructure such as bridges and buildings. Whilst it is 
ostensibly a manoeuvre to enable the enclosure of a cluster of individuals, I argue that since 2010 
it has also been ‘data-driven’. In other words, that the containment manoeuvre has enabled the 
mass capture of personal data from those contained, akin to a digital variation of ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ (Harvey 2004, Thatcher et al. 2016), forming what Till Paasche (2013) has called 
‘coded police territories’. In so doing, it has morphed from a manoeuvre designed originally to 
prevent immediate or immanent disruption, to a manoeuvre ensuring the minimization of future 
disruptive activities.   
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In response to this, protesters have developed an equally ingenious set of manoeuvres. These 
build on an assortment of established knowledges and practices that have enabled the 
continuation of activist engagements during protest events in the UK and throughout the world. 
Each of these manoeuvres entail a different spatial logic, represented by a schematic diagram at 
the beginning of each section. I argue that not all were integrated with, or mediated by, the Sukey 
platform, and as such, did not all help to generate ‘cat-and-mouse games’. Nevertheless, each 
manoeuvre was deployed a) in order to counter police containments and b) to challenge 
regulated, anticipated and sanitized forms of public protest such as the so-called ‘A-to-B’ 
demonstration.   
This chapter proceeds by introducing three manoeuvres witnessed during two protest events in 
2014, and which are known to have been repeatedly performed at demonstrations held between 
2010 and 2015. The first of these manoeuvres is the ‘occupation’. In recent years it has seen a 
‘popular’ (Gerbaudo 2012, 10) and ‘populist’ (Laclau 2005) resurgence with encampments 
springing up everywhere from parks in New York and London, to squares in Cairo and Madrid. In 
all these instances, I suggest the rationale has been to establish new societal rules beyond such 
spaces by first establishing them in such spaces. Accordingly, the taking of space through 
occupation is concerned with territorial control. In so doing, efforts are directed to making public 
spaces safe and hospitable.  
Another manoeuvre I call the ‘splinter’. Differing in spatial form from the occupation, participants 
in a splinter do not ‘occupy’ space. Instead, the manoeuvre is a literal attempt to break away from 
pre-agreed A-to-B demonstration routes. It cannot, following the definition I use, exist 
independently but must always form as an offshoot from a larger body of protesters. This, I 
contend, is both its greatest strength and weakness. Nevertheless, it satisfies a similar latent 
desire for disruption as the occupation of space; albeit in a resolutely more transient, mobile form.      
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The final manoeuvre is the ‘rhizome’. An empirical instantiation of Deleuze and Guattari’s (2011) 
favoured form, the rhizome is an intensive, mobile, unpredictable and ‘rootless’ manoeuvre 
deployed to maximize disruptive capacities during protest events. I argue that unlike the previous 
two manoeuvres the rhizome is neither the main body of the protest event (like an occupation) 
nor does it directly emerge from such (like a splinter), but is generated only from a latent force 
within and beyond it. The switch towards certain public order policing tactics created the 
conditions for, and precipitated the rise of, the Sukey platform in order to generate, mediate and 
communicate such efforts. I move on to evaluate the efficacy of these manoeuvres, in relation to 
the affordances of the Sukey platform, in chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
 
Containment: History, Form and Legality     
 
 
Fig 2.1 | Containment   
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As Lesley Wood (2014, 37) suggests, kettling techniques were used against German ‘anti-nuclear 
demonstrators’ in 1986, and according to Scott Sørli (2012, 2) ‘the earliest well-documented police 
kettle occurred in Hamburg on 8 June 1986’. It has since become the principally deployed 
manoeuvre in public order situations in the UK, being transported from mainland Europe in 1995 
and deployed against ‘disability rights protesters’ in Parliament Square (Wood 2014, 37). However 
it was only in 2001 that the manoeuvre morphed into a more recognizable form when deployed 
during a May Day demonstration, to contain 1,000 protesters at Oxford Circus (Guardian 2001). 
Peter Waddington suggests it was developed in response to the Poll Tax Riot (1990), during which 
dispersal tactics used on the day were largely ‘counter-productive’, succeeding in ‘spreading the 
disorder that had occurred in Trafalgar Square throughout the West End’, rather than diminishing 
it (Waddington 2009, n.p.). 
The Guardian report from the May Day event draws attention to some of the key dynamics that 
continue to govern its use. The containment itself lasted for over 4 hours, beginning at 2.45pm. 
At 3.21pm, ‘regular uniformed’ officers are replaced with (or transform into) ‘officers in riot gear’ 
(Guardian 2001, n.p.). At 4.15pm an announcement is made informing those within that they are 
being contained to prevent further disorder (Guardian 2001, n.p.). At 7.20pm activists are only 
released on the condition they are searched and photographed (Guardian 2001, n.p.). Each of 
these elements – the use of riot police, communication of conditions of containment, and personal 
data-collection for evidence-gathering and forward-intelligence purposes – continued to define 
the use of containments from 2010 to 2015. Some, I argue, have intensified in a ‘data-driven’ era.   
Scott Sørli (2012) identifies four different kinds of containments. The first of these is a ‘police 
kettle’ (polizeikessel) and refers to the most common, static containment. The second is the 
‘wandering kettle’ (wanderkessel); a type of moving containment in which the police ‘arrange 
themselves in front of, to the sides of, and behind protesters as they march’ (Sørli 2012, 2). In such 
a manoeuvre the police have control over the territorial extent of the protesters encircled, 
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resulting in the ability to exercise this spatial power as and when desired. The third type identified 
by Sørli does not have a direct German translation, but is referred to as a ‘hyper kettle’ and also 
rather ominously as a ‘compression machine’ (Sørli 2012, 2). In this the police ‘link arms, push 
forward firmly, compressing people against each other and any available building facades’, or as 
Joyce and Wain describe, such a manoeuvre involves the police ‘containing protesters in a cordon 
and gradually decreasing the space inside’ (Joyce and Wain 2014, 155). ‘Bridge kettling’ is the final 
type of containment, the earliest of which, according to Sørli ‘occurred on the Pont de la 
Guillotière in Lyon, on 20 October 2010’ (Sørli 2012, 2). More infamous, however, was the 
Westminster Bridge containment during the student demonstrations in December 2010, as vividly 
documented by the journalist Dan Hancox (2011a, 2011b).       
 
Fig 2.2 | Timeline of public order policing in the UK  
The containment is often characterized as a preventative measure of ‘last resort’. However, with 
an increasing ‘(para-)militarization’ of protest policing within the UK over the last 30 years (see; 
1986 | Introduction of Public Order Act. Imposes a number of restrictions on public protest. 
Codifies ‘disruption’ for the first time.   
June 1986 | First use of a containment (wanderkessel) in Hamburg, Germany at an anti-
nuclear demonstration. 
March 1990 | Poll Tax riots, London. Significant disorder across central London. 
1990 | Slow transition from primacy of tactics of dispersal to containment begins.  
October 1995 | First recorded use of a containment in the UK, at a disability rights 
demonstration in Parliament Square, London.  
June 1999 | J18 ‘Squaring up to the Square Mile’ demonstration, City of London. Dispersal 
tactics still prevalent.  
May 2001 | Significant use of containments at a May Day demonstration in Trafalgar Square, 
London. Leads to a succession of legal challenges regarding its indiscriminate nature (Austin).   
April 2009 | G20 protests, City of London. Widespread use of containments.   
June 2009 | Home Affairs Committee release ‘Policing of the G20 Protests’ report. New 
guidelines regarding the deployment of containments drawn up.   
December 2010 | Students, journalists and others contained on Westminster Bridge during 
anti-tuition fee rise protests. Sukey 1.0 is launched.    
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Jefferson 1987, 1993; Waddington 1987, 1993; Northam 1988; Hills 1995; Della Porta and Reiter 
1998; Reiner 1998) and a more recent ‘militarization’ in the US1 (Elmer and Opel 2008, Wood 
2014), its frequent use during student and anti-austerity demonstrations in the UK was widely 
scrutinized. Previous to May Day (2001) the principle public order policing tactic involved the 
dispersal of protesters. The ‘Carnival Against Capitalism’ (or, J18) in 1999, I contend, was the last 
protest event in the UK at which the dispersal of protesters took precedent over containment. A 
copy of an action map designed for the event and distributed in advance of it exists within the 56A 
Infoshop in Southwark, south London. Arguably the map’s production, along with the disruption 
it caused, led to a wholesale change in public order policing in the UK.     
Map 2.1 | J18 ‘Squaring up to the Square Mile’ map  
                                                          
1 Although the history of kettling is more commonly Anglo-Germanic, one of the most infamous 
deployments occurred during a G20 protest in Toronto in June 2010. As Neil Smith and Deborah Cowen 
(2010, 29) note, this ‘effective siege’ led to the ‘arrest and jailing of a larger number of people…than in any 
other event in Canadian history, with ‘more than 1100 people…arrested and detained’ (Smith and Cowen 
2010, 29). Over five years since the Toronto G20 containment, Superintendent Mark Fenton of the 
Toronto Police Services was found guilty of ‘unlawful or unnecessary arrest…’ (Krishnan 2015, n.p.) of 260 
people, in one containment, on a single day.  
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Whether in static, mobile, ‘hyper’ or ‘bridge’ forms, a containment is deployed to curtail the 
disruptive capacity of an assembled crowd by denying them territorial possibilities. Whilst the 
objective of ‘confin[ing] rioters to a defined area’ might have been listed in the original Public 
Order Manual (1984) (see; Northam 1988, 183), with various manoeuvres such as the ‘wedge’ and 
the ‘cordon’ noted, the more specific art of creating a containment in order to minimize disruption 
is a recent phenomenon.2  
It is described as a ‘contingency tactic to be used when alternative tactics to prevent serious 
disorder, serious injury or loss of life have failed or are expected to fail’ (NPIA 2010, 110). 
Although, ‘[i]n some circumstances the tactic may have other objectives (e.g., to prevent crime, 
arrest offenders)’ (2010, 110). Those who find themselves in a containment are not permitted to 
leave until senior officers are satisfied the threat of disruption has significantly diminished. During 
the May Day demonstration in 2001 this was over 4 hours. On Westminster Bridge in December 
2010 it was a similar length of time (Hancox 2011c). As is suggested in the National Policing 
Improvement Agency’s (NPIA) Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace (2010, 110); 
‘[c]ontainment[s] should last only as long as is reasonably required’ with this criteria being decided 
by operational police command.  
In 2005 a legal case was brought to the High Court by Lois Austin and Geoffrey Saxby to claim 
damages for ‘false imprisonment and a breach of… [the] right to liberty under the European 
Convention [on Human Rights]’ (Guardian 2005, n.p.) after being contained during the May Day 
demonstration in 2001. Following an unsuccessful appeal in 2007, the case was then heard in the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The original decision was upheld (BBC News 2012), with 
the judges ruling it was the ‘least intrusive and most effective’ tactic available to the police at the 
                                                          
2 The Public Order Manual of Tactical Options and Related Matters was composed by the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 1984 to codify public order policing tactics and manoeuvres. Its existence 
was only made public following the collapsed Orgreave Trial in 1985. It continues to exist in an adapted 
form today. For a comprehensive, but likely outdated version see ACPO (2004). The NPIA’s Manual of 
Guidance on Keeping the Peace (2010) is the most recent public derivative of the original manual.        
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time (Lewis 2012, n.p.). However, despite this, the ECtHR concluded that kettling ‘must only be 
done in the face of an imminent breach of the peace, must be done in good faith, must be 
proportionate and must be done for no longer than is reasonably necessary.’ (Scorer 2012, n.p.). 
These multiple rulings, along with recommendations made by the Home Affairs Committee (2009) 
following the G20 demonstrations, have pressured police forces in the UK into setting more 
rigorous guidelines for deploying containment manoeuvres during public order situations. 
However, as incidents during student and anti-austerity demonstrations from 2010-2015 have 
shown, it is debatable as to whether these factors are actually taken into consideration.         
 
Etymology; as Concept  
Polly put the kettle on, 
Polly put the kettle on, 
Polly put the kettle on, 
We’ll all have tea. 
 
Sukey take it off again, 
Sukey take it off again, 
Sukey take it off again, 
They’ve all gone away. 
Traditional Nursery Rhyme derived from ‘Jenny’s Baubie’ by Joseph Dale (1803) 
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The English language noun ‘kettle’ derives from the German verb einkesseln (‘to surround’ or ‘to 
encircle’) and the past participle eingekesselt. The root of both of these – kessel – also has more 
topographical connections; referring to a mountainous feature that surrounds or encircles a low-
lying area such as a plain or valley.3 In English, the word kettle only refers to a vessel that boils 
water. In German the direct translation is a cauldron. Up until its recent deployment as a public 
order policing manoeuvre the word kettle had no associated verbs, such as ‘to kettle’ or ‘kettled’ 
– only existing as a noun to refer to the object itself. When one boils water in the kettle the term 
used is not ‘kettled’ only more generically as ‘boiled’. The traditional nursery rhyme that opens 
this section refers directly to this Anglicized definition.  
The nursery rhyme tells the story of an ingenious tactic hatched by Polly and her sister Susan 
(referred to as Sukey) who would, in order to avoid playing a game decided by their brothers, 
pretend to set up a tea party. Upon realizing what they were about to be forced to play, the 
brothers would run away in fear. The poem itself has two parts, the first of which concerns the 
apparent ‘putting on’ of a kettle in order scare the brothers into leaving. This setting-up would 
usually, as the story goes, scare them so much they would abandon any plan they had to get the 
sisters to play with them on their own terms. The second, arguably more devilish part, involves 
the ‘taking off’ of the kettle once the girls had realized their aim to scare their brothers away had 
been successful. The Sukey platform is named in homage to Polly’s sister Susan who promises to 
‘take off’ the kettle.  
There are four things to say based on this short reading of the nursery rhyme and the associated 
Germanic etymology of the term. Firstly, the act of kettling – despite its documented brutality – is 
derived most evidently in the English context from a playful, even devilish and devious, act in order 
to avoid an undesirable event occurring. Polly’s ‘putting of the kettle on’ is a scare tactic designed 
to force the dispersal of her brothers in order for them to avoid coercion into a game neither 
                                                          
3 My thanks go to Jana Wendler for this definition.  
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wishes to play. Containments are very often carried out in protests to the same effect with similar 
‘fake’ kettles deployed to scare protesters in dispersing. I will discuss the carrying out of such a 
‘fake’ containment during an NCAFC demonstration in chapter 9. Perhaps unlike in the nursery 
rhyme, however, if individuals ignore the threat the police will ordinarily carry through with it 
anyway; subjecting those to containment against their wishes.    
Secondly, from the Germanic root, kettling is a tactical endeavor devised in a military context. As 
Sørli (2012, 2) suggests, the ‘German word for military encirclement…is kesselschlact, literally 
‘cauldron battle’. Similarly, football stadiums are often referred to as kessels in the cauldron-like 
sense of the term. When the atmosphere becomes particularly charged in such it is referred to as 
a hexenkessel or a ‘witches’ cauldron’.4 Thus the containments executed during protest events in 
the UK are emblematic of the ‘paramilitary drift’ identified by Northam (1988, 29) in public order 
policing over the last 30 years, through which military and colonial policing manoeuvres have 
become codified as normal police tactics.  
Thirdly, back to the domesticated English definition, a kettle (or otherwise a kind of cauldron) 
involves the kinetic process of boiling in which liquid particles (usually water) become energized 
and turn into a gaseous form, creating steam. Thus the physical excitement of water particles is 
often metaphorically likened to the bodily responses by kettled individuals who, when contained 
in an ever-smaller and restricted space, are forced to either submit to the manoeuvre at hand or 
– like steam escaping from a boiling kettle – break out from it. Although presented as an equal 
choice (unlike the water particles that have only one option of escaping by transforming to a 
gaseous state), individuals usually have little opportunity other than to submit to what Rory 
Rowan calls the ‘logic of the kettle’ (Rowan 2010, n.p.). Although synonyms such as ‘pockets’ and 
‘corrals’ are often used in reference to containments, neither call forth the pressurizing force of it 
unlike the term kettle.     
                                                          
4 Thanks again to Jana Wendler for alerting me to this delightful turn of phrase.  
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Lastly, as suggested above, the kettle expresses a topographical formation. As such, the kettle 
does not simply refer to a temporary manoeuvre or deployable tactic performed by police officers 
or military personnel but an altogether more solid, enduring geographical feature. Such a 
formation allows clearer lines of sight from higher, surrounding terrain onto lower, surrounded 
positions. No other manoeuvre is deployed during protest events for as long as containments. 
Whilst kettles can range in duration from temporary cordons penning protesters in for minutes, 
they are routinely deployed to contain large volumes of demonstrators for hours. The reference 
to solid, enduring topographical features is therefore a relevant one. Further, this reference to a 
mountain range or similar – thus allowing for a hierarchical visioning of those below and encircled 
– is a relevant description of the surveillance practices performed in concert with the kettle itself.     
This is why, I argue, the noun ‘kettle’ and the verbs ‘to kettle’ and ‘kettling’ have entered public 
discourse so definitively. Unlike the administrative speak of containment; kettle, to kettle and 
kettling reference these playful-elemental-tactical-geo-territorial definitions directly. Although 
considered an inappropriate term by the Met, both ‘kettles’ and ‘kettling’ have been used liberally 
in traditional print and new web media, in tabloid and broadsheet publications as well as in the 
legal and technological press (see, for instance; Campbell 2009, Rowan 2010, Hudson and Price 
2011, Geere 2011, Ridler 2011, Whittaker 2011, CBC News 2012). In all English-language 
publications, ‘kettling’ has an unambiguous meaning referring to the act of public order police 
containment of protesters. As such, it is often more apt to use in place of the more general term 
‘containment’. I use both interchangeably throughout this thesis purely for variety.    
 
Data-driven Kettles 
Another aspect of the manoeuvre demonstrates an intensification in a new, data-driven age. In 
the Home Affairs Committee Report one of the identified failures of the policing effort during the 
G20 Protests in London in 2009 was the lack of communication both with those contained within 
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the kettles and between officers – as well as more obvious failures concerning the use of force. 
Within it, the committee proposed that: 
The police and HMIC [Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary] should consider 
whether it would be better, as far as possible, to use intelligence to identify potentially 
violent protesters and contain them while simultaneously filtering out small groups of 
peaceful protesters. This would reduce the need for “mass” clearances, limit the use of 
force (as the contained area would be that much smaller), be a more efficient use of 
resources and be more in the spirit of the Austin ruling. (Home Affairs Committee 2009, 
17, emphasis added) 
Whilst varying intelligence units have existed within public order policing operations in the UK for 
a considerable length of time (at least pre-2004), both Forward Intelligence Teams (FITs) and 
Evidence Gathering Teams (EGTs) have come to form a central role in relation to the most recent 
deployment of containments during the period between 2010 and 2015. Both FITs and EGTs 
provide senior officers with intelligence that aid in compliance with identified good practice and 
the legal restrictions laid down in the Austin ruling. This is what has variously been termed 
‘predictive’ or ‘preemptive policing’ (Graham 2011, Paasche 2013). Whilst the physical act of 
restricting the movement of protesters on the day of an event may prevent disorder being carried 
out there and then it is rather less equipped at dealing with disorder in the near future (the next 
week, etc.) or on the general horizon or distant future (the forthcoming months, years, etc.). FITs 
and EGTs allow the police to anticipate future actions by collecting data on those contained within 
a kettle.  
One of the perceived reasons for the proliferation of disorder during the London riots in 2011, as 
speculated on by Bloom (2012) and others (Halliday 2011) was the rise of private, mobile 
messaging platforms such as Blackberry Messenger (BBM). As James Ball and Symeon Brown 
(2011, n.p.) wrote in the Guardian; ‘[t]he free, secure BBM service was an easy way to share 
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information on where riots were and what police were doing’. It was during the riots that, as 
Raekha Prasad and Yemisi Adegoke (2012, n.p.) add; ‘the gap between police intelligence and 
what people in riot-affected communities knew about pending unrest was often glaring’. In the 
years since, similar platforms to BBM have become ubiquitous. Although Whatsapp is a market 
leader, Facebook Messenger, Telegram and Snapchat are all major players broadly offering the 
same private, mobile, cross-device, multi-media and social communications experience. The 
period of student and anti-austerity protest from 2010 to 2015 is defined by this technological 
revolution in which the nature of communication prior to, during and after such events has 
changed radically.  
A little-known ‘text-message broadcast system’ (Hirsch and Henry 2005, n.p.) called TXTmob was 
the first to be used to organize activists digitally, on-the-go, and in response to the rise of ‘strategic 
incapacitation tactics’ such as ‘no-protest zones, less lethal weapons, and strategic arrests’ (Zajko 
and Béland 2008, 721). As the Invisible Committee (2014, 1) recall, it was: 
…invented by American activists [the Institute for Applied Autonomy, or IAA] as a way to 
coordinate via cellphones during protests against the Republican National Convention in 
2004. The application was used by some 5000 people to share real-time information about 
the different actions and movements of the police. Twitter, launched two years later, was 
used for similar purposes…     
Thus I argue that, in concert with new developments in forward-intelligence and evidence-
gathering, the containment has been deployed at contemporary protests as a form of data-
gathering on organizers, participants and sympathizers via photographic, textual, video and 
cartographic means. The rise of rudimentary communication platforms such as TXTmob 
intensified, rather than merely gave birth to, these efforts.    
Indirectly, containments offer data-collection possibilities; often being ‘viewed by the police as a 
source of valuable intelligence’ (Network for Police Monitoring [Netpol] 2015, n.p.) in order to 
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profile activist identities, relationships, connections and for use at future events. Although the 
handing over of personal data on the condition of release is now unlawful in the UK,5 the mass 
arrest of all those contained is still common. In fact, the largest ever mass arrests witnessed in the 
UK have also been the result of kettles deployed in the last five years. All of these have occurred 
on the streets of London, and have been conducted by the Met.   
On most of these occasions individuals were neither charged, nor convicted, of a public order 
offence. 145 arrests were made in a containment at the Fortnum & Mason department store 
during an anti-austerity demonstration in 2011 (Bastani 2013), 182 cyclists were arrested under 
similar circumstances during a Critical Mass event near the Olympic Stadium in July 2012 (Netpol 
2012), a further 59 were arrested during an anti-British National Party (BNP) demonstration in 
central London in June 2013 (Dee 2014), and another 286 shared the same fate during a counter-
protest to the English Defence League (EDL) in east London in September 2013 (Netpol 2013). The 
latter of these is the largest mass arrest in British history. 10 were found guilty in relation to the 
first (Malik 2011), 5 more a result of the second (Richards 2013), a case involving another 5 in the 
third collapsed due to a lack of evidence, and only a further 2 are known to have been charged in 
the final case (Dee 2014).6  
This emphasis on anticipating future actions by way of collecting data on activists, en masse, is 
dependent upon associative forms of profiling that have become prevalent in a big data era. 
Emergent within the ‘diverse worlds of risk management consulting, computer science, 
commercial logistics, and data visualization’ (Amoore 2013, n.p.) these new calculative methods 
                                                          
5 See; Mengesha vs. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2013): 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2013/1695.html  
6 Across these four landmark events a total of 17 people have been found guilty of a mixture of crimes 
including aggravated trespass (Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, n.p.), failure to remove an item 
of clothing used to conceal identity (such as a scarf or bandana – Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994, n.p.), and other minor public order offences, out of a grand total of 672 originally kettled and 
arrested. No single individual was convicted of a serious public order offence under the Public Order Act 
(1986).  
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ascribe value to individual data points (name, age, date of birth) by connecting them. Novel 
streams of data produced by an array of digital devices (smartphones, cameras, GPS receiver, etc.), 
and coded objects (credit cards, building access cards, etc.) in a variety of circumstances 
(purchasing goods, travelling internationally, applying for credit, etc.) can be drawn together to 
form algorithmic ‘rules of association’ (Amoore 2009, 51). These otherwise invisible connections 
are thus rendered visible, for the purposes of making ‘actionable security decisions’ (Amoore 
2009, 52, original emphasis). ‘By connecting the dots of probabilistic associations, the algorithm 
becomes a means of foreseeing or anticipating a course of events yet to take place’ (Amoore 2009, 
52). As Transmediale (2015, n.p., original emphasis) critically suggest, it is these methods that have 
led to ‘[l]ife… being increasingly governed by a logic of capture all as a never-ending enterprise of 
predictive control’.  
Although these associative methods of data analysis are perhaps best witnessed in relation to 
sovereign border control – as discussed in chapter 5 – they are equally deployed in relation to 
what officials in the UK now call ‘domestic terrorism’. That is to say, activists engaged in the 
organization and attendance of protest events such as student and anti-austerity demonstrations. 
That this procedure often relies on the mass collection of data from containments initiated at 
protest events is thus a marked intensification of the manoeuvre in relation to a pre-data-driven 
era. In the next section I wish to explore the other side to this battle: through the manoeuvres 
devised, developed and deployed by activists in response to containments.    
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Occupation  
 
 
Fig 2.3 | Occupation 
The 2010 student movement began with a series of occupations of UCL lecture rooms. Whilst it is 
a well-established activist tactic (see; Pickerill and Krinsky 2012), ostensibly public occupations – 
such as Occupy London or Movimiento 15M (15M) in Madrid – do not necessarily or directly 
involve seizing the means of production nor re-valorizing nominally empty or underused spaces. 
Instead, such occupations are rendered as semi-permanent protest camps (Feigenbaum et al. 
2013) or autonomous spaces (Abellán et al. 2012). The purpose, therefore, is not so much related 
to concrete material processes per se (unfair working conditions, absentee landlords, etc.), but 
dedicated to the reclamation of public (or quasi-public) space. This is emblematic of a distinctive 
‘populist’ (Laclau 2005) turn in political identity and contemporary society.    
To this end, occupations must first involve the undoing of existing spatial relations (this space is 
not what it was), through a process of abstraction (this space is interchangeable), followed (if 
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successful) by an importation of a new, previously suppressed or ignored set of socio-spatial 
relations (this space is now something different). In all cases the occupiers seek to overcome 
existing sovereign power in such spaces in order to govern alternatively, often to nullify its 
administrative legacy ‘as if it was never there’. Barker’s (2012) critique of Occupy Wall Street 
gestures precisely towards this effort, with occupations driven by the ‘emerging logics of 
aggregation’ (Juris 2012, 259).   
Yet, the occupying manoeuvre is a contingent one governed by its own precarity. As a collective, 
resistant force, it is a transient, temporary manoeuvre that does not always seek an immediate 
legacy in the public space it occupies. The main aim of the Occupy movement, therefore, was not 
the taking of public space, per se, but the transformation and democratization of society. Those 
that nominally fail (see; Alimi 2012, Zamponi 2012) do so for a variety of structural, organizational 
and symbolic reasons. Yet even the more long-standing Occupy camps – Wall Street, St Paul’s – 
nevertheless generated some unresolvable tensions (Anonymous 2012, Halvorsen 2015).  
The mechanics of any occupation must, despite this acknowledged precarity, be built to make 
space hospitable. It is not, as will be discussed in chapter 9, a manoeuvre designed to outflank, 
evade or avoid any police containment tactics. Instead, its main force is in locating and 
entrenching a particular space that makes police containment, if not impossible, then, 
undesirable. In other words, an occupying manoeuvre seeks to render a containment useless or 
impractical. As Halvorsen suggests in relation to Occupy London: 
…taking space involved a tension between moments of rupture and, lived space times of 
intensity that provide an opening to new possibilities, and everyday life, the routines and 
rhythms through which social life is reproduced, a tension that was made visible in the 
contrast between the two camps [of St Paul’s and Finsbury Square]. (Halvorsen 2015, 402, 
original emphasis) 
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Thus, the encampments Halvorsen speaks of were not solely dedicated to generating ‘moments 
of excess’ (Free Association 2011, 33) ‘ephemeral’ (Cobarrubias and Pickles 2009, 37) or 
otherwise; despite the obvious euphoria that comes with taking space. But more accurately, 
‘these ruptures took the form of particular territories, occupied spaces from which new social 
relations and values are created’ (Halvorsen 2015, 403). In essence they became – at least in an 
idealized if not wholly realized form – spaces of habitation and care necessarily oriented towards 
social reproduction.        
Nevertheless, it is through this framing that we can understand the motives for occupation as a 
contemporary manoeuvre in and of itself – as well as a counter-manoeuvre against the 
containment. The occupations I focus on here were carried out during a TUC demonstration in 
London on October 18th 2014, and during a NCAFC demonstration in London on November 19th 
2014.   
 
Splinter  
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Fig 2.4 | Splinter  
The ‘splinter’ is an altogether different beast. Commonly defined, it refers to a fragment or shard 
of material broken off from an object, such as a plank of wood, and inserted into another body. 
As such, it can only be defined in relation to this main object, which it is always significantly smaller 
in volume than. A splinter is invariably sharp, being violently shorn from the surface of this larger 
body. Moreover, it must be defined in relation to the softer, more unfortunate body subject to 
penetration by the splinter in question. Think of the way the splinter makes its way through the 
subcutaneous layer of human skin to lodge itself awkwardly inside. As a ‘foreign body’ splinters 
expose the delicate nature of the subject body, as well as the sharpness of the splinter and the 
volume of the main object. 
Synonyms for the splinter might include that of the fork. When a developer takes the original 
source code for a software project and develops their own version with it, it becomes known as a 
‘project fork’. Forking is common with open-source software projects as developers are not 
mandated to contact software license owners before doing so and as such, many open-source 
projects are the result of forked activities. For example, an early fork from the Spanish version of 
Wikipedia led to the creation of the Enciclopedia Libre Universal en Espanõl in 2002 (see; Tkacz 
2015). Yet there are differences between a splinter and a fork, most notably in the intensity of the 
split that each of them denotes. A splinter is sharp and the process of splintering gestures towards 
an abrupt moment and a certain connected pain. A fork, on the other hand, is more akin to a road 
travelled down (i.e. ‘a fork in the road’). Whilst similarly spatially-inclined, it does not connote the 
same degree of force that comes with a possible splinter. It is this force that is more appropriate 
for what I want to draw attention to here.   
As a metaphor for this second type of manoeuvre it is apt. Firstly, the splinter is always derived, 
and broken away from the main ‘body’ of the demonstration. Those who comprise what are often 
called ‘splinter marches’ are made-up of protesters originating from a main demonstration itself. 
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Reasons for doing so are various. Often they are pre-organized in advance of the main 
demonstration. On other occasions, they arise out of particular tactical, ‘of-the-moment’ decisions 
in order for protesters to, for example, evade the police. Secondly, the splinter is therefore 
significantly smaller than the total of the main body. They may comprise of anything between just 
a handful of people (5-10) to a much larger, more organized and planned splinter consisting of 
thousands. Thirdly, as splinters they also are defined through their penetration as foreign bodies 
into other subjects. In an urban setting this splintering usually results in protesters entering into 
non-designated protest areas in and around the ‘official’ protest route, often producing a rather 
strange juxtaposition between protesters and non-protesters (shoppers, tourists and workers, 
etc.). As such, they become foreign agents in an everyday urban space – shattering the boundaries 
between protest and non-protest.  
It is this effect – of disruption – that often justifies the protest splinter. Once again it is seen by 
many contemporary activists as a general response to the perceived lack of disruption offered by 
A-to-B demonstrations. The splinter march is an attempt to enact alternative courses of action 
before, during and after larger, unified demonstrations. As a result of these three dynamics the 
splinter is a direct challenge to the containment. Due to its umbilical relation to an otherwise 
routine, non-disruptive demonstration, the protagonists of a splinter can also hide in plain sight: 
as participants in the consensual operation of an A-to-B demonstration. The splinter I document 
in this thesis occurred during a TUC demonstration in London on October 18th 2014.     
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Rhizome  
 
Fig 2.5 | Rhizome 
The ‘rhizome’ is markedly different from previous manoeuvres. Unlike an occupation it does not 
seek to take space in order to hold on to it and to make it hospitable. Further, unlike the splinter 
it does not have an umbilical relationship with another form. In short, a ‘rhizomatic’ manoeuvre 
is a rootless tactic that endlessly seeks to colonize space but only temporarily. It is a manoeuvre 
that is eminently playful in the spatial unpredictability of its operation. In other words, it is the 
polar opposite of an A-to-B march – with no A or B point to proceedings. As such it is perhaps the 
containments’ ultimate enemy resulting in often balletic encounters that produce theatrical, 
‘frivolous’ or entirely farcical pursuits during protest events colloquially referred to as ‘cat-and-
mouse’ games between proponents of the manoeuvre and police (see; BBC News 2010, Fahy and 
Fitzgerald 2010, Rawlinson 2010, Thomas 2013).      
The term itself is derived from the Ancient Greek rhizoma meaning ‘mass or roots’ and rhizoo 
‘cause to strike root’. In botany and dendrology it refers to a subterranean plant stem with the 
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capacity to grow ‘diageotropically’. In other words, to travel in the direction of the earth’s 
gravitational pull (downwards) and in opposition to it (upwards). However it takes another, 
metaphorical, shape in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (2011). I am not the first to 
apply it in an activist context. Deleuze’s work is widely-quoted in relation to the Zapatista 
movement as well as Occupy itself (see; Nail 2012), whilst ‘assemblage theory’ credited to Deleuze 
and Guattari, and Manuel DeLanda (2006), has also been applied to the spatiality and organization 
of social movements (McFarlane 2009, Anderson and McFarlane 2011) as well as in relation to 
ideas around the ‘multitude’ and ‘swarm intelligence’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Tampio 2009). 
Yet as Michael Woods et al. (2013, 434) have suggested, ‘the full implications’ of employing the 
rhizome as a metaphor to describe social movements ‘are rarely teased out’, with only Deleuze’s 
‘commitment to joyful affirmation’ (Culp 2016, 2) considered. The intention here, is to apply it 
empirically, and critically, to spatial manoeuvres.  
Deleuze and Guattari (2011) identify six key properties of the rhizome that make it applicable to 
the cat-and-mouse games witnessed during the protest events detailed in this thesis. Firstly, 
rhizomes possess an endless connectivity through which other entities can be attached, re-
attached and detached: ‘any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2011, 7). There is no ‘core’, genealogical or arboreal relation between one 
thing and another, only an open passage between two or more such things. This emphasizes the 
rhizome’s connective, heterogeneous force. In protest events I argue that activists engaging in a 
rhizomatic manoeuvre collectively move in whatever direction necessary to maintain this 
heterogeneous urge. In other words, unlike the previous two, the rhizome strikes out wherever it 
desires. It does not flow at a routine and measured speed within or outside of the A-to-B 
demonstration (like the occupation), and neither does it emerge from a larger volume of 
individuals (as a splinter manoeuvre does). Moreover, the manoeuvre is commonly used to enable 
participants to join, re-join and disjoin from any number of other protesters engaged in various 
actions in the midst of a demonstration.  
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The rhizome is also built on a third principle of multiplicity. As Deleuze and Guattari (2011, 8) 
iterate; ‘[t]here is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject.’ Instead, via 
‘lines of flight’ the rhizome attaches itself to ever more things, its only power being that which is 
generated through a determination by its participants. As such, the manoeuvre is defined through 
its momentum rather than any core, intrinsic element. The only manner in which it is able to gain 
power as a tactic is to remain constantly on the look-out for planar opportunities; locations to 
navigate towards, spaces to temporarily occupy, peoples to subsume. Unlike the occupation, it 
does so with variances in speed and magnitude; with participants engaging in activities that 
invariably result in some people being left behind; so long as new opportunities are found. 
However, this is as much a quality as a critique of the rhizome – more of which will be expanded 
on in chapter 9. In any case it is worth noting here that this unceasing demand for new territory is 
never entirely without root, and indeed, is sometimes (if not always) reliant upon a rooting of 
some kind whether technological, spatial or epistemological.    
The fourth concerns the principle of ‘asignifying rupture’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, 10), that is 
to say, the casting aside of the formality and insistence of ‘breaks’, ‘separations’ and other such 
‘cuts’ across objects, bodies and things. In other words, the rhizome has the propensity, like 
anything else, to sever and be severed; but that in doing so, does not lose anything of its 
transformative potential. It is this regenerative capacity that allows the rhizome to maintain its 
force regardless of counter-actions such as containments. ‘A rhizome may be broken, shattered 
at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2011, 10). With each ‘break’ – that is, with every attempted containment – energies are 
near-infinitely split resulting in multiple rhizomatic movements strung out in every direction in 
order to thwart spatial control.   
The final two principles bring us back around to the practice of mapping. The fifth and sixth 
principles of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome concern the principles of cartography 
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and decalcomania. Accordingly, the rhizome is ‘a map not a tracing’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, 
13) and as such is an entirely unique, constructive form that is not built on a ‘blueprint’. In other 
words, it is an entirely novel thing ‘open and connectible in all of its dimensions…detachable, 
reversible, susceptible to constant modification’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, 13). As they 
reiterate, ‘[p]erhaps one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has 
multiple entryways…’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, 14) and as such can be attached and detached 
to anything else without the need for a linear ordering.             
The rhizomatic manoeuvre, I argue, might be the quintessential mapping act. This is in contrast, 
say, to the staple movements of those taking part in an A-to-B-style manoeuvre which is merely a 
playing out or a ‘tracing’ of the pre-established route itself. As such, the primary act of taking part 
in an A-to-B demonstration is an example of decalcomania. The movements themselves are 
merely ‘peeled’ (like a ‘decal’) from the pre-ordained route and laid down on the world itself – 
there is no discrepancy, only a neat array between template and action. The rhizome however is 
exactly the opposite. In other words, there is no template and no array. Nor is there even a 
discrepancy – no template exists to be referenced against. On a practical level, for protesters, this 
cartographic contingency generates a powerful political force. For the police, it is this disruptive 
capacity that must be minimized in the midst of a protest event.  
Rhizomes, therefore, do not come in pre-packaged forms and as a result, are not easily 
determinable. Whilst this presents a grand opportunity for those within the manoeuvre, it 
presents somewhat of a difficulty for those desiring to map its navigational intentions. Whilst the 
police are ever interested in ‘mapping’ (in literal, analytical and metaphorical terms) the 
movements and intentions of protesters during demonstrations, so the Sukey platform was during 
its period of activity. In 2014, with the platform dormant, the actions continued. The rhizomatic 
manoeuvres I focus on here occurred during the TUC demonstration on October 18th 2014, and a 
NCAFC demonstration on November 19th 2014.    
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Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a genealogy of police and protester manoeuvres in public order 
situations, beginning with the police containment and ending with activist ‘occupations’, 
‘splinters’ and ‘rhizomes’. Each of the latter have been specific responses to the continued rise, 
and development of, the former.   
The containment or ‘kettle’ first saw deployment in Germany in the mid-1980s at a time when 
British police forces were still content with dispersing (rather than containing) disruptive crowds. 
Although it first saw deployment in the UK during a disability rights protest in 1995 it wouldn’t be 
until 2000 that the manoeuvre morphed into a more recognizable form. May Day 2001 became a 
watershed moment as 3000 people were contained in Oxford Circus for over four hours, in order 
to prevent a breach of the peace. Legal challenges to the manoeuvre followed in the High Court 
(in 2005) and the ECtHR (in 2012) as it faced wider public and judicial scrutiny.  
I argue that from 2010 the manoeuvre was intensified by new ‘data-driven’ desires and 
intelligence-led operations. This growing obsession with a ‘capture all’ (Transmediale 2015, n.p.) 
mentality saw a series of the largest ever mass arrests in UK history; all of which were facilitated 
by a deployment of a containment. In this new phase of public order policing the manoeuvre has 
become increasingly facilitated by, and dependent upon, a wider policing assemblage including 
liaison officers, EGTs and FITs that aid in the recording of audio-visual evidence. This, I further 
argue, has marked a shift to anticipating future demonstrations through associative methods of 
data analysis and profiling of activists. Put otherwise, what Claudia Aradau and Tobias Blanke 
(2015, 1) call the ‘(Big) Data-security assemblage’.   
In response to the intensification of containments, activists have sought new and novel ways of 
conducting protests. Three particular kinds of manoeuvres have emerged in the recent years. 
These include: ‘occupations’, ‘splinters’ and ‘rhizomes’. Whilst occupations are a long-established 
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tactic in activist repertoires the world over, attempts to take specifically public spaces have 
typified many 2010-2015 protest movements such as Occupy and 15M. The essence of the 
manoeuvre is a re-designation of public space itself in order to challenge pre-existing and 
prevailing inscriptions.  
The ‘splinter’ was the first of two ostensibly more mobile, and heretofore uncodified, manoeuvres 
I have witnessed during protest events in the UK. Instead of formally taking space splinter 
manoeuvres are designed to break free from routed, A-to-B-style demonstrations in order to 
disrupt other spaces. Part of the success of the splinter movement is predicated on hiding in plain 
sight within such a demonstration – acting and operating as compliant, consensual activists – 
before ‘splintering’ and actively appropriating space beyond the confines of a routed 
demonstration. As a result, however, the splinter exists in an umbilical relationship to these larger 
body of demonstrators and as such must always, eventually, return to being subsumed into its 
operation later in time.  
The final manoeuvre – the ‘rhizome’ – bears only slight similarity to the splinter, and little to the 
occupation. Named in reference to Deleuze’s concept of the rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari 2011), 
it is a manoeuvre that is necessarily rootless, endlessly connective, multidirectional as well as 
heterogeneous. No amount of rupturing, breaking or splitting will cause the end of such a 
manoeuvre. Indeed, its great ability is its propensity exactly to rupture, break or split. In so doing, 
it regenerates; gaining strength in every move. At least, of course, in theory. A critique of this will 
be forthcoming in chapter 9.   
One of the main threads throughout this chapter has been the state and practice of ‘disruption’. 
The containment, as has been detailed, is a manoeuvre deployed in order to minimize it. When 
presented with a situation in which there is a perceived threat of disruption (‘serious’ or 
otherwise) to the local community, the police ordinarily impose a kettle. In direct contrast, each 
of the three activist manoeuvres are direct attempts to maximize disruption and deny the 
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imposition of a containment or any such manoeuvre that seeks to restrict protest. The occupation 
is a direct attempt to disrupt a pre-existing operation of public space, through an inscribing of 
alternative value. The splinter disrupts the order of an A-to-B demonstration by challenging its 
codified boundaries as wrought in (temporary) metal barriers and enforced by event organizers. 
Then, finally, the rhizome similarly disrupts the A-to-B demonstration by ignoring it completely; 
instead setting off around city streets in entirely unpredictable ways. The following chapter takes 
up this disruptive thread more thoroughly, by further attending to the ‘data-driven’ and 
technologically-mediated aspects of the protest tactics explored here.    
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Chapter 3 | Disruptive Cartographies 
  
This chapter explores various tactical, autonomous, and radical conceptualizations of cartography. 
In order to expand on these, the term ‘disruptive cartographies’ will be introduced. As will become 
evident throughout this and subsequent chapters, the term is rooted in the mapping of so-called 
‘manoeuvres’ within protest events. It is these events that have necessitated the rise of 
‘disruption’ as a specialized protest tactic, and therefore the deployment of a digital mapping 
platform. This mapping practice has emerged from a novel, extra-institutional milieu beyond more 
traditional organizational forms. The platform itself has pushed the boundaries of cartographic 
aesthetics, form and practice to generate an altogether unique navigational, geographic and 
socio-political force.  
These disruptive tendencies are not restricted to the cartographic form. The last few years have 
been dominated by ‘disruptive technologies’ and ‘disruptive innovation’ (Bower and Christensen 
1995). Whilst these can be characterized as neoliberal in origin and force, they more accurately 
engender a libertarian impulse that depict both state and market as obstructive to capital 
circulation and accumulation. On the other hand, disruptive cartographies disrupt the state and 
market in order to inhibit their operation, rather than to propel or accelerate capitalist processes. 
The difference between these disruptive tendencies is critical.     
The aim of this chapter is to provide a diagnosis of a variety of critical cartographic terms each 
embodying a different relation between maps, mapping and activism. In charting this terrain it 
will be necessary to appraise ‘tactical media’ (Garcia and Lovink 1997), ‘tactical cartography’ 
(Institute for Applied Autonomy 2010), ‘autonomous cartography’ (Counter-Cartographies 
Collective et al. 2012), and ‘radical cartography’ (Denil 2011) in turn. I consider each of these in 
order to draw attention to their limitations. As recent digital mapping technologies have been 
developed in response to police public order tactics such as containments, they have generated 
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novel navigational practices. Although each has conceptual import, none provide an entirely 
sufficient framework to understand the Sukey platform. For this reason, the term ‘disruptive 
cartographies’ is preferred. The key dynamics underpinning it are unpacked in chapter 5.    
Firstly, I argue that the separation between ‘tactics’ and ‘strategy’ favoured by Michel de Certeau 
(1984), tactical media theorists, and tactical cartographic practitioners, is impossible to maintain 
in the digital era. Protesters and police have battled to adapt to shifting territorial engagements 
brought about by networked possibilities, as explored in chapter 2. The activities of each are 
simultaneously strategic, tactical and logistical operations, dependent on more complex 
assemblages. As a result, tactical media and tactical cartography are limited in applicability. Taking 
a conciliatory tone, I consider Kluitenberg’s (2011) efforts to ‘hybridize’ each concept to account 
of the mass street mobilizations that have utilized the power of social media platforms and mobile 
devices since 2010.  
Secondly, ‘autonomous cartography’ (Counter-Cartographies Collective et al. 2012) shifts 
concerns away from tactics towards organizational forms. As Nunes (2014, 10) argues, broader 
socio-political shifts in labour provision and ways of doing activism have brought-into-being a 
‘mode…that can be described in its own right’ without recourse to state practices or traditional 
labour formations such as trade unions. This autonomy, therefore, concerns a separation of 
organizational, epistemological and political power from established forms. Autonomous 
cartography, I argue, is deployed as a tool or a method to advance the aims of activist groups 
comprised of individuals with complimentary, overlapping concerns. Ordinarily the cartographic 
process is used to make visible socio-political connections or flows that may not be evident; such 
as the fluidity of nation-state borders, the precarity of workers, or the abstractions of capital. This 
‘autonomous’ ethic is shared by student groups in the UK who have engaged in disruptive 
practices during protest events.       
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Finally, I explore the concept of ‘radical cartography’ (Denil 2011) in order to appraise the 
definition of ‘radicality’ and its possible applicability to the case study. As Denil (2011, 8) suggests, 
radicality concerns both a Romantic ideal centred on innovation and experimentation, as well as 
a ‘pragmatic directness’. The Sukey platform, I argue, satisfies both these criteria. Nonetheless, 
Denil’s model is limited only to cartographic form, with his search for a radical cartography 
ignorant of radical cartographic practice. It is necessary therefore to distinguish the difference 
between, and possibility of, radical cartographic form and practice.  
None of these activist conceptualizations consider the tactical, autonomous or radical nature of 
digital navigation. Moreover, none take account of the relation between disruption, manoeuvres, 
risk and navigational knowledges exercised, captured, circulated and acted upon during protest 
events. This is why it is necessary to compose an entirely new term to explain such phenomena.   
 
Disruption 
‘The theory of disruption is meant to be predictive.’ 
(Lepore 2014, n.p.) 
‘Disruption’ refers to the nature of cartographic practice during the production and use of a digital 
map in any array of instances. It does not refer to the disruption of the map as form nor thing – 
although these aspects certainly play their part in exercising the disruptive tendencies of the 
cartographic effort. This is in contra-distinction to Denil’s (2011) radical cartography which 
demands a trans-form-ation of the map itself, but not any attendant cartographic practice 
afforded, mediated or generated by the map. That is not to say, however, that the digital mapping 
platform that forms the focus of the critique here is not radical, according to Denil’s definition. It 
will be shown that it satisfies the criteria for such, as outlined above.  
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As discussed in the previous chapter ‘disruption’ is a particularly charged term for all parties 
involved in the kind of UK political activism considered here. It is the term against which policing 
measures and actions are judged during public order situations. It is the police’s duty to evaluate 
the effect of any protest on local communities. If it is found that it may indeed cause ‘serious 
disruption’ (Public Order Act 1986, 8, emphasis added) a senior officer responsible for 
coordinating the public order situation may move to impose conditions on it. For autonomous 
activists ‘disruption’ is the key dynamic to be executed during such actions. Disruption, then, is a 
sacred force at the heart of any and all protest. Much of the disillusionment with mass protest 
marches has been focused on their inability to disrupt everyday life as a result of their routed, pre-
ordained and pre-agreed nature.           
However, more recently, ‘disruption’ has come to denote ‘economically disruptive technologies’ 
that have the potential to ‘transform the way we live and work, enable new business models, and 
provide an opening for new players to upset the established order’ (McKinsey Global Institute 
2013, n.p.). It entails what Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen call ‘catching the wave’ (Bower 
and Christensen 1995, 43). Examples offered up by the McKinsey Global Institute (2013, n.p.) 
include ‘the semiconductor microchip, the Internet, or steam power in the Industrial Revolution’.  
In a contemporary mould, as Jill Leopore suggests, ‘[t]hings you own or use that are now 
considered to be the product of disruptive innovation include your smartphone and many of its 
apps, which have disrupted businesses from travel agencies and record stores to mapmaking and 
taxi dispatch’ (Leopore 2014, n.p.). In order to refine the current debate around disruption and 
innovation, Clayton Christensen et al. (2015, 46) re-state that ‘”[d]isruption” describes a process 
whereby a smaller company with fewer resources is able to successfully challenge established 
incumbent businesses’. In the McKinsey report they identify twelve ‘potentially economically 
disruptive technologies’ (McKinsey Global Institute 2013, 4) that possess the characteristics to 
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‘drive economic impact and disruption by 2025’ (McKinsey Global Institute 2013, 2) including 
cloud technology, advanced robotics and autonomous vehicles.    
According to McKinsey, disruptive technologies have to satisfy four criteria. Firstly, they must 
‘drive accelerated rates of change or discontinuous capability improvements’ (McKinsey Global 
Institute 2013, 2). Secondly, they must demonstrate a ‘broad reach’ in regards to the ‘potential 
scope of impact’ (McKinsey Global Institute 2013, 3). Thirdly, they must have the ‘potential to 
create massive economic impact’ in regards to ‘profit pools’, GDP figures and capital investments 
(McKinsey Global Institute 2013, 3). Then finally, they must ‘have the potential to dramatically 
change the status quo’ by transforming ‘how people live and work’ or ‘shift surplus for businesses’ 
(McKinsey Global Institute 2013, 3) amongst other radical changes.  
It is within this framework that one might be tempted to situate a cartographic form of disruption. 
As Lepore argues:  
the rhetoric of disruption—a language of panic, fear, asymmetry, and disorder—calls on 
the rhetoric of another kind of conflict, in which an upstart refuses to play by the 
established rules of engagement, and blows things up…Think of it this way: the Times is a 
nation-state; BuzzFeed is stateless. Disruptive innovation is competitive strategy for an 
age seized by terror.’ (Lepore 2014, n.p., original emphasis)  
However, the difference between ‘economically disruptive’ technologies and cartographically 
disruptive technologies is that whilst one offers to disrupt in the name of a continuation of forms 
of capital extraction and accumulation, the other works to suspend or deny it. In other words; to 
undermine and provide a degree of contingency (and thus, insecurity) that threatens the 
otherwise smooth workings of capital. Whilst economically disruptive technologies may equally 
regard existing markets and capital accumulation processes as undesirable, only the former desire 
to overcome such with more capital accumulation. Whilst one works to ensure capital(ism) 
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continues in its ever-creative, yet ever-destructive (socially, geographically) form, the other works 
to disrupt it through urban, protest event scenarios.     
The ridesharing platform Uber is emblematic of how digital technologies work to undo the state 
and its forms, relations and process. This ‘undoing’ is not dissimilar to the work of disruptive 
cartographic projects such as Sukey which forms the case evidence in this thesis. How Uber and 
Sukey differ lies in their attention to particular kinds of state processes. Whilst Uber indirectly re-
configures state-funded public and private transportation from buses to taxis, activist platforms 
directly target state institutions such as the police. They activate the power of the crowd in order 
to disrupt the ‘settings given by capital and the state’ (Dean 2016, 11). Thus, each distrusts the 
state – but for different reasons. One sees the state as a bureaucratic entity stifling market 
relations, whilst the other sees the state as a violent institution suppressing citizens’ capacity to 
exercise their democratic rights – in favour of elite, capital interests. 
What is critical to remember, therefore, is that disruption is not the preserve of radical left 
activism. On an international scale the power of disruptive technologies is, and continues to be, 
harnessed for capital accumulation, albeit thanks to a libertarian impulse. Whilst easily labelled as 
a neoliberal practice – consistent with neoliberal desires to dismantle state apparatus’ – 
identifying its more radical libertarian force, allows one to explore possible relations (and 
contradictions) between economically disruptive technologies and disruptive cartographies.  
  
Tactics 
‘A tactic depends on time – it is always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized “on the 
wing.” Whatever it wins, it does not keep.’  
(de Certeau 1984, xix) 
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As will become clear, disruptive cartography depends on so-called ‘strategic’ entities. Moreover, 
disruptive cartographic projects depend on communicational logistics. As such, any disruptive 
cartography is also dependent on particular organizational forms and attendant digital 
infrastructure. Disruptive cartographies cannot, therefore, be considered horizontally 
momentary, but vertically so. Every ‘mapping moment’ (Dodge et al. 2009, 234) is shot through 
with other ‘strategic’ and ‘logistical’ elements. A failure of these strategic and logistical elements 
may, therefore, bring about the failure of a ‘tactical’ action. As such, the difference between so-
called strategic actors (the state or police) and tactical actors (protesters) is based on the 
generative tendency of the mapping assemblage in question, rather than an a priori temporal 
capacity.   
In The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau makes a distinction between two kinds of 
actions: strategies and tactics. The first of these he defines as: ‘[t]he calculus of force-relationships 
which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a 
scientific institution) can be isolated from an “environment.”’ (de Certeau 1984, xix). The other, 
he suggests, is: ‘[a] calculus which cannot count on a “proper” (a spatial or institutional 
localization), nor thus on a borderline distinguishing the other as a visible totality.’ (de Certeau 
1984, xix). 
Strategies, as de Certeau suggests, are made possible by institutions of various kinds, but limited 
to those, more generally, with some form of capital. In turn, it is this capital that is operationalized 
through some kind of institutional investment and ‘proper’ placing, thus allowing it to generate 
an ‘inside/outside’ relationship to others. This is, put simply, a definition of any particular modern 
organization, and a description of the type of power it demonstrably wields.  
However: 
A tactic insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its 
entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance. It has at its disposal no base where it 
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can capitalize on its advantages, prepare its expansions, and secure independence with 
respect to circumstances. The “proper” is a victory of space over time. On the contrary, 
because it does not have a place, a tactic depends on time – it is always on the watch for 
opportunities that must be seized “on the wing.” Whatever it wins, it does not keep. It 
must constantly manipulate events in order to turn them into “opportunities.” The weak 
must continually turn to their own ends forces alien to them. (de Certeau 1984, xix) 
If we crystallize de Certeau’s tactical mode of operation, we can conclude that it consists of the 
following characteristics. Firstly, a tactic works across an opposing, presumably strategic, territory. 
A tactic, therefore, must work across terrain that is not of its own choosing. Secondly, a tactic 
works ‘fragmentarily’ with neither the effort nor ability to act in totality and to take totally: a 
tactical mode of operation functions on piecemeal terms by necessity – it cannot ‘take over’ a 
strategic entity as a whole in order to prevent its functioning, or apprehend it to replace its 
functioning. Further, it must operate in a de-centralized fashion. As de Certeau suggests, ‘it has at 
its disposal no base’ (1984, xix). Therefore, it must operate in a decentralized fashion. Moreover, 
it cannot plan ahead and act with future moves in mind. The tactical mode of operation works not 
to secure space, but to harness time. In so doing, practices that cleave to the tactical mode of 
operation must use: 
…clever tricks, knowing how to get away with things, “hunter’s cunning,” maneuvers [sic], 
polymorphic simulations, joyful discoveries, poetic as well as warlike. The Greeks called 
these “ways of operating” mētis. (de Certeau 1984, xix) 
The tactic works not to colonialize space, but to occupy a brief temporal event in order, not to 
advance any kind of strategic gain, but to make skillful progress. It must do so, however, through 
many means that are not identified and codified as per strategic modes – it ‘must continually turn 
to their own ends forces alien to them’ (de Certeau 1984, xix).  
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Fragmentary activity, decentralized control and ‘of-the-moment’ orientation during protest 
events are a necessary result of the upsurge of extra-institutional forces in the UK. As Nunes (2014, 
8) makes clear, the similarities between activist movements around the world include: 
 …the distrust of representative politics and representation in general, the shunning of 
formal organizations and the tendency towards organising in networks, the preference 
for creative, extra-parliamentary forms of actions, the tactical diversity, and the use of the 
internet for organising, mobilising, disseminating information, generating affect and 
garnering support. 
Further, a commitment to seizing opportunities ‘on the wing’ (de Certeau 1984, xix) is 
characteristic of much of the austerity-era protest action as practiced by autonomous activists. 
Much of this has involved an ethical eschewal of A-to-B events due to a lack of perceived disruptive 
possibility, leading to the taking up of various techniques designed to target a multitude of 
subjects, including, but not limited to, big business and financial institutions. This shift away from 
the typical A-to-B protest event can be seen, in de Certeauian terms, as ‘opportunistic seizures’ of 
forces previously alien to them. In other words, as tactical actions. 
However spatial manoeuvres – collective, coordinated and scripted movements generated by 
activists during student and anti-austerity protests in the UK – are curious ‘extra-institutional’ 
(Scott 2012, XVI) or ‘organizationless’ (Nunes 2014, 9) entities that do not fit neatly into the de 
Certeauian dualism, emerging neither from strategic nor tactical, nor even logistical positions 
alone. Instead the tactical, strategic and logisitical bleed into each other. Throughout the rest of 
the next section the relevant ‘tactical’ literature will be scrutinized in order to identify particular 
opportunities for a conceptual expansion in the context of protest mapping.  
As David Garcia and Geert Lovink (1997, n.p.) suggest; ‘Tactical Media are what happens when the 
cheap ‘do it yourself’ media…are exploited by groups and individuals who feel aggrieved by or 
excluded from the wider culture’. As such, it has become an umbrella term through which a 
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multitude of people including ‘the activist, Nomadic media warriors, the pranxter [sic], the hacker, 
the street rapper, [and] the camcorder kamikaze’ (Garcia and Lovink 1997, n.p.) have been able 
to gather under. What has brought these otherwise disparate individuals together is an awareness 
of the value of ‘temporary reversals in the flow of power’ (Garcia and Lovink 1997, n.p.). In short, 
and in de Certeauian terms, an appreciation of the power of seizing opportunities ‘on the wing’ 
(de Certeau 1984, xix).   
‘In its most expansive articulation’, as Rita Raley (2009, 6, emphasis added) continues, ‘tactical 
media signifies the intervention and disruption of a dominant semiotic regime, the temporary 
creation of a situation in which signs, messages, and narratives are set into play and critical 
thinking becomes possible’. These two terms – intervention and disruption – are seen consistently 
throughout the tactical media literature, and imply that tactical activities are temporary and 
therefore precarious attempts to provoke critical appraisal of semiotic regimes, rather than induce 
wholesale transformations of socio-material ones. As interventions they seek to meddle, confuse 
and agitate. As disruptions they orchestrate minor perturbations designed to tamper with smooth 
temporal flows. These ‘dominant…regime[s]’ (Raley 2009, 6) are already-always structural, 
strategic flows. Tactical media projects, therefore, work faithfully to de Certeau’s dualism as 
tactics of the weak. They acknowledge that such work can only do so ‘on the fly’, whilst lacking 
the generative power to operate through strategic entities.  
But as Wark (2003, n.p.) suggests, tactical media has a deliberate blindness towards another force 
he calls ‘communicational logistics’. Whilst tactical media projects have been, and continue to be 
successful on their own tactical terms (fragmentary, nomadic, reflexive, responsive, etc.), they 
have continued to orientate themselves exclusively towards strategic entities. Moreover, Wark 
(2003, n.p.) posits them as monolithic, with tactical interventions appealing only as ‘a way of 
getting into the cracks’ and he suggests it is increasingly necessary to attend to this logistical 
power.  
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Eric Kluitenberg (2011, 7) attempts to re-visit some of these cornerstone issues of tactical media 
in light of the ‘resurgence of social protest in an era of ubiquitous media’. In short, the ferment of 
2010 and 2011 has led to the need to re-appraise the conceptual coordinates of tactical media, 
not least because of the growing ubiquity of new social media platforms and mobile devices. This 
resurgence is extrinsically linked to mass manoeuvres taking place in public space during such 
occupations. In order to make sense of this shift, Kluitenberg gestures towards the term ‘hybrid 
space’ to describe the embedded but transgressive nature of technologically-mediated political 
actions in public places such as squares and parks: 
Hybrid Space is discontinuous and volatile, always varying in density or ‘thickness’. The 
expansion of wireless transmission protocols and wireless network technologies have 
greatly added to the density, thickness and complexity of hybrid space. In the most literal 
sense the media have moved into the streets and, although extremely recent, this 
phenomenon is already accepted as a vernacular of contemporary life. (Kluitenberg 2011, 
11) 
Whilst in Kluitenberg’s new interpretation the tactical and the strategic are enmeshed, it is 
nonetheless the tactical that still assumes conceptual primacy in this operation. In short, the 
tactical is still assumed to be able to interject, intervene and inter-act with the strategic. Further 
‘possible trajectories’ (Kluitenberg 2011, 49) that Kluitenberg speculatively identifies for tactical 
media are worth evaluating in detail here since they explicitly gesture towards tactical 
cartography. More generally, he is keen to further operationalize the ever-spatial characteristics 
of tactical media. For example, he suggests that recent occupations of public spaces have been 
‘permeated by electronically mediated flows’ that have ‘both construct[ed] and capture[d] them’ 
(Kluitenberg 2011, 50). Their hybrid nature suggest the concept of tactical media has been able to 
live on through a new, networked mode of existence. The encampment provides a perfect 
empirically-verifiable case for such, with protesters simultaneously occupying ‘physical’ space (‘in’ 
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tents, ‘in’ squares, and ‘in’ cities) whilst coordinating action via social media platforms and through 
mobile means. 
Visibility is the other of the main noted trajectories. For this, Kluitenberg details the importance 
of WikiLeaks’ operation ‘in the ambiguous terrain of media transparency and untraceable’ 
(Kluitenberg 2011, 51). Yet, he suggests that whilst transformative, WikiLeaks is indicative of a 
rather problematic shift, as its: 
…insistence on radical transparency invites… [a] complicated problem: in a situation of 
ubiquitous visibility the traceability of the citizen becomes absolute, and privacy becomes 
a remnant of the past. With this ultimate demise of the private sphere it is hard to imagine 
any form of autonomy will still be feasible. (Kluitenberg2011, 52) 
In other words, the last five years has seen the rise of the ethics of ‘openness’. But in the case of 
Wikileaks this radical transparency has been predicted, organizationally, on a ‘radical opacity’ that 
‘has become increasingly untenable’ (Kluitenberg 2011, 51, emphasis added) as efforts to 
undermine their activity have intensified.    
There are two points to be made in light of Kluitenberg’s work. Firstly, that occupations and 
encampments are fluid forms entailing a process of occupy-ing and encamp-ing. As I suggested in 
the previous chapter, occupations generate temporary spaces of habitation and care. But in order 
to avoid fetishizing their form, they must be considered as one protest manoeuvre amongst many, 
all oriented in some sense towards disruption. Secondly, that the problem of ‘radical opacity’ 
identified by Kluitenberg is not limited to just Wikileaks. In the conclusion of this thesis I draw 
attention to failures of the Sukey platform to encourage public participation whilst ensuring the 
safety and – if necessary – anonymity of its activist collaborators. In the next section I look to how 
other cartographic conceptualizations have emphasized the critical feature of this dynamic: 
autonomy.     
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Tactical Cartography  
Tactical cartography is a tool for political action. In An Atlas of Radical Cartography (Mogel and 
Bhagat 2010) the Institute for Applied Autonomy (IAA) define it as: 
…spatial representations that confront power, promote social justice and are intended to 
have operational value…”tactical cartography” refers to the creation, distribution, and use 
of spatial data to intervene in systems of control affecting spatial meaning and practice. 
Simply put, tactical cartographies aren’t just about politics and power; they are political 
machines that work on power relations. (Institute for Applied Autonomy 2010, 29–30) 
Mogel and Bhaget’s more expansive commitment to systems of control, meaning, practice and 
power relations insulates tactical cartography against the criticism levelled at tactical media. In 
other words, suggesting that tactical cartography works across socio-material registers rather than 
simply semiotic ones.    
In highlighting their ‘operational value’ the IAA are gesturing towards tactical cartography as a 
method, rather than as a rhetorical or purely symbolic device ‘standing in for’ or representing 
political action. Again, the IAA also deploy the term ‘intervene’ in reference to the force, scope 
and direction of such cartographic work. Much like other tactical media projects, tactical 
cartographic ones have historically involved a brand of interventionist political action seeking to 
work in between strategic cracks by ‘exposing’ and visualizing existing power relations, notably of 
the socio-spatial kind.  
Mapping projects undertaken by the Counter-Cartographies Collective (3Cs) have aimed to 
‘construct new imaginaries of collective struggle and alternative worlds’ (Counter-Cartographies 
Collective 2015, n.p.), by tracing the linkages between otherwise disparate economic and social 
elements, and to situate socio-spatial relations of entities such as HE establishments. It is precisely 
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these articulations that tactical cartographic projects have been able to engineer; and these 
interests continue to form the backbone of student activism both in the US and the UK. Such 
efforts help to provide a practice of disorientation, enabling the connection of the ‘abstractions 
of capital to the sense-data of everyday perception’ (Toscano and Kinkle 2015, 7) for those 
studying and working in HE establishments. These tactical maps aid in this (dis)orientation.       
Moreover, these efforts have spawned a variety of publications that have sought to draw 
connections between their own active research and other such collectives like Colectivo 
Situaciones, Precarias a la Deriva (Precarious Women Adrift) and Hackitectura (see; Cobarrubias 
2009, Cobarrubias and Pickles 2009, Counter-Cartographies Collective et al. 2012). As such, the 
3Cs can be seen as both practicing and collectively writing about tactical cartography. 
Aesthetically, they share a preoccupation with Deleuzo-Latourian conceptions of geopolitical 
space, emphasizing the connected, intertwined, nodal, fluid nature of contemporary capitalism. 
For example, Cobarrubias and Pickles’ reading of Hackitectura’s Cartographies of the Geopolitical 
Territory of the Straits of Gibraltar (2004) map, emphasize that: 
Instead of accepting the border as a fixed entity that separate[s] an “us” from a “them,” 
constraining bodies and movement, the groups involved are mapping the complex 
networks of flows that make up this “border” region…To these they have added new 
interaction space, such as those created by communication technologies that span and 
connect the region of the straits and facilitate even tighter networks of contact and 
coordination on both sides. The result is a map that does not reproduce the border as a 
space of separation but follows the flows across the Mediterranean in order to articulate 
the border as a space that is created, inhabited and traversed. (Cobarrubias and Pickles 
2009, 51–52) 
As such, Hackitectura’s mapping ethics align with Kluitenberg’s (2011, 49) suggestion that tactical 
media operators desire to navigate ‘the hybrid realities in which they find themselves immersed’.  
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Map 3.1 | Hackitectura Cartographies of the Geopolitical Territory of the Straits of Gibraltar (2004) 
As these examples illustrate, the separation between tactical cartography as a kind of 
metaphorical, analytical approach and tactical cartography as a geographical, actual pursuit is 
difficult to maintain, even though there may still be ‘profound differences between those who 
research mapping as a practical form of applied knowledge, and those who seek to critique the 
map and the mapping process’ (Perkins 2003, 341). Sometimes this has entailed using tactical 
cartography as a symbol for analytical work that ‘renders economic and political complexity’ 
(Raley 2009, 2) in a more legible form – as Jameson’s (1995) ‘cognitive mapping’ approach 
demands – whilst sometimes using it as a literal term for explicitly cartographic projects that 
visualize territorial, geopolitical entities, and capital flows across space. In any case, it has denoted 
tactical efforts designed to challenge dominant strategic and, at times, logistical power relations. 
Yet, much like the broader genre of tactical media, tactical cartography has some conceptual 
limitations which need addressing here. The most pressing of these concerns, once again, is the 
tactical-strategic divide, this time with three slightly different articulations.  
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Firstly, whilst tactical media, as per Wark’s (2003) criticism, has failed to even consider logistical 
forms of power, tactical cartography has been rather more attentive to this dimension. The 
Hackitectura map does nothing but trace logistical forms of power such as communications, 
capital and security flows that nominally extend through and beyond strategic, territorial entities. 
The 3Cs’ Disorientation guides follow all manner of HE flows that transcend national boundaries. 
Whilst such efforts may still be considered tactical interventions of the de Certeauian kind, they 
do not position themselves antagonistically towards organizational forms, but flows between 
such. This is an important distinction, and one that escapes Wark’s criticism of tactical media. 
Territorial metaphors, also still useful to a degree, are blunted by this material shift towards socio-
economic flows and digital networks. De Certeau’s suggestion that tactical endeavours emerge 
from de-centralized positions amounts to nothing if ‘strategic’ entities are entirely capable of 
possessing and exercising that ability too. Moreover, emphasizing the power of delineated 
territories over the flow between, around and into such, belies the constitution of contemporary 
life as it is.     
Secondly, although the term ‘tactical cartography’ is widely used in order to situate such work 
within a tactical media framing, there are a number of corollary terms for such practices. ‘Counter-
mapping’ (Peluso 1995, Wood 2010) and ‘counter-cartography’ (Counter-Cartographies Collective 
2015) are perhaps the most commonly used, with ‘autonomous cartography’ (Counter-
Cartographies Collective et al. 2012) and ‘radical cartography’ (Mogel and Bhagat 2010, Denil 
2011) also prevalent. Rhiannon Firth’s (2014) attempts to chart an ‘anarchist pedagogy’ in relation 
to these earlier efforts shows a continuing desire to, in some way, comprehend and critique 
progressive kinds of cartographic theory, methodology and practice.  
Each definition draws on a specific operational term. Tactical cartography demands an 
‘intervention’ into ‘systems of power and control’ (Institute for Applied Autonomy 2010, 29). 
Counter-mapping is concerned with an ‘appropriation’ (Peluso 1995, 384) of state tools and 
| 75 
 
techniques (i.e. maps) to predominantly fight territorial and resource claims. Counter-
cartography, however, is preoccupied with ‘destabilizing’ current representations and imaginaries 
(Counter-Cartographies Collective 2015, n.p.). Autonomous cartography, as also proposed by the 
Counter-Cartographies Collective et al. (2012, 444), promotes ‘self-organization’ through militant 
cartographic means. Radical cartography, as imagined by Mogel and Bhagat (2010, 6), is a process 
of ‘subverting’ conventional framings for social progress, whereas radical cartography, as defined 
by Denil (2011, 20), must ‘disrupt’ existing cartographic schemas.   
 
Table 3.1 | A Typology of Critical Cartographies. Source: compiled from various.  
Whilst the intention is not to critique all of these various strands of critical cartography, it is 
necessary to draw attention to the two ‘counter-‘ types (counter-mapping, counter-cartography), 
Mapping 
Practice 
Definition 
Operational 
Terms 
References 
Key 
theorists 
Practitioners 
Tactical 
cartography 
The creation, distribution, and 
use of spatial data to 
intervene in systems of 
control affecting spatial 
meaning and practice 
Intervention 
Institute for 
Applied 
Autonomy 
(2010) 
de 
Certeau, 
Wark, 
Lovink 
IAA, Surveillance Camera 
Players, Bureau D'Etudes 
Radical 
cartography I 
The practice of mapmaking 
that subverts conventional 
notions in order to actively 
promote social change 
Subversion 
Mogel and 
Bhagat (2010) 
Jameson, 
Toscano 
and Kinkle 
Unnayan, Center for Urban 
Pedagogy, Pedro Lasch, 
Trevor Paglen, Elin O'Hara 
Slavick, An Architektur 
Radical 
cartography 
II 
Any document/object that 
satisfies 'mapicity' whilst 
disrupting pre-existing 
cartographic schema 
Disruption Denil (2011) 
Gombrich, 
Berger, Fry 
Cubists, Situationists 
Counter-
mapping 
The appropriation of the 
state's techniques and manner 
of representation to bolster 
the legitimacy of resource 
claims 
Appropriation 
Peluso (1995), 
Wood, Fels and 
Krygier (2010) 
Peluso, 
Harley, 
Edney, 
Wood 
Indigenous groups, 
community organizations 
Counter-
cartography 
The rendering of new images, 
destabilization of current 
representations and 
construction of new 
imaginaries 
Destabilization 
Counter-
Cartographies 
Collective 
(2015) 
Pickles, 
Elwood, 
Bunge 
3Cs, Detroit Geographical 
Expedition and Institute 
Autonomous 
cartography 
The creation of new 
geographic knowledges 
through critical, militant 
organization 
Autonomy 
Counter-
Cartographies 
Collective et al. 
(2012) 
Deleuze, 
Hardt, 
Negri, 
Lazzarato 
3Cs, Colectivo Situaciones, 
Precarias a la Deriva, 
Hackitectura 
Vernacular 
mapping 
Non-statist, extra-
institutional, participatory, 
cartographic practices taken 
as techniques of addition 
Addition 
Gerlach (2010, 
2014, 2015) 
Deleuze, 
Guattari, 
Ingold 
OpenStreetMappers 
Disruptive 
cartographies 
The capture, verification and 
rendering of navigational data 
for the purposes of radical, 
autonomous practice 
Disruption Hind (2015a) 
Deleuze, 
November, 
Amoore 
Sukey 
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because, like tactical cartography, they gesture towards an antagonism with strategic forms of 
power. Although, counter-mapping – in Peluso’s (1995) original text – is more concerned with 
techniques of recognition and appropriation rather than intervention or destabilization, per se. 
Still, there seems to be considerable overlap between tactical mapping and counter-cartography, 
with each attempting to incorporate logistic forms of power into such methods. 
Thirdly, tactical cartography is still wedded to a temporal framing that posits tactical action as 
anchorless and ‘of the moment’. As a result, tactical cartographic work is rendered fleeting; 
without acknowledgement of the material, infra- and inter-structural requirements to be so. 
Indeed, this kind of ‘off the cuff’ mapping completely belies the complex strategic underpinnings 
of many tactical cartographic works. What is perhaps most impoverished in this conceptualization 
is that most, if not all of these tactical cartographic endeavours have been executed by, through 
and oriented towards, the digital. It is this disavowal of the digital assemblage that allows such 
tactical actions to occur that forces an expansion of the tactical media/cartographic framing.      
Whilst tactical cartography has a critical lineage and an analytical purchase on features of 
contemporary life that need to be acknowledged, there are elements to the Sukey platform that 
escape it. Further, both counter-mapping and counter-cartography fall into similar binary traps as 
tactical cartography, relying on the pre-existence of another organizational force for its own 
conceptual strength, as Joe Gerlach (2010) suggests. A thoroughly disruptive cartography works 
across semiotic and socio-material registers, disobeys a strict temporal framework, jettisons any 
particular organizational arrangement, is embedded in mass movements rather than artistic 
intervention, dissolves the otherwise false distinction between offline and online activism and 
enrols ‘ordinary’ activists in such a cartographic entanglement. The Counter-Cartographies 
Collective et al.’s (2012) ‘autonomous cartography’ and Mark Denil’s (2011) ‘radical cartography’, 
however, furnish these qualities. They will be attended to in the next two sections.  
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Autonomous Cartography 
Disruptive cartographic projects are autonomous. They do not ‘appropriate’ or ‘ape’ state 
techniques in any way to do battle on the same terrain as in counter-mapping. The Counter-
Cartographies Collective et al. (2012) elucidate a number of autonomous mapping projects wholly 
independent from state-strategic entities, quite visibility demonstrating alternative socio-spatial 
trajectories that whilst nominally might challenge the state in various ways, does so from an 
independent epistemological base. For example, Precarias a la Deriva’s use of the Situationist drift 
(dérive) is a unique method through which the ‘spatial practices of precarious workers’ (Counter-
Cartographies Collective et al. 2012, 447) can be explored. Moreover, as they continue: 
This innovative research-intervention methodology allows the women of Precarias a la 
Deriva to experiment with alternative [autonomous] forms of political organization 
outside traditional political parties and trade union structures. Through the drifts, the 
Precarias not only investigate their situations, they also enact new, lived spaces of 
everyday life and create new practices and networks of resistance. (Counter-
Cartographies Collective et al. 2012, 447) 
What is crucial, here, is the political articulation of such efforts as necessarily outside of both 
strategic organizational structures, and other antagonistic formations such as traditional political 
parties and trade unions. For instance, what links the women of Precarias a la Deriva is not that 
they work in the same industry, nor even in the same workplace, but they are defined by, and 
connected in, their precarious status otherwise ignored by formal trade union regulations. 
Throughout industrial capitalism labour affiliation (occupation, profession, etc.) and political 
issues (wages, rights, etc.) have been one and the same. In a post-industrial age the latter 
transcend labour affiliation, finding solidarity in thematic-relational, rather than occupationally-
determinable interests. As the Counter-Cartographies Collective et al. ask:  
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How could temp[orary] workers, the self-employed, workers on per-hour contracts, and 
domestic workers (to name but a few) strike? Who would even notice? These 
questions…highlight the conditions and experiences of precarious works in the current 
economy. (Counter-Cartographies Collective et al. 2012, 446) 
With increasing numbers in these labour categories, autonomous projects and collectives of 
various shades are now familiar across Europe. Building on Counter-Cartographies Collective et 
al.’s (2012) insights into the practitioners and subjects of autonomous cartography is therefore 
incredibly important. No other framework is able to comprehend these extra-institutional political 
affiliations, energies and articulations.   
Joe Gerlach’s (2010; 2014; 2015) concept of ‘vernacular mapping’ compliments this reading of 
autonomous cartography, by equally drawing on these extra-institutional qualities. As he says, 
vernacular mappings are: 
…non-statist…participatory, cartographic practices, either digital or analogue in their 
composition, in which such performances are not taken to be technologies of capture, but 
as techniques of addition; of adding more to the world through abstraction; of adding to 
the riskiness of cartographic politics by proliferating yet more renders of the world. 
(Gerlach 2014, 23, original emphasis) 
Whilst Gerlach does not gesture to how these non-statist mappings relate to the state, they 
nonetheless exist outside of it. He delicately qualifies this by suggesting that vernacular mappings 
are also ‘extra-institutional’ (Gerlach 2014, 23). The two are not the same, of course, if one does 
not equate the state solely with institutions. What Gerlach is intending to draw attention to here 
is the way in which mapping projects have, in recent times, emerged outside of traditional 
organizational forms – both statist and extra-statist. Neither state mapping departments (UK 
Ordnance Survey, etc.) nor formal institutions (businesses, philanthropic organizations, cultural 
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societies, universities, etc.) have led a mapping revolution, but loose, informal and voluntary 
collectives. As Gerlach suggests: 
Virtual and actual mapping collectives such as OpenStreetMap present serious challenges 
to the theory and profession of cartography. Those who spend their spare time walking 
around and reorienting the globe with GPS devices in hand, or pouring over code from the 
comfort of their armchairs, are not necessarily trained in formal cartography, and, 
moreover, there is no obvious motive for how and why OpenStreetMappers map. 
(Gerlach 2010, 165) 
Statist and institutional arrangements do not allow for these twin freedoms – of mapping in ‘spare 
time’ or ‘pouring over code from the comfort of…armchairs’. This voluntary dimension is therefore 
central to Gerlach’s definition of vernacular mapping – even if it is only offered implicitly by 
Gerlach in his work on OSM as a collaborative, ‘crowd-sourced’ mapping enterprise. Nevertheless, 
it is synonymous with being non-statist and extra-institutional.  
Vernacular mapping, it is said by Gerlach, ‘espouses a politics of the aesthetic whereby creative 
potential is valorized as a series of political interventions, but not necessarily in a subversive or 
angst-ridden manner’ (Gerlach 2010, 166). In this crude characterization any other political 
intervention aside from the vernacular and voluntary is deemed ‘subversive’ and ‘angst-ridden’. 
Yet being compelled to map – rather than simply volunteering to do so – should not be conflated 
with mere subversion nor angst. In so doing, Gerlach excludes a large range of cartographic 
projects that nonetheless share a plethora of similarities; organizationally, materially and ethically 
to the vernacular mapping projects he identifies. This unnecessary division between voluntary and 
compelling enterprises is the shortfall of the vernacular mapping framework. 
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Radical Cartography  
Disruptive cartography is radical in practice. Mark Denil (2011) unpacks what ‘radicality’ in a 
cartographic sense might entail. He identifies two possible lineages: Romanticism and 
pragmatism. On the one side he suggests that: 
There is an unmistakable appeal to a term like radical: there is something in it that speaks 
to the Romanticist spirit embedded in Western culture since the 1800s. The word conjures 
up visions of a Zapata, or of a Ché; of a Wilde in his cell; a Byron swimming the Hellespont; 
or a Marx in his garret. The attraction of these visions hinges on the concept of the 
sublime, a pivotal quality in 18th and 19th Century philosophers and aesthetics. The sublime 
counterbalanced the classic concept of beauty with a powerful experience of the 
uncontrollable, the dark, the dangerous, and the (possibly) threatening. (Denil 2011, 8, 
original emphasis)     
In this, radicality is directly related to a kind of avant-gardism – an innovative or experimental way 
of operating. A radical cartography in this sense, then, would demand innovative techniques or an 
experimental aesthetic. Yet as Denil (2011, 8, original emphasis) continues, there is also a 
‘suggestion of hard-headed “realism” and pragmatic directness implied by the term radical’, a case 
of ‘getting things done’. In this definition radicality concerns the deliberate forgetting of social 
norm and etiquette that form established ways of doing things. A radical cartography in this sense, 
then, would entail an almost revolutionary re-setting of the established ways of both producing 
and using maps.   
Although Denil (2011, 9) suggests there is an ‘ambiguity’ to radicality as a result of this 
Romanticist/pragmatist distinction this is actually far from the case. Both emerge from the same 
dissatisfaction with pre-existing socio-cultural norms, and consequently, gestures towards a 
desire to think and then act differently. They are ultimately one and the same utopian project. A 
radical cartography, therefore, involves both an innovative way of thinking/doing cartography and 
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a more instrumental, articulated desire to actually deliver such a project. In a sense, then, it is 
both extensive – in the ways it searches far and wide for new ideas, concepts and forms – and 
intensive – in the way it works in and on itself to formulate novel, applicable methodological 
trajectories.    
Denil is also concerned with defining the essence of the map. He concedes that ‘no universal 
criteria exists for determination [sic] of map-hood’ (Denil 2011, 10) and that ‘[t]here has been and 
is a tremendous multiplicity of things that can, will, have been, and might be, identified and used 
as maps’ (Denil 2011, 9). ‘We know a map when we see one’ (Denil 2011, 9) may yet be the most 
accurate definition however elusive and subjective it may seem. Nonetheless, Denil perseveres 
and suggests that: 
 In order for a category of “things that are maps” to exist, there must be some essence or 
characteristic that allows that state of being a map to be recognized and made operative. 
For convenience we might think of this essence or characteristic as mapicity. (Denil 2011, 
10, original emphasis) 
For this essence or characteristic to be made operative, Denil further suggests that ‘[t]he criteria 
of usefulness, usability, and believability’ (Denil 2011, 11) are appropriate tests to define a map’s 
mapicity, but admits that this is rarely applied in the necessary wholesale manner to any and every 
object encountered. Nonetheless being able to recognize what is and isn’t a map involves a 
definite degree of literacy – a gaining of knowledge on the intricacies of cartographic design, form, 
content and practice. It is only through a ‘schema’ of mapicity – that is, an appropriate interpretive 
template – that a map can properly be understood. 
In conclusion, ‘a truly radical cartography would be one where the accepted schema of mapicity, 
or significant parts of it, is broken down and replaced’ (Denil 2011, 15). With this working 
definition (even, methodology) in hand it is possible to evaluate all manner of supposedly ‘radical’ 
‘critical’ or ‘alternative’ maps as Denil proceeds to do. Nonetheless there are faults. Denil is 
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immune to discussing mapping practice. Here, there is a split: between radical maps and maps for 
radical practice. Whilst the map in Denil’s definition is, by requirement, mandated to shatter pre-
existing cartographic schemas (although not so much that the now-old one disappears 
completely), the map in this speculative new definition can acceptably perform within pre-existing 
schemas so long as they work towards fostering radical practice. Radical mapping practices are 
therefore practices that perhaps do the above, i.e that they connote a ‘major paradigmatic shift’ 
involving a ‘new vocabulary, grammar, and syntax’ for such practices, whilst being both Romantic 
and pragmatic in nature (i.e. utopian).  
Whilst nominally radical practices, disruptive cartographies do not necessarily hold true to Denil’s 
(2011: 15) rather high demand that their form involve a ‘leap to a new schema’. Nonetheless I 
argue that the Sukey platform employed a playful aesthetic notably radical in the way it was 
deployed in various promotional and cartographic material connected to the project. The 
conceptual basis for this aesthetic discussion will be explored in the following chapter. However, 
it is not the map itself that needs to be considered radical in this instance. Ultimately, the concern 
lies with radical cartographic practice. Throughout, this practice will be seen as both an interactive 
(with the map itself) and a generative force (with the world).  
Between the ‘tactical cartography’ of the IAA (2010), the ‘autonomous cartography’ of the 
Counter-Cartographies Collective et al. (2012), the ‘vernacular mapping’ of Gerlach (2014) and the 
‘radical cartography’ of Denil (2011) there are the roots of a new, necessarily conjunctive kind of 
critical cartography. Devising a wholly new term is therefore necessary. However, one must also 
pay respect to its corollaries and antecedents; to tactical cartography for its emphasis on 
intervention and disruption, to autonomous cartography for its interest in extra-institutional 
bodies, and radical cartography for its focus on pragmatic Utopianism.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to establish a new term: disruptive cartographies. I have done so 
through a systematic diagnosis of three particular antecedent terms: tactical cartography, 
autonomous cartography and radical cartography. The first of these has been squarely focused on 
practice; the second has been centred on organizational composition; and the third has paid 
attention mostly to cartographic form. Yet for various reasons none of these are perfectly 
applicable to the case in question – of a digital mapping platform deployed for activist purposes. 
Tactical cartography has focused too much on the momentary nature of such action. Autonomous 
cartography has been defined only in relation to a pre-existing power as a ‘counter-’ action, and 
radical cartography has ignored cartographic practice. Yet in each are the seeds of a new 
combinatory cartographic project: disruptive cartography.  
This new term expands on some of the above characteristics of each to form a cartographic 
prognosis. If tactical cartography is brought back into a sympathetic rather than antagonistic 
relationship with strategic and logistical forces and infrastructures, it becomes rather more 
applicable to the Sukey platform; operating as a digital mapping assemblage. If autonomous 
cartography is rescued from its restrictive framing as a counter-action and placed more 
appropriately within the wider autonomous literature as an action organizationally-derived from 
an extra-institutional milieu, then it becomes easier to identify the proponents, and mediators, of 
protest manoeuvres. If radical cartography expands its definition to include not only radical form 
but also radical practice it can connect up with broader non-representational theories (see; Thrift 
2008, Anderson and Harrison 2012) that posit that the latter rather than the former comprise the 
centre of geographic knowledge and meaning.   
Moreover, disruptive cartographies are navigational. Tactical cartography is an analytical tool 
rather than a ‘calculative device’ (Amoore and Piotukh 2016, 2) through which navigational 
decisions are made. Autonomous cartography is, similarly, a method through which interventions 
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are made into socio-political order. Radical cartography entails a consideration of cartographic 
form and aesthetic. None concern the act of navigation. Only vernacular mapping gestures 
towards it. Disruptive cartography, however, is a thoroughly navigational practice designed to 
affect the capture, circulation and use of navigational knowledge in protest events. Whilst all 
political, none of these frames are equipped to deal with digital mapping practices as performed 
through mobile devices during demonstrations, or to understand how such devices ‘affect our 
capacity to decide and act’ (Amoore and Piotukh 2016, 2) in the world.       
Further, none of these frames emphasize the disruptive force of the Sukey platform. Whilst it may 
be ‘tactical’, ‘autonomous’ and ‘radical’, I argue that it more acutely mobilizes the art and practice 
of disruption as it is politically, spatially and legally defined. Without it there is no cartographic 
project. As suggested above, disruptive cartography is dependent on and generates an attention 
towards caring for bodies. In other words, it simultaneously is dependent on the execution of 
disruptive manoeuvres that increase the risk for those involved whilst also decreasing the risk for 
others. In advancing disruption, it also generates attention towards the safety of bodies within 
the protest space.  
These two dynamics: of navigation and risk will be explored in chapter 5. Each is entwined with 
the other and so demand a more thorough unpacking in order to delve deeper into the nature of 
disruptive cartography. What follows in the immediate chapter is a taking-up of the aesthetic 
question posed by Denil (2011) regarding cartographic form, as well as those offered by 
Kluitenberg (2011) in relation to hybridity.    
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Chapter 4 | Interface  
 
The digital interface has ushered a novel perceptive capacity into the world. This is what Andersen 
and Pold (2011, 9) refer to as the ‘interface aesthetic’. Although it is traceable back to the birth of 
the personal computer and the launch of the original Apple Macintosh (see; Manovich 2001), a 
number of parallel and subsequent developments have led to the rise, consolidation and re-
emergence of particular interface aesthetics that do not subscribe to slick, modern(ist) fantasies.  
Instead, the crude 8-bit ‘pixelated graphics’ of early videogames are an equally integral element 
of this digital interface aesthetic. In recent times they have been re-purposed; emblematic of a 
fiercely independent imaginary often operating in direct conflict with major hardware developers 
such as Apple and Microsoft. At once a result of technical limitations of both computer and 
interface, and a stylistic expression of a counter-cultural world, the pixelated graphic remains a 
key driver of a particular kind of interface aesthetic today.       
In this chapter I suggest that the digital interface must be considered as material object, mediator 
and effect (Galloway 2012, Hookway 2014, Lammes Forthcoming). An interface is not strictly a 
computer component, but a boundary or threshold, a mediator between two states, as well as an 
object itself. More specifically in relation to digital technology, the term can refer simultaneously 
to a specific part or area of an object (screen to mobile device), a series of objects working in 
relation (application to operating system) to one another and a process or inter-action (stroke, 
tap, double-tap). There is at once both a visual ordering of phenomena and a relation between 
phenomena and other objects – literally an inter-facing.  
In digital mapping terms the strokes, taps and pinches of the interface ensure that worldly 
phenomena are brought to the fingertips. This is what Sybille Lammes and I call ‘double-tap’ (Hind 
and Lammes 2015, 80). It is through interaction with a mobile, capacitive touchscreen that a 
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greater perceived relation or ‘correspondence’  (November et al. 2010, 585) is secured between 
cartographic signposts. This ‘navigational interface’ (Lammes 2011, 1) ensures that these 
signposts are aligned and that the user of a mobile device is able to navigate smoothly and 
efficiently.    
Combined with the ‘outward’ generation of manoeuvres, the ‘inward’ attention to a digital 
mapping platform (aesthetically and relationally) forms a multi-oriented action. This, I argue, 
following Alexander Galloway, yields a ‘coherent aesthetic[s]’ (2012, 46) whilst exercising an 
‘incoherent politics’ (2012, 47). Whilst the former consists of a ‘gradual coalescing around a 
specific being’ (Galloway 2012, 46) such as a digital, mobile interface; the latter ‘dissolves existing 
institutional bonds’ (Galloway 2012, 47).  
Thus I argue that the Sukey platform was the ‘pivot’ enabling protesters to navigate during protest 
events, providing a space through which navigational knowledges could be generated and 
circulated. It ensured that so-called ‘active phenomena’ (namely, manoeuvres) in protest events 
could be rendered cartographically in order to aid disruptive activities. Without the alignment of 
various cartographic signposts activists would have to seek navigational assurances from 
elsewhere, unable to engage in the de- and re-territorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 2011) of the 
urban environment.  
 
Aesthetics  
As Soren Pold (2005, n.p.) has suggested ‘the interface is now a central aesthetic form conveying 
digital information of all kinds’. It is through various interfaces that we now comprehend the 
world, and as Andersen and Pold (2011, 9, original emphasis) further argue ‘[t]he question of 
interface aesthetics is intrinsically linked to our perception of the interface’. As they continue, 
however: 
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If it is not possible to fully ‘unveil’ the ‘mise en abîme’ of the interface we can…elucidate 
how interfaces can embed choices, conduct, languages, and ultimately values, worldviews 
and aesthetics into technical infrastructures. The word aesthetics derives from the Greek 
‘aisthesis’ that means sense perception, and today we perceive our environment through 
interfaces’ (Andersen and Pold 2011, 9–10) 
Thus, the aesthetics of our modern world is derived from and through the interface itself. If digital 
culture has brought us many ways of sensing this world it is courtesy of the interface:  
Usually understood as a technological artefact optimized for seamless interaction and 
functionality…the interface also draws upon cultural and artistic traditions, and plays an 
important role in our culture as art, entertainment, communication, work and business. 
It is a cultural form with which we understand, act, sense and create our world. (Andersen 
and Pold 2014, no p.n.) 
Yet the interface exists in a triple state. It is at once an object, a mediator and a process – a material 
element, a conduit and an effect. This much is obvious from looking at the word itself. ‘Inter’, 
means between or in relation to, and ‘face’; the front or the main focus of an object or body. 
Together this triple state allows the interface to loop seamlessly and endlessly between the three, 
creating an ambiguity as to its form, content and purpose.      
Yet as a result of these surface-value interpretations there are a number of assumptions about 
what interfaces are, who or what they involve, and what they actually do. Often we consider an 
interface to be an object for some kind of exclusive visual purpose. This draws from the second 
part of the word – face. Faces are the means by which we establish and verify identity. Only 
through the face may we know exactly who someone, or what something is. As such, the interface 
is connected to a specific reading of what aesthetics is and entails. In Lev Manovich’s (2001) The 
Language of New Media, the interface is shorthand for the Graphical User Interface (GUI) of 
personal computers. As Manovich suggests, the original Apple Macintosh – released in 1984 – 
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gave rise to a whole new era in which the ‘modernist values of clarity and functionality’ (Manovich 
2001, 63) in design became of paramount importance. These values were unequivocally visual 
ones, as Manovich’s story attests to: 
The user’s screen was ruled by a straight lines and rectangular windows that contained 
smaller rectangles of individual files arranged in a grid. The computer communicated with 
the user via rectangular boxes containing clean black type rendered against a white 
background. Subsequent versions of GUI added colors [sic] and made it possible for users 
to customize the appearance of many interface elements, thus somewhat diluting the 
sterility and boldness of the original monochrome 1984 version. Yet its original aesthetic 
survives in the displays of hand-held communicators such as Palm Pilot, cellular 
telephones, car navigational systems, and other consumer electronic products that use 
small LCD displays comparable in quality to the 1984 Macintosh screen. (Manovich 2001, 
63) 
In this, the Apple Macintosh assumes a primary position in the development of the interface as an 
aesthetic object comprising of lines, shapes, colours, foregrounds and backgrounds. It is this iconic 
‘original’ aesthetic that Manovich suggests lives on through other subsequent devices such as 
mobile phones and sat-navs, governing acceptable and attractive design discourse. As such we 
often think that an interface involves only a two-relationship between human and machine – like 
a graphical user interface (GUI) – that gives us access to an otherwise undiscoverable world (the 
computer). However, an interface is more than an object that gives rise to visual possibilities. 
Interfaces involve other senses such as touch, gesture and proprioception.    
Manovich’s portrayal of the Apple design aesthetic is a dominant one. Whilst the emergence of 
the original Apple Macintosh (and further iterations beyond it) have imposed a particular clean, 
slick, modernist interface aesthetic, I argue that there have been parallel design aesthetics equally 
as important to consider. ‘8-bit’ is one such alternative tradition.  
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Jesper Juul, in a short documentary entitled The Evolution of 8-bit Art (PBS Digital Studies 2015), 
contends that 8-bit culture is a combination of both the graphical style of console games 
developed during the 1980s (such as the Nintendo Entertainment System [NES]), and the DIY ethic 
of home computers during the same period (such as the Commodore 64). Further, he argues that 
there are three reasons why the 8-bit aesthetic continues to be so prevalent. Firstly, the ease of 
creating 8-bit style designs has meant that there is typically a low-barrier to entry. One of the key 
aesthetic principles of this enduring 8-bit style is that all graphics are pixelated to some extent, so 
that characters, landscapes, objects, menus and other phenomena are rendered as crude block 
colours. Of course, during the original 8-bit era this was due to a technical limitation – console and 
computer games were limited by 8-bits as this comprised the extent of microprocessing power 
available to developers during the 1980s. In the present day, however, with microprocessing 
capabilities far beyond a mere 8-bit, this is more an aesthetic choice rather than a result of a 
technical restriction. Whilst arguably a kind of ‘retro revivalism’ (Guffey 2006, 162) driven by 
nostalgia, it nonetheless still possesses ‘deeply transformative’ potential (Weil 2016, n.p.).  
Fig 4.1 | Super Mario Bros. (1983) on the NES. Sources: Playbuzz (2015), New Retro Wave (2015) 
Secondly, the counter-cultural, ‘independent’ nature of 8-bit design lends itself well to various 
media-artistic projects that might consider themselves to be ‘outside of’ or ‘in opposition to’ 
mainstream design cultures – much like Dadaism, Surrealism and Situationism. As Wood (2010, 
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199) says of the former two, ‘[t]his counterculture demanded a counter-map’ to which the 
anonymous designers of Le monde au temps des Surréalists obliged. Those involved in Sukey’s 
design, development and deployment have also used their skills in various other alternative 
projects such as Hurricane Hackers, Occupy London and New York, and the Open Source Ecology 
initiative – further adding to the ‘independent’ and autonomous history of the Sukey platform.   
Thirdly, the rise of 8-bit culture is the result of the low technical specification required to actually 
produce pixelated media – whether they be console or PC games, mobile applications, ‘chiptune’ 
songs or some other 8-bit influenced project. This, I argue, is a return to a kind of low-tech 
necessity that gave birth to the original 8-bit aesthetic in the 1980s. As a result, this resurgent 
graphic style is the cultivation of a DIY ethic resulting initially from a specific technical constraint 
on a particular kind of media (videogames) that has re-imposed itself on mobile application design. 
Due to exponentially increasing computer power, mobile smartphones possess the same capacity 
for interaction and immersion as video and computer games of the 1980s. As such, the constraints 
of the time have been re-programmed for those developing and designing mobile applications. 
Yet understanding this DIY aesthetic and ethic is only possible if the interactive capacities of the 
digital interface are also explored.     
 
Interactions  
Interfaces are relational; quite literally inter-faces. As such they are not exclusively aesthetic 
objects but performances. Alexander Galloway’s (2012) critique of Manovich rests on the latter’s 
modernist emphasis on the former quality. In this, Galloway suggests that Manovich 
…returns again and again to the formal essence of the medium, the techniques and 
characteristics of the technology, and then uses these qualities to talk about the new 
(even if he ends up revealing that it is not as new as we thought it was)…Scattered 
throughout the book, Manovich advances a number of aesthetic claims that have become 
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commonplace parlance in the discourse on digital interfaces, including the idea of a “logic 
of selection,” the importance of compositing, the way in which the database itself is a 
medium, the emphasis on navigation through space, the reversal of the relationship 
between syntagm and paradigm, the centrality of games and play, the waning of temporal 
montage (and the rise of spatial montage), and many other observations. (Galloway 2012, 
3) 
This is what Galloway later calls an ‘emphasis on poetics and pure formalism’ (2012, 5) or, in other 
words, a focus on the strict aesthetic principles of the interface rather than their effects. Galloway 
also argues that Manovich’s emphasis on the poetics of the interface is simultaneously an 
‘apparent abdication of the political’ (Galloway 2012, 7). Whilst a dedication to the former is not 
necessarily an abandoning of the latter, Galloway suggests this is certainly the case for Manovich, 
whose aim it was in The Language of New Media to establish the key a priori aesthetic dimensions 
of a new type of media. That is, of the interface before the ‘injection’ of the political in the form 
of device use.  
Yet as Galloway is at pains to argue, the interface is always an effect – always a mediation rather 
than simply a medium. In this Galloway is diametrically opposed to the likes of Manovich, Friedrich 
Kittler and Marshall McLuhan who favour a ‘hermeneutics of media devices’ (Galloway 2012, 14) 
rooted in one particular designation of techne as ‘substrate and only substrate’(2012, 16). Yet as 
he continues, techne is also ‘technique, art, habitus, ethos, or lived practice’ involving ‘practices 
of mediation’ (Galloway 2012, 16) as well as media. The 8-bit aesthetic is testament to this ‘ethos’ 
or ‘lived practice’.  
It is this mediation that practitioners of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) have also drawn attention 
to. Sybille Lammes (Forthcoming, 7), for example, contends that the interface should be 
considered as a ‘sign-thing’ rather than an effect, per se, ‘in order to stress the materiality of 
interfaces as well as their transformable character’. In Manovich’s approach there is little room to 
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both pay attention to the material properties of the interface as well as its ‘transformable 
character’.      
Galloway puts it another way by considering the interface an ‘autonomous zone of aesthetic 
activity’ (Galloway 2012, vii). Yet this aesthetic activity is varied to say the least. There is a great 
difference between certain kinds of activities through which the interface affects and produces 
effects. In other words, different interfaces set different ‘trajectories’ for human and non-human 
relations (O’Grady 2015, 131). The types of manoeuvres discussed in chapter 2 have the possibility 
of being folded into these inter-face relations. Yet they are markedly different from the strokes, 
taps and double-taps of the mobile interface that also constitute an interaction. It is important to 
distinguish between these two primary variations: extended activities or manoeuvres writ large 
(occupations, splinters, rhizomes, etc.) and the inter-actions in which bodies come to interact with 
the interface itself. The ‘navigational interface’ (Lammes 2011, 5) is the pivot between the two.    
It is possible to characterize these positions in relation to their orientation. The Kittler-McLuhan-
Manovich stance is resolutely inwards into the object. The Galloway position is, on the contrary, 
an external orientation towards practice. Whilst the former delves even deeper into the aesthetic 
and graphical forms of the interface-as-media, the latter projects outwards to consider how 
media(s) form relationships with others. One is a stabilization of the interface, the other is the 
unsettling of it.  
As Galloway (2012, 30) argues, interfaces are less surfaces or planes of content than they are sites 
of ‘thresholds and transitions’. ‘An interface is not something that appears before you but rather 
is a gateway that opens up and allows passage to some place beyond’ (Galloway 2012, 30). As 
Hookway (2014, 12) explains: 
The sur-face, as a facing above or upon (sur-) a given thing, refers first of all back to the 
thing it surfaces, rather than to a relation between two or more things. A surface exists 
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primarily as an aspect of that which it surfaces, before it can be said to perform any 
additional functions or hold any other characteristics that relate to its facing.  
In this, an interface is certainly not a surface, as the former 
…does not primarily refer back to a thing or condition but rather to a relation between 
things or conditions, or to a condition as it is produced by a relation. The interface as a 
problem does not primarily bear on the characteristics or properties of the entities it 
interfaces, though it may do secondarily. Rather, the problem of the interface bears on 
what must take place in the drawing together of entities into a relation, and to the 
combined or synthesized behavior of those entities within that relation. (Hookway 2014, 
14)   
But they are also far more than their reading as digital objects or even digital relations allows for. 
Hookway (2014), for instance, traces the term back to its roots as a term coined by engineer James 
Thomson, in relation to his work on fluid dynamics. At this time, in 1869, the interface 
…denoted a dynamic boundary condition describing fluidity according to its separation of 
one distinct fluid body from another. The interface would define and separate areas of 
unequal energy distribution within a fluid in motion, whether this difference is given in 
terms of velocity, viscosity, directionality of flow, kinetic form, pressure, density, 
temperature, or any combination of these. From difference the interface would produce 
fluidity. As a boundary condition it would be inherently active. While imperceptible in 
itself, it would be inferable according to its effects.  (Hookway 2014, 59, emphasis added) 
Thus, Hookway’s (and by extension, Galloway’s) definition of the interface stays true to Thomson 
original 1869 definition of a dynamic boundary or threshold. It is this definition I put to use in the 
next section, as it contains a navigational dimension that other definitions do not cover. It also 
points towards another as yet unexplored aspect of the interface italicized above. When the 
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interface works the interface as ‘thing’ remains unseen and is only ‘inferable according to its 
effects’ – i.e. a difference in velocity, viscosity, flow, etc. This invisibility of the interface is what 
Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin (2000, 21) refer to as the ‘logic of transparent immediacy’. The 
interface only purports to work if its materiality slips into the background and only its effects 
become perceptible.     
 
Navigational Interfaces 
But what does this ‘working’ entail? What does the interface seek to do? Put simply it seeks to 
open up phenomena to the world. An interface is an exposure to a reality. In the context of the 
digital map the interface works to bring the user into relation with the phenomena of the world – 
anything and everything accessible via the medium of the digital map. Or, put otherwise, via the 
‘navigational interface’ (Lammes 2011, 5). This is what Google Maps desires to do when it says 
users can have ‘the world’s geographic information at [their] fingertips’ (Google 2015, n.p.). Thus, 
the interface becomes less a ‘technolog[y] of vision’ as suggested by John Pickles (2004, 81) and 
more a technology of aesthetic activity as envisaged by Galloway; exercising what Mark Paterson 
(2007, 128) would call ‘feeling at a distance’. In other words: 
…with the proliferation of touch screen interfaces, users of new digital mapping platforms 
engage not in a double-click manner, but in a double-tap action. In order for users to zoom 
into a mapping interface of any touch screen device, they have to perform a double-tap 
of the desired area. Completing the command will see the map focus. In so doing, as 
Google Earth claims…it becomes even more intimately possible to access the world’s 
geographic information through one’s fingertips. (Hind and Lammes 2015, 80-81, original 
emphasis) 
How do we join up these inter-actions and wider manoeuvres in the midst of the protest event? 
How can both be considered in relation to the navigational interface? I argue that it is through the 
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art of navigation – demanding a specific kind of attention and orientation – that manoeuvres and 
gestural inter-actions come together. More commonly than ever it is through the latter that the 
former is enabled: 
…as these touch screen capabilities are more prevalent in mobile devices such as 
smartphones and tablets, double-tap also refers to actions ‘on-the-go’ in which 
navigational knowledge is sought through the touch of these digital interfaces. (Hind and 
Lammes 2015, 81) 
This double-tap interaction is short-hand for a host of gestures made possible by the rise of 
touchscreen devices. These may entail a near-infinite number of gestures including, but not 
limited to: the long press, flick, pan, pinch, rotate, scroll, spread, tap, double-tap, two-finger scroll 
and the two-finger tap. The Windows 8 Operating System (OS) – the first fully-functional touch-
enabled Windows OS – recognizes eight such gestures (Microsoft 2015, n.p.), whilst Apple’s own 
include an ever-more elaborate suite of interactions including the ‘three-finger swipe’, the ‘two-
finger double-tap’ and the ‘two-finger swipe to the left from the right edge’ (Apple 2015, n.p.).  
Fig 4.2| Multi-touch gestures. Source: adapted from Wikipedia (2016)   
Each suite of multi-touch gestures has been developed for use across a range of mobile devices 
from smartphones to tablets and laptops. Some of these gestures (zoom, etc.) have more use on 
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smaller interfaces (smartphones), whilst others (edge swipes, etc.) are optimized for trackpad use 
(laptops). Regardless of device, the rise of touchscreen functionality is directly connected to the 
increased desire for mobile computing in various forms. In other words, the rise of the ‘mobile 
interface’ (Farman 2012, 16).         
The reason why ‘double-tap’ assumes a greater prominence in the detailing of this shift to 
touchscreen devices is that it purports to bring the world closer to the user, once again through 
the ‘logic of transparent immediacy’ that Bolter and Grusin (2000, 21) identify. So: 
Whereas the keyboard is a passive mechanical channel between the computer and the 
user, haptics enables a more active exploration and allows the user not just to see three-
dimensional shapes represented on the screen, but also to feel them and interact with 
them…Haptics devices are becoming cheap and ubiquitous, increasingly accessible via 
everyday technologies such as mobile phones. These unfolding technologies are a set of 
augmentations that begin to play with an emerging multisensory realm, one that talks of 
the engendering and engineering of ‘immersion’, of ‘presence’, of ‘aura’ through the 
addition of touch. (Paterson 2007, 128, original emphasis) 
It is, in short, an illusion through which the interface gains its power. It is through the interface 
that users purport to be able to seamlessly interact with the world – with the material interface 
itself becoming transparent. Like Bolter and Grusin suggest: 
 What designers often say they want is an “interfaceless” interface, in which there will be 
no recognizable electronic tools – no buttons, windows, scroll bars, or even icons as such. 
Instead the user will move through the [digital] space interacting with the objects 
“naturally” as she does in the physical world…In this sense, a transparent interface would 
be one that erases itself, so that the user is no longer aware of confronting a medium, but 
instead stands in an immediate relationship to the contents of that medium. (Bolter and 
Grusin 2000, 23–24)     
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Moreover, as Lammes argues ‘[i]nstead of simply showing ‘frozen’ spatial information, interfaces 
now also perceptibly take part in the creation of spatial relations’ (Lammes 2016, 3). Since Bolter 
and Grusin’s intervention in an early digital age, interfaces are capable of intervening in 
navigational tasks rather than merely (re)presenting spatial information. On traditional desktop 
computers and non-touchscreen devices there are multiple human-machine interfaces that need 
to be mobilized in order for a cartographic command to be carried out such as ‘search for location 
X’, ‘pan across environment Y’ or ‘zoom into feature Z’. The most obvious are the keyboard, which 
provides the ability for the user to type in the letters of location X; the mouse ball, which allows 
the user to move across environment Y; the left-mouse button which permits the user to ‘double-
click’ the map and zoom into it; and the screen, which allows the user to actually witness these 
decisions being made and to see the map itself.  
Each of the above – the keyboard, the mouse, and the screen – is known as a peripheral. That is, 
a device external to the computer itself, nonetheless interfacing with it in some way to provide 
either an input or output. In the case of the keyboard and the mouse these are inputs. Both enable 
the user to input text or to execute decisions in a GUI. Put otherwise, input peripherals are 
primarily human-to-machine interfacings permitting the user to issue commands – of a textual, 
graphical and navigational nature – to the computer itself. On the other hand, the screen is an 
output peripheral. It allows whatever decisions have been made, and commands have been 
executed, to be displayed for the user in question.  
This is a necessary feedback loop that enables the user to ‘know’ (or at least the semblance of 
knowing) what command the computer has actually carried out. For instance, whilst one could 
reasonably assume the cartographic commands introduced above had been performed if the 
specific keystrokes, clicks and navigations had been followed, this would rely on a strict 
interpretation of the necessary commands (these keystrokes, that number of clicks, etc.) and a 
working knowledge of the operational state of the machine. Any adjustment (deliberate or 
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accidental) to the commands, or a deterioration in the state of the machine would lead to an 
operational failure. In other words, the cartographic commands would not be completed.      
This is what Bruno Latour calls a ‘double-click’ philosophy (Latour and Hermant 2006, Latour 
2013), in which ‘[t]he little computer mouse makes us used to seeing information as an immediate 
transfer without any deformation, a double-click’ (Latour and Hermant 2006, 18, original 
emphasis). In one sense it is a critique of mimesis that has been prevalent across various academic 
fields from Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) to media studies, in which the interface is 
commonly only, as Lammes (2016, 5) suggests, ‘theorized as an immaterial and one-dimensional 
membrane or surface’ as opposed to a transformative material object. It is also another, material, 
reading of the same processes that Bolter and Grusin (2000) identify: that of the allegedly 
transparent interface. What is different in Latour’s account is that he ties it explicitly into hardware 
use, by suggesting that the philosophy itself is operationalized through the use of peripheral 
devices such as keyboards and computer mice.   
Unlike Latour, however, the intention here is not to position this technological interaction as 
indicative of a modernist illusion of ‘information without transformation’ (Latour 2013, 127) or 
what Norton (2013, 3) calls an ‘anti-mode’ in relation to Latour’s recent work on ‘modes of 
existence’. His explication of this double-click mentality is, perhaps more accurately, a lament for 
a closer, tactile and analytical approach to encountering technological phenomena. It is, in 
essence, a methodological approach – a way of doing. Latour desires to take this edifice down; 
only striving to understand its construction in order to set about a dismantling and a re-
construction in another form.     
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Fig 4.3 | Touchscreen layers. Source: Stavrakis (2012)   
Things are different, however, with the kind of touchscreen device the Sukey platform was 
designed to be used on. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, touchscreens provide a combined 
input/output permitting the user to both issue commands (search, pan, zoom) in the form of 
specific ‘multi-touch’ gestures (tap, pan, double-tap) and relay the results of these commands 
back to the user in the form of a visual feedback. Materially these are different ‘layers’ comprising 
of, at the least, a protective shield, a capacitive touch panel, an electrical field and a TFT (thin-film 
transistor) LCD display. Together these comprise what one would collectively call ‘the interface’. 
Indeed, unless the device is pulled apart or otherwise broken, these sub-layers remain invisible. 
Phenomenologically, then, the user interacts only with the top layer of such as attached to the 
front of a mobile device – and yet visual feedback is provided via the TFT LCD display, and haptic 
gestures are only registered through the capacitive touch panel.      
From the latter perspective, the touchscreen performs a dual purpose. Though materially it 
comprises of multiple internal interfaces and interfacings (between shield and touch panel, touch 
panel and electrical field, etc.), for the human operator it is a double interface providing both 
human-to-machine (input) and machine-to- human (output) interactions; even if this ‘impedes 
immersion’ due to this convergence of input and output (Kaerlein 2012, n.p.).          
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Whilst visual feedback might seem like the primary form of relay for the user to ascertain whether 
their commands have been performed, touchscreen devices are also reliant upon other particular 
vibrations and sounds. These mitigate against some of the apparent pitfalls of using a mobile 
touchscreen device as outlined by Kaerlein (2012). Put otherwise, the touchscreen device is a 
‘double interface’ in a communication flow sense (input/output) but is also a double, or even 
triple, interface for the way in which it provides feedback in more than one register. As 
touchscreen devices differ from previous iterations of the mobile phone or laptop because they 
lack actual, individual, raised keys that can be felt apart from the main body of the device, other 
ways of notifying users of their actions is necessary. More often than not this is in the guise of a 
small vibration every time the user touches the interface. This allows users to make a binary 
distinction between touch and non-touch – although not to differentiate between the type of 
action performed (letter typed, application opened, etc.). Although this is perhaps a rather 
primitive haptic feature – especially for those able to feel braille and interpret refreshable braille 
displays – it nonetheless is a radical feature for those unaccustomed to receiving anything other 
than visual cartographic feedback.  
Secondly, with the lack of any peripheral devices such as a separate keyboard, mouse, or screen 
the input functions that interface with the GUI become internalized. In other words, they become 
‘black-boxed’ and away from view. As Latour (1987, 2-3) suggests ‘[t]he word black box is used by 
cyberneticians whenever a piece of machinery or a set of commands is too complex. In its place 
they draw a little box about which they need to know nothing but its input and output’. As such 
the mobile device itself becomes a black-box in its entirety – with the mechanical and electronic 
aspects of its working hidden from view. Yet this is not simply a rhetorical flourish by 
cyberneticians and Actor-Network theorists alike. Many smartphones cannot be opened by the 
user at all – only ‘interfaced’ with power and transfer cables or via Wi-Fi and Bluetooth 
connections. Instead, when things fail and the device stops working, it must be sent back to the 
manufacturer. The only ‘certified’ people that have permission to open the black box itself are 
| 101 
 
employees of the manufacturer themselves. The black-boxing of the mobile device is now a 
common, and crucially accepted, feature. This is another way in which the mobile touchscreen 
device has ensured a ‘double-click’ importance.       
Thirdly, following Paterson, touchscreen devices engender and enable ‘a more active exploration’ 
with digital phenomena, as opposed to the ‘passive mechanical channel[s]’ (Paterson 2007, 128) 
or ‘metronymic and calculative clicks’ (Hind and Gekker 2014, 6) of peripheral inputs like 
keyboards, mice and even gaming joysticks and controllers. The touchscreen device is, inversely, 
portrayed as an object with inherently playful characteristics that allow users to artistically, 
sensually and intimately ‘feel’ their way across the interface itself, and in turn, ‘feel’ or 
‘manipulate’ the very things they encounter on the device. This is often how touchscreen devices 
are sold – as more ‘natural’ or ‘intuitive’ in the way users can interact with it. Peripherals are 
unambiguously pieces of computer hardware. Keyboards can be used for nothing other than 
inputting characters into a computer, and mice have no other function than to allow for the 
navigation across on-screen spaces and the selection of phenomena within them.  
Yet the interface is ambiguous in form and requires little reduction to cast it merely as a surface 
as opposed to a device component. Thus one is invited to view it alongside other similarly flat, 
rectangular surfaces: panes of glass, paint canvases, office desks and coffee tables. Any of the 
gestures and movements one can perform in relation to these can, to an extent, be performed 
through the touchscreen interface. In other words, one can see through the interface like through 
a pane of glass, perform painterly strokes like on a canvas, position various objects like on an office 
desk and move objects around like on a coffee table. In essence, the touchscreen is seen as 
‘intuitive’ and ‘natural’ because it performs skeuomorphically as a non-digital object.    
This is what is meant by a shift to a ‘double-tap’ mode of (inter)action (Hind and Lammes 2015, 
80). Double-tap characterizes the shift to both touchscreen and mobile devices. Not only does this 
strengthen Latour’s double-click philosophy – by updating and refining it – but it also draws 
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attention to these gestural and mobile dynamics so integral to navigational practices. In more 
specific terms, then, the kinds of navigational practices that are generated during protest events. 
The Sukey platform was an integral ‘pivot’ between the gestural ‘double-tap’ actions and spatial 
manoeuvres such as occupations, splinters and rhizomes, allowing navigational information to 
flow through the platform, enabling users to make navigational decisions during protests.      
In his description of the ‘online Paris’ Latour and Emilie Hermant create, the former alludes to the 
tactile affordances of representations: 
We can see the social; we can even touch it. Through comments, images and models we 
can show this showing and make this touch tangible provided we follow up tracers, a little 
despised, often barely visible, that bureaucracies abundantly multiply, that computers 
materialize, and that we call “paper slips” when they circulate and “signs” when they have 
been fixed to something. (Latour and Hermant 2006, 18) 
Further on in the same text, Latour offers a little more on this: 
The person pointing to the rat’s neuron touches a sheet of glossy paper, the head end of 
a network of multiple and heterogeneous substitutions. Clearly, there is a reference; what 
he [a biologist by the name of Etienne Audinat] says is real; the proof lies at his fingertips, 
provided he doesn’t, for a single second, leave the narrow shaft in which layers of 
intermediaries flow, each differing from the one before and the one after by a miniscule 
gap, a hiatus. (Latour and Hermant 2006, 23) 
The attempt, therefore, is not to discredit Latour’s exposure of double-click. Instead, the intention 
is to build on it. His characterization of double-click is a precursor to the development of a 
methodological approach (ANT). The desire here, on the contrary, is to develop an understanding 
of a double-tap mode of existence in order to fully comprehend the gestural, mobile nature of the 
navigational interface. Latour’s double-click philosophy does not, and cannot, take into account 
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the shift to mobile forms of computing. As a result, the three aspects identified before remain 
unexplored as phenomena – despite their integration into mobile devices and ways of navigating.  
If employing double-click, we cannot understand how touchscreen devices provide a combined 
input/output for both issuing commands and relaying the results of those commands back to the 
user. This is different to how peripherals are used, and means we mistake and mis-locate the 
feedback mechanism at play. Further, we cannot then understand how the device blackboxes 
these now-internal mechanisms designed to generate combined input/output functions. With 
double-click we are forced to rely upon an outdated metaphor of using a computer mouse and 
desktop. As a result, we cannot consider how the device is able to become mobile and thus affect 
navigation. Finally, being loyal to double-click results in missing the different, purportedly 
‘intuitive’ and ‘natural’ modes of interaction with touchscreen devices. Instead, one is stuck with 
considering that our only interaction with phenomena in a digital environment is through the 
clicks of the mouse button. As such, we cannot consider the quality or breadth of these new 
gestures.   
In turn, and more appropriate to the Sukey platform, we fail to identify the generation of 
manoeuvres during protest events. With these moves made the interface morphs into a stable, 
mobile, technological proposition for this purpose. Without them we are left to wonder exactly 
how and why the touchscreen – as a navigational interface – plays a significant role in mediating 
the suite of counter-containment manoeuvres introduced in chapter 2.  
Returning to the definition of an interface as a kind of ‘threshold or boundary condition’ (Hookway 
2014, 16) the coming-into-being of particular protest manoeuvres can be detailed. Only when a 
threshold is crossed – courtesy of a building of momentum – is the manoeuvre fully realized. Up 
until this point it operates across a virtual field (in the Deleuzian sense) ready and primed but not 
actualized. Employing Hookway’s (2014) more expansive, and original, definition of the interface 
allows for these connections to be made. Without it, the interface can only be comprehended in 
| 104 
 
relation to digital devices. If one is to be able to draw connections between how such thresholds 
or boundary conditions act and manifest themselves then the job of understanding how mobile, 
digital mapping technologies are integrated, enrolled and assembled in through navigational 
practices becomes a much easier one.    
In shifting focus from double-click to double-tap one becomes more attentive to so-called 
‘mapping moments’ (Dodge et al. 2009, 234). Although I have suggested before that one 
difference between Latour’s double-click and the concept of double-tap is that the former is a 
methodological move and the latter an empirical one, I concede the latter also allows 
methodological moves to be made. Turning attention to mobile devices as opposed to desktop 
computers does not on its own allow for novel, methodological approaches to magically be 
devised. This is why outlining the combined input/output function of the touchscreen, the 
blackboxed nature of the device, and the allegedly ‘intuitive’ interaction it affords, is necessary. 
As will be seen throughout, for manoeuvres within a protest event these comprise of a) an 
increase in the level of care taken (attention) b) a navigational desire to re-orientate oneself in 
relation to an external body or occurrence (orientation) or c) an increase in the level of risk taken 
(intensity). Each of these aspects is mediated by the navigational interface.       
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to do several things. In the first instance I have argued, following 
Pold (2005) and Andersen and Pold (Andersen and Pold 2011) that the interface brings with it a 
certain set of aesthetic principles. However, despite the prominence of a particular kind of design 
aesthetic centered on modernist principles of clarity and functionality, there are other such 
interface aesthetics that propose different realities. One of these – an 8-bit aesthetic – originally 
borne out of technical constraints has come to embody a counter-culture. Despite the slow release 
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of these constraints over the decades pixelated graphics – the hallmark of 8-bit aesthetics – has 
consistently re-emerged as a stylistic and, further, political choice for designers.   
Yet the interface itself is variously a material object, a mediator and an effect. In the first instance, 
the interface is a major component of digital devices from desktop computers to mobile 
smartphones. It is, in other words, a material object. Yet, despite mimetic pretenses, it is also a 
‘sign-thing’ (Lammes 2016, 5) that allows particular actions to take place between different actors 
whether they be human or non-human. In an original sense an interface is a ‘dynamic boundary 
condition’ (Hookway 2014, 59) or a ‘zone across which all activity must occur in order to possess 
meaning, force, or power’ (Hookway 2014, 63). As a result, the interface is also simultaneously an 
‘interface effect’ (Galloway 2012) that generates a particular kind of socio-spatial outcome as a 
result of its ontological status as a boundary condition, zone or threshold between two or more 
possible states. Without these various understandings of the interface it is impossible to see how 
it can generate particular actions in and through the world.  
However, it is the ‘navigational interface’ (Lammes 2011, 5) of mobile devices that brings about a 
‘double-tap’ (Hind and Lammes 2015, 80) interaction central to the Sukey platform. It was through 
the taps, stokes and pinches of the capacitive touchscreen that allowed individuals to interact with 
spatial phenomena for the purposes of navigating through protest events. The reason for why this 
double-tap articulation is critical, is that it is through this interaction that it purports to bring the 
world closer to the user. As a double or even triple interface, the capacitive touchscreen allows 
for inputs and outputs in various sensory modes besides the exclusively visual including the haptic 
and the aural.  
In order to make sense of this it is useful to employ one of Galloway’s (2012, 51) ‘regimes of 
signification’. The case study in question is the combination of an inward orientation towards a 
specific, unified and ‘coherent aesthetic’ (Galloway 2012, 46) of 8-bit or pixelated graphics with 
an outward orientation towards the unspecified, splintered and ‘incoherent politics’ (Galloway 
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2012, 47) of de- and re-territorializing manoeuvres. The pivot between the two, I argue, is the 
navigational interface that allows these states to be worked on and across. The activation of this 
navigational interface via double-tap activity is the contention within this chapter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
| 107 
 
Chapter 5 | Risk  
 
This chapter will attempt to unpack the nature of risk – vis-à-vis digital mapping and the protest 
event – in order to draw attention to a number of productive tensions in the disruptive 
cartographic enterprise. In the previous chapter I argued that the navigational interface was 
simultaneously a material object, a mediator of activity and an effect (an ‘interfacing’). It is 
through such an interface that navigational knowledges are sought; allowing users to garner 
critical information pertinent to their geographic location, personal safety and activist aims.     
Risk manifests itself through particular spatial practices. It is through the performance of various 
kinds of manoeuvres different degrees and kinds of risks are exercised, calculated, advanced, and 
variously celebrated, intensified, mitigated against or ignored. In a cartographic sense, risk is a 
state that occurs across, and in relation to, ‘calculable territory’ (Hannah 2009, 66) during protest 
events. In other words, that calculations made by activists in demonstrations variously affect their 
exposure to numerous risks such as police containments.   
Yet, historically, as Sam Kinsley (2014) suggests, there have been few studies on the calculable 
practices of non-sovereign bodies, or on how a ‘distributed model of sovereignty and control [can] 
exist’ (Galloway and Thacker 2007, 47). As Hannah (2009) and Rose-Redwood (2008; 2012) argue, 
such a process depends on a sequence of necessary inscriptive actions that - as Elden (2013) rightly 
says - comprise various socio-cultural ‘techniques’ extending from geo-carto-tools (used for 
surveying, triangulation, and statistical analysis, for example) to wider political and cultural 
concepts, epistemologies and practices. Although states and mapping companies still undertake 
a large proportion of this work, so do extra-institutional actors. 
Secondly, it will be argued that cartographic disruption is an inherently risky endeavor. This allows 
us to say two things. Although calls for ‘ever-riskier’ cartographic practice – as argued by the likes 
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of Gerlach (2014) – are increasingly prevalent, it shall be argued that disruptive cartographies 
oscillate between escalating and minimizing risk. Indeed, that ever-riskier cartographic practice – 
although a welcome clarion call for open-ended mapping endeavors – present an unavoidable, 
unresolvable tension at the heart of the production of cartographic knowledge. In fact, as will be 
suggested here, it is the acknowledgement and successful management of this tension that leads 
to the most effective cartographic projects.   
Next, Louise Amoore’s (2009, 2011, 2013) work will be presented as a potential entry-point into 
the discussion around risk, anticipation and political action that is missing from the above-
mentioned literature on calculable territories. As such, disruptive cartographies will be presented 
as operating through not simply a cartographic logic but an ‘anticipatory logic’ (Anderson 2010, 
792, emphasis added). In fact, it will be argued that cartographic logic inherently involves an 
anticipatory logic also, in order to properly attend to what has been called ‘risky territory’ 
(November et al. 2010, 581). The unpacking of the Deleuzian definition of the virtual – as a ‘real’ 
but un-actualized state – is integral here in order to properly situate this argument. In other words, 
in order for a disruptive cartographic project to occur, it must work across future, possible terrains 
in order to secure and advance an operational present.   
   
Calculable Territory  
Establishing the connection between spatial practice, cartographic logic and the concept of risk is 
an important first move. In Matthew Hannah’s work on the West German census boycott 
movements of the 1980s, the concept of ‘calculable territory’ (Hannah 2009, 66) is used to identify 
a set of largely state practices that involve the ordering of geographical knowledge and the 
imposition of such onto a population through various forms of ‘spatial inscription’ (Rose-Redwood 
2008, 289). As Stuart Elden has argued, territory itself is neither a benign force, nor commensurate 
with other corollary theorizations such as ‘political-economic notions of land, nor even…[in the] 
| 109 
 
political-strategic sense of terrain’ but must be understood, instead, comprising ‘the techniques 
used to – amongst other elements – measure land control and terrain’ (Elden 2013, 17).  
Territory is far more than the ground on which it is based. Yet Hannah further explains that 
calculable territory ‘remains not merely relevant but absolutely central to all modern forms of 
governance, including sovereignty’ (Hannah 2009, 68, emphasis added). The reason for this is that 
calculation – of territory, of population, of capital flows – is a direct attempt to measure and 
attenuate differing kinds of governmental risks that seek to threaten the security, extent and 
strength of sovereign power. Therefore, calculation is a logic through which such risks can be 
evaluated and acted upon in order to solidify such power. Some of the efforts to reduce territorial 
risk have been monumental – on a scale only made possible by nation states. Even then, the 
successful execution of such projects is by no means assured. Matthew Hannah’s (2009) analysis 
of the efforts by the West German state to implement a new federal census show this in stark 
terms, as does Matthew Edney’s (1997) explication of the British Empire’s mapping of India. In 
regards to the former, such an ambitious project was driven by a need to perform modern 
‘biopolitical activities’ (Hannah 2009, 70) such as state planning, educational provision and welfare 
delivery without which the state would cease to operate effectively and efficiently. In the absence 
of these huge calculative efforts the state itself, it is argued, leaves itself open to higher degrees 
and kinds of risk that intersect with basic sovereign functions. In plain terms, these risks manifest 
themselves most prominently across a spatial terrain affecting, for instance, the boundary-making 
and boundary-securing of the state, the movement of citizens, or the operation of commercial 
activities.              
Although sovereign forms of power have historically involved the ordering of geographical 
knowledge for purposes of population and territorial control, they are not alone in this. Indeed, 
too often have territorial concerns been wrapped up in notions of sovereignty and sovereign 
power – even if ‘the private interests of capital also have a considerable stake in reconfiguring the 
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interiority of the territory as a calculable space’ (Rose-Redwood 2012, 301). Whilst sovereign and 
colonial powers have committed to undertake ambitious, sometime disastrous projects in order 
to ameliorate potential threats to their existence, territory is performed in many other arenas by 
many other actors who not fit into the usual mould – either as quasi-state actors or through the 
private interests of capital. As Galloway and Thacker suggest, the sovereign state has shifted to 
articulating a new ‘regulatory model…fostering, impelling, and optimizing life’ (Galloway and 
Thacker 2007, 76). Moreover, the state is now not the sole actor capable of calculation; not least 
in relation to territorial ambitions. Yet, as Sam Kinsley (2014, 369) has noted ‘there have been 
fewer studies of calculative practices by non-state actors’ despite this shift. It is this dearth of 
research on such that the first section in this chapter seeks to address.   
Further, as has been discussed in previous chapters, ‘disruptive cartography’ does not concern 
state actors. The practice of mapping in this mode does not ‘ape’ state practices, nor exist in a 
dualistic relation to it, or even serve to ‘subvert’ it in any way. It cannot, also, be seen as sovereign 
form, if sovereignty is defined as the ‘ability to suspend the law’ (Galloway and Thacker 2007, 115) 
rather than the capacity to merely impose it. At no point, despite tactical pretenses, did Sukey or 
the activists allied to, and around it, magically assume either ability. Yet it resolutely mobilizes the 
above conceptualization of territory in order to perform similar moves that might otherwise be 
seen as the preserve of the state. Or even still, to perform actions that equally might not be seen 
as the preserve of the state, at least in relation to territorial concerns. The way in which, for 
example, disruptive mappings have sought to provide care in an otherwise care-less space.  
But how does calculability enhance, or help codify the concept of territory? As Kinsley (2014) 
suggests, few studies have been undertaken that approach territory from a non-sovereign 
perspective. Therefore, in order to look at how it has historically been appraised we need to 
evaluate these sovereign definitions. For Hannah, calculation enabled the ‘modern governance of 
populations’ through a commitment towards a ‘general science of order’ that 
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…had two components: mathesis and taxinomia. The first concept denotes a commitment 
to approach the known world as a calculable order of “simple natures” representable (in 
principle) through algebra; the second, taxinomia, refers to the ordering of complex or 
composite phenomena by means of establishing their relations of identity and difference. 
(Hannah 2009, 67)  
On its own, the conceptualization of territory does not necessarily gesture towards this algebraic 
representation or taxonomic relationship. Put simply, calculable territory refers directly to forms 
of territorial action that directly enroll mathesis and taxinomia in the art of governance. In order 
to sketch out this calculable territory, Hannah turns to a model devised by Reuben Rose-Redwood 
(2008) that lists six operative elements, simplified to: a basic coordinate system; boundaries; built, 
legible environment; demographic information; additional data; and event-based knowledge 
(Hannah 2009, 68). 
The project undertaken by the West German state during the 1980s to enforce a census on the 
population amounts to number four in the model: the acquisition of demographic information 
pertaining to the citizens of the state. The triangulation of India during British imperial rule across 
the 18th and 19th centuries served numbers one (‘a basic coordinate system’) and two 
(‘boundaries’) in the model in order for further state and non-state activities to take place; 
everything from general administration to commercial exchange. Each concerned the direct 
enrollment of both mathesis and taxinomia. Firstly, that a numerical value could be attributed to 
various phenomena and spaces and, secondly, that such values could be organized and scrutinized 
in reference to other commensurable valuations in order to discern similarities, proximities and 
differences.   
Yet in detailing this model, Hannah suggests that the heuristic ‘clearly suggests what would be 
entailed in the emergence of a more total “surveillance society”’ (Hannah 2009, 69) – even if the 
reality is far more fragmented in its operation. However, rather than consider the above in relation 
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to what Philip Agre (1994) would call the ‘surveillance model’, it is perhaps more productive to fit 
each of the above into the cyclical process of the ‘capture model’ instead. This, in contrast, entails 
the acquisition and representation of data. ‘The capture model’, argues Agre (1994, 109, emphasis 
added), ‘describes the situation that results when grammars of action are imposed upon human 
activities’. However, although the above is a general structure, it is not necessarily vertically 
organized so that, for example, number three is reliant on number two, which in turn is reliant on 
number one, despite Hannah’s suggest that the above constitute ‘basic “layers” or “levels”’ 
(Hannah 2009, 68). As such, each ‘grammar’ has the potential to work independent of the other.   
Event-based knowledges, for instance, are not necessarily dependent on additional data ‘tied to 
demographic and economic units’ (although often are, of course) (Hannah 2009, 68), and built, 
legible environments do not necessarily require the operation of boundaries – state – or 
otherwise. A good example of the latter are telecommunication networks that in practice act 
entirely independent of such, as projects such as ‘Border Bumping’ (Oliver 2012, n.p.) reveal.   
These ‘grammar of action’ suppose a certain degree of violence inherent in the notion of capturing 
phenomena. As Hannah echoes, the 1987 West German census controversy ‘highlighted the fact 
that the knowledge needed for biopolitics or sovereignty presupposes intervention’ (Hannah 
2009, 70, emphasis added). In other words, in order to impose a new calculative process onto a 
population, for the purposes of exercising biopolitical or sovereign power, a violence of some kind 
of another had to be wrought on those subject to the process. Even if the model should be thought 
of, as Hannah suggests, ‘neither as a an exhaustive nor…a fully realistic representation of the role 
of territory in actually existing power relations’ (Hannah 2009, 68), the abstraction chosen to 
represent this process (i.e. a layering) nonetheless has a performative power that affects this 
representation. Re-inscribing the above as separate but possibly intersecting ‘capture cycles’ 
allows us, in a methodological sense, to re-imagine calculable territory.  
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Moreover, the general emphasis on calculable territory being a sovereign act is still implicit in the 
above model, a position only supported by Rose-Redwood’s (2012, 300, original emphasis) 
contention that the number itself is a ‘political technology that renders the world calculable as a 
strategy of government’ rather than govern-ance more generally. Indeed, in much of the model 
above, most of the elements are defined in relation to state activities – whether in the form of 
boundary-making or census delivery. This continued emphasis on distinctly state forms of 
calculable territory is attributable to a general approach that is indebted to the work of Foucault, 
and in particular, his Security, Territory, Population lectures (Foucault 2007) that focus on 
‘governmentality’. Wresting conceptions of calculable territory away from this Foucauldian 
framing is therefore necessary if we are to consider it without reference to sovereign power. The 
constant desire to always return the practice of calculation back towards the state prevents us 
from being able to witness other actor’s use of it in and of itself.  
 
Event-based Knowledges  
It is the final of the six elements however, that is of most relevance, as it is during protest events 
that event-based knowledges are produced and interacted with most readily. Whilst it can 
generally be suggested that the speed of each operation in the model above increases as one 
progresses through the elements this should not necessarily be the distinguishing feature of each. 
Although a wholesale coordinate system might take years to lay down, and event-based 
knowledges possess a dynamism that temporally limits their operation; one does not preclude the 
other. That is, the production and maintenance of the former may, and does, include the latter.  
Whilst a protest event may take place within an urban environment deemed to have operated 
through a basic coordinate system built at the beginning of the modern era (calculative element 
number one), the ongoing production of internal boundaries (calculative element number two) 
and constant updating and re-generation of the built, legible environment (calculative element 
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number three) muddy this temporal framing. Whilst the platform was oriented towards the 
generation of event-based knowledges, this generative force depended on the affordance of the 
deployed mapping platform that in turn was selectively interpreting the built, legible environment 
in order to display different types and levels of infrastructure. Event-based knowledges, therefore, 
do not act alone but in concert with many of the other operative elements of calculable territory 
across temporal registers.    
Moreover, it is perhaps the one calculable mode which is most dissociable from state, sovereign 
action – therefore making it a relatively easier theoretical move to begin with the most discernable 
extra-state process. Whilst it is possible for a non-state or non-corporate entity to produce a basic 
coordinate system7 or even a built, legible environment; it is practically more believable for such 
bodies to engage in the collection of demographic data (calculative element number four), 
additional data (calculative element number five) and event-based knowledges (calculative 
element number six). In more detail, Hannah notes the importance of 
…[m]ore fleeting, ‘transactional’ or ‘event-based’ knowledge, that is, records of 
individuals being at particular places doing specific things at specific times (e.g. buying 
something with a credit card or running a red light). (Hannah 2009, 68) 
The identification of event-based knowledge as a specific kind of territorial inscription provides 
the perfect opportunity for a wider interpretation of calculable territory beyond the state. As they 
are defined by Hannah (2009, 68)  as ‘[m]ore fleeting’ activities compared to the formation of 
coordinate systems or the creation of a legible built environment, they enter into an ‘everyday’ 
framework through which a whole plethora of actors become able to generate event-based 
knowledge. Whilst it may be fanciful to suggest that non-state entities are capable of designing 
coordinate systems (less still being able to legally enact them), and the capture of ‘basic socio-
                                                          
7 The rise of the what3words platform is illustrative of this, with the world divided up into 57 trillion 3m2 
squares each addressed with a ‘unique combination of just 3 words’ (see; what3words 2016, n.p.).  
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economic or demographic information’ (Hannah 2009, 68) now as easily carried out by private 
companies, arguing that event-based knowledge can be generated by other kinds of actors is far 
less contentious.  
In fact, it could be said that these fleeting records actually characterize the activities of non-state 
actors more than they do the state itself. In essence they comprise the minutiae of quotidian 
experience: from commuting to work, to purchasing goods, and engaging in leisure activities. The 
event-based knowledges produced from such activities do not, by default, intersect with the state, 
but instead exist in their own extra-state worlds. Although this is not to say that they don’t 
intersect with the state, many do. However, it is (a) not the state that is necessarily the primary 
driver of such knowledge, nor is it (b) a default (inter)mediary for such activities. 
Moreover, with the rise of digital, mobile technologies it becomes absolutely critical to analyze 
what, historically, is a novel, emergent capacity to capture, record and store vast quantities of 
everyday data. Not only is it theoretically more believable that extra-institutional actors 
participate in the generation of such (as opposed to other calculable territorial practices), but it is 
being practically shown to be the case. The comparative ease at which quotidian data can be 
produced is testament to this. Indeed, much of the event-based data that is generated is 
backgrounded or automated in some way; from geo-locative data to web-tracking data. It is this 
kind of data that we generally refer more appropriately to as ‘metadata’. In other words, data that 
provides the context of a related packet of data rather than the packet content itself. Whilst geo-
locative data commonly provides us with a geo-coordinate of some kind, based on a general 
coordinate system, it does not always give us the context for this location – the what, why, when 
and who.      
This is why the concept of calculable territory needs to be understood in more detail and in 
relation to these everyday activities, as they constitute the most novel of calculative territorial 
processes. Yet, digital, mobile technologies do not always float free from these other operative 
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elements. In fact, they rely on many of those very same ones discussed by Rose-Redwood and 
Hannah. But more than this: they also aid in actively producing, tweaking and maintaining them – 
perhaps even on that rare occasion to dissolving, collapsing or re-constituting them. Perhaps then, 
it is no grand assumption to posit the following: it is through event-based knowledge that all other 
calculative territorial practices now flow.      
With these clarifications in mind it perhaps becomes a little less easy to argue that the concept of 
calculable territory should be defined exclusively in relation the sovereign power. Yet, Foucauldian 
emphasis on governmentality has, up until now, only served to make any such argument harder 
to propose – by limiting the space in which calculable territory might be theorized. If these event-
based calculative territorial processes have the capacity to engage with, affect and otherwise re-
constitute other operative elements – from basic coordinate systems to demographic data – then 
a certain power lies in the ability to intervene and disrupt such activities.     
 
Making Things Legible  
In order to unpack the notion of calculable territory a little bit more, Hannah identifies ‘two 
distinct but mutually dependent epistemological moments’ (Hannah 2009, 68) that define it, and 
are as equally applicable to one process as it is another. The key point is that each one of Rose-
Redwood and Hannah’s identified calculative territorial processes are defined by a commitment 
to, and deployment of, these two logics.  
The first of these is legibility, which Hannah explains with the help of James C. Scott (1998) and 
Michael Curry et al. (2004) is   
 …a matter of inscribing territory with basic systems of geographical reference that allow 
knowledge about populations, resources or activities to be indexed to specific locations, 
and hence make territory readable. (Hannah 2009, 68) 
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In general, to make something ‘legible’, one has to construct a system through which the practices 
in question can be delivered. Further, a vocabulary will also certainly be necessary through which 
the ‘thing’ can be articulated and referred to. There must be an anchoring in the former and more 
often than not in the latter too. Making something legible therefore, allows it to be ‘read’ 
according to the prescribed system; both in operative and interpretative terms. In contemporary 
sovereign terms the most common of these practices is surveying, or more specifically, cadastral 
surveying involving the mapping and ordering of land in legal, property terms. The commissioning 
of a postal or zipcode system through which each residential, business or governmental entity is 
given a unique address, is another such practice of making territory legible. This necessary 
inscription of reference system onto referent is, in essence, the practice of contemporary 
cartography. As ever, it is an intensely political practice – wrapped up in violent colonial 
mechanisms for re-defining and re-assigning land rights. Codifying and disseminating information 
on how exactly to interpret such a mechanism is critical to its uptake – enforced or otherwise.  
Fig 5.1 | Media monitoring workflow. Source: Uchaguzi (2013)   
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However, the same is just as true for the generation of event-based knowledges. Both an 
operative framework and an interpretative system must be devised in order for such practices to 
become normalized, contextualized, and universalized (Bittner et al. 2013, Mulder et al. 2016). 
One such example can be derived from the media monitoring of three Kenyan by-elections in 
2012. This workflow is similar to one deployed by the Sukey team, and involves the schematic 
drawing of relations between various inputs, flows and outputs. In the Kenyan case, this 
comprised of: media monitoring and SMS teams (inputs), language translations, categorizations 
and edits (flows), and final by-election reports (outputs). In developing such an operative 
framework, the entirety of the system can be made legible not only to those responsible for 
processes within the system, but also to those reliant on it from ‘without’.   
This geographical process of ‘making territory legible’ requires the analysis of existing forms of 
(territorial) activity and the identification of possible fundamental units of operation (land 
registries, postal codes, etc.). In this, territory is not cast as a fixed neutral object but as ‘the 
outcome of actions conducted toward it or some previously supposedly neutral area’ (Elden 2013, 
17). Moreover, that territory is conceptualized as ‘itself a process, made and remade, shaped and 
shaping, active and reactive’ (Elden 2013, 17). That this processual re-making and re-shaping 
occurs by virtue of event-based practices should be emphasized. Although, as Elden further 
contends, considering territory as a process rather than a neutral object is not simply enough, but 
must consider the assembling and dis-assembling of various techniques and elements that come 
to ‘measure land and control and manage terrain’ itself (Elden 2013, 17). As a final point, this 
legibility involves the development, dissemination, and subsequent unpacking, of the building 
blocks that go into capturing the event-based practice computationally – in this case navigational 
commands and spatial manoeuvres during a protest event.    
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Mobilizing Knowledge 
The other epistemological moment through which calculable territory can be identified involves 
the mobilization of knowledge. In simple terms, it is the process through which the data captured 
by the inscriptive procedure outlined previously is ‘put to work’ or otherwise ‘mobilized’ for the 
purposes of territorial control. As Hannah suggests, once again in relation to the West German 
census boycott movement, ‘this advance still depends to an important degree on the cooperation 
of individuals’ (Hannah 2009, 69) through consensual compliance. However, this is not always the 
case. Although it may seem as if the difference between the surveillance and capture models, as 
detailed by Agre (1994), is between either the clandestine extraction of knowledge and the 
consensual, ‘democratic’ collection of data, this is actually far from the case. Indeed, this is where 
Hannah also falls foul of this distinction, making no mention of the way in which geographical 
order and forms of data capture can be violently imposed upon populations without any kind of 
‘cooperation’. Indeed, it could be argued that the majority of cartographic projects actually entail 
either coercive or clandestine techniques.  
At the other end of the scale – besides consensual, coercive or clandestine methods – there is also 
collaborative capture. This is another way in which the notion of calculable territory should be 
thought differently. The nature of collaboration – i.e. the coming together of otherwise separate 
groups – demands a greater emphasis on non-state actors. Although state collaboration is of 
course possible (and indeed, prevalent in the form of territorial blocs and agreements), it also 
permits other kinds of collaboration between state and non-state, and also non-state and non-
state. Collaborative capture involves the imposition of new ways of gathering data and formalizing 
activities that differ significantly from the others – most notably in the mutuality that is offered 
via this model. Event-based practices entail the generation of data from multiple, individualized 
sources (Elwood and Leszczynski 2012). This mutual agreement – whereby both or all parties gain 
equally from the relationship – is not present in consensual, coercive or clandestine operations.  
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Nevertheless, in all these cases – whether through consensual, coercive or clandestine capture 
processes – there is an imposition of a ‘way of doing things’ onto the individual and pre-existing 
activities. Although the method may differ, it necessarily involves a disruption of existing practices 
and an implementation of new, to-be-learnt ones. As Agre has argued, it is at this point that the 
grammar assumes a ‘normative force’ (Agre 1994, 110) outlining what the activity in question 
ought to be in relation to the now formalized model. I argue the Sukey platform imposed a new 
way of both navigating and accessing navigational knowledge previously impossible during protest 
events.      
The first stage of this ‘mobilization’ therefore involves a mobilization of the abstract – an 
execution/prescription of the model – onto to the activity. In a cartographic sense this involves 
imposing the map onto – or in advance of – the territory itself in order to fully constitute it. The 
Twitter message parsing system, it also can be argued, is the primary mode through which 
protesters came to comprehend this geographical-infrastructural relationship between place, 
communication and delivery. The mobilization of knowledge requires a second part, however. 
Once the new grammar has been imposed onto the activity (whether through consensual, 
coercive or clandestine methods) it cannot sustain itself indefinitely without further 
instrumentation. 
What is important to note here is how the mobilization of knowledge entails the deployment of 
‘political technologies’ both in the narrow instrumental sense as demonstrated in Agre’s capture 
model, and in the wider sense as theorized by Elden (2007, 2013). Put otherwise; how the latter 
conceptualization can help to re-consider the former as ‘shot through with social practices of the 
“political” at every turn’ (Rose-Redwood 2012, 301). Or even more appropriately to the case 
study, what Joe Painter calls ‘networked socio-technical practices’ (Painter 2010, 1096). We will 
return to these ideas later. Needless to say, this instrumentation is far from a technical, a-political 
stage, but conversely an intensely political one.         
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What connects these kinds of collaborative operations to consensual methods is that both require, 
and are built on, access permissions to be granted by each and every data provider. Digital, mobile 
‘app’ culture is predicated on the gifting of access by individuals to various kinds of data modules 
within an electronic device such as a smartphone or tablet. These permissions include, but are not 
limited to: access to photographic and video files, access to Wi-Fi connection, access to a 
microphone, access to a camera, access to text messages, or access to GPS. In essence, any 
particular function within the device itself. Without the granting of these permissions the 
application is either unable to work at all, or severely restricted in its operation. Nonetheless it is 
this permissive logic that underpins the mobilization of geographic knowledge produced by digital, 
mobile devices – whether in consensual or collaborative modes. Coercive or clandestine methods 
involve a flow of data from one to another for the direct benefit of only one. Collaborative capture 
involves a multi-directional flow of data between one and the other for mutual benefit.  
 
Between Capture and Addition  
However, in returning to Joe Gerlach’s (2010; 2014; 2015) work, introduced in chapter 3, it is now 
possible to say that generating ‘ever-riskier’ cartographies is ontologically impossible – as well as 
being ethically undesirable– as mapping necessitates the capture, calculation and ordering of 
geographical knowledge. Moreover, that mapping cannot escape imposing a grammar of action 
upon associated activities. In Gerlach’s call for an ever-riskier cartography he demands that we 
think in more abstract terms about a) what mapping is and b) what ethico-political positions it 
manifests. These commitments are both ontological and epistemological in scope. Nevertheless, 
a call for ever-riskier cartographies denies that (a) necessarily relies on particular kinds of 
orderings, thus, compromising the intentions of (b).  
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In order to properly tackle this problem at the heart of Gerlach’s claim, the concept of risk needs 
to be defined both in itself and in relationship to cartographic practice. His definition of vernacular 
mapping posits that 
…such [cartographic] performance[s] are not taken to be technologies of capture, but 
techniques of addition; of adding more to the riskiness of cartographic politics by 
proliferating yet more renders of the world. (Gerlach 2014, 23, original emphasis) 
Whilst Agre (1994) is committed to a hermeneutic reading of the exact nature of information 
production, use, circulation and privacy in the digital age, Gerlach endeavours to take a normative 
approach, arguing that cartography is not simply a tool for capturing ever-increasing volumes of 
geographic data, but an abstract device to generating even more volumes of such. Vernacular 
mapping, Gerlach argues, does not exist as an extraction or a wrestling of geographical data from 
the world and into the map. Instead, it is said to involve a proliferation of data into the world, 
through the medium of the map. This non-representational approach directs attention away from 
the map itself – as object, as artefact, or as representation/image – and towards mapping 
practices. Otherwise, that maps ‘are always mappings…constantly in a state of becoming’ (Kitchin 
and Dodge 2007, 335, original emphasis). 
Both capture (Agre) and addition (Gerlach) models are non-representational. That is, both 
contend that maps are ontogenetic in nature, ‘of-the-moment’, always remade and that ‘mapping 
is a process of constant reterritorialization’ (Kitchin and Dodge 2007, 335). However, in the 
capture model the attention is directed towards the production of the map itself, with the aim of 
ensuring a relative ontological security of the map itself. Whilst it is acknowledged that maps are 
ontogenetic in nature, it nonetheless attempts to impose a relative security through it. As Agre’s 
(1994) model suggests: an order can be imposed on an activity through a grammar that, in turn, 
solidifies and strengthens the power of the grammar itself. But as further suggested by Agre, that 
process is never inevitable. In fact, there is often great resistance, the result of which leads to any 
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number of things: an improved observation, a redesigned grammar or – if the resistance fails – a 
reconstituted activity. The ‘cartographic workflow’ (making things legible, capturing, collecting, 
rendering, etc.) in such a situation would travel from world to map through the mapping 
production process.  
In the addition model – the ever-riskier sensibility offered above – the attention is directed 
towards the world itself, and a multiplicity of renders of such. In this, Gerlach (2014) suggests, the 
aim is to ensure a relative ontological insecurity of the world, rather than a relative security of the 
map, per se. Yet the ‘world’ in this case is simply an array of possible practices affected by the 
imposition of the map on such. What we have here, then, is simply a difference in orientation at 
different points in the cartographic workflow. The difference between the capture model and the 
addition model is not a wholesale difference in a conception of the map itself or any mapping 
practice. They do not stand as competing models. They simply identify different stages in the 
mapping production and consumption process. In other words: all mapping practices entail 
capture and addition.         
 ‘Technologies of capture’, instead of adding to the riskiness of cartographic politics, subtract from 
this riskiness. In other words, they minimize rather than escalate risk; seeking in some way to 
alleviate the possibility of any force destabilizing the security of the world it seeks to capture. The 
reasoning behind this can be found, of course, in the definition of capture itself – as discussed 
previously. To capture something involves isolating, restraining and incarcerating it. It involves a 
taking of phenomena from a wider environment and importing it in another space altogether. 
Only through capturing these unruly moments, activities, borders, peoples or spaces and 
implanting them into a calculated, curated and managed space are their unpredictable qualities 
minimized. In so doing, according to the logic of vernacular mapping, the quality of the world is 
dramatically reduced and opportunities restricted. In order to comprehend what technologies of 
capture might actually entail from a risk perspective we need to unpack the concept itself.  
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Anticipatory Carto-logics  
Risk itself is an orientation towards the not-yet-happened. It is at once a technology, a quality and 
a calculation through which we assign particular forms of value to a future event. Yet this future 
event cannot be known entirely, or perhaps, not even identified in the first place. It is elusive. This 
uncertainty – of what possibly lies ahead – is the essence of risk. Yet there are different modes of 
risk, and Amoore (2013) suggests one of these is replacing another as the more dominant force in 
contemporary life. As she explains: 
…the mode of risk that is flourishing across the horizons of contemporary economy and 
security operates according to a possibilistic logic. It does not deploy statistical 
probabilistic calculation in order to avert future risks but rather flourishes in conditions of 
declared constant emergency because decisions are taken on the basis of future 
possibilities, however improbable or unlikely. (Amoore 2013, 12, emphasis added) 
This possibilistic logic is different from a probabilistic one, Amoore suggests, because rather than 
seeking to avoid future risky events it actively works across its terrain to simulate, model and 
manage it. Through this possibilistic logic 
…it acts not strictly to prevent the playing out of a particular course of events on the basis 
of past data tracked forward into probable futures but to preempt an unfolding and 
emergent event in relation to an array of possible projected futures. (Amoore 2013, 9, 
original emphasis) 
In other words, it feeds off the uncertainty of the future event rather than treats it as an 
undesirable quality; playing with it rather than isolating it. There are two moments at which, 
according to Amoore, the probabilistic mode has comes undone in recent times: 9/11 and the 
2008 financial crash. ‘Together’, she suggests, they ‘signal the limits of insurability and, therefore, 
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the limits of modern forms of risk calculation’ (Amoore 2013, 8). This is the death, it is argued, of 
the probabilistic mode, through which it has been shown that exceptional events – ‘a terrorist 
attack, flood event, hurricane, pandemic, or financial crisis’ (Amoore 2013, 9) – cannot ever be 
predicted. The reason for this is that probabilistic logic works according to ‘a complex set of 
exclusions, exemptions, and exceptions’ (Amoore 2013, 8) that seek to isolate the apparently 
ungovernable and unpredictable; these so-called exceptional events. In so doing, they remain 
entirely outside of the predictive logic, remaining ‘off the radar’ and outside of calculation. Any 
actualization of the possible event, therefore, is unpredicted and unscripted. They are, in market 
terms, ‘externalities’.  
The possibilistic logic works differently. As mentioned above, it feeds off this uncertainty. 
Exceptional events become, not unpredictable and uninsurable happenings, but entirely 
‘workable’ and calculable occurrences. ‘What matters’ is not even that past events become 
predictions for future happenings, but, instead, that there is a new found ‘capacity to act in the 
face of uncertainty, to render data actionable.’ (Amoore 2011, 29, original emphasis). This is 
concomitant with a shift to a ‘small p’ logic.8 This is not a transition to a similarly exceptional logic 
driven by the grand narratives of terrorism and economic failure, but one informed by quotidian 
dynamics of interrogation, exposure and doubt,  that operate through the ‘most mundane and 
prosaic spaces’ (Amoore 2009, 49). This is due to a wholesale reconfiguration of the art of 
governance more generally, entailing both the embrace of ‘differential degrees’ (Amoore 2013, 8) 
of identification and the uptake of new management techniques and technologies for the 
purposes of anticipating future events. It is as much a shift in scale as anything else.  
The first of these is linked to Gilles Deleuze’s (1992) concept of the ‘dividual’. Here, the human 
subject no longer simply exists in a relation between ‘mass’ (public) and ‘individual’ (private) but 
                                                          
8 In the same sense of differentiating between ‘big C’ Conservatism and ‘small c’ conservatism, say. Here 
there is a difference both in form and in tone; between institution, philosophy and practice.    
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the latter is infinitely divided up into other categories, becoming ‘a fractioned subject whose risk 
elements divide her even when in herself’ (Amoore 2013, 8). Common characteristics of identity 
such as race, class, ethnicity, gender, nationality, dis/ability and facial features are cross-cut with 
other dividuated risk factors such as telephone records, credit card transactions, social media 
activity, travel ticket purchases and other such traces that comprise the dividual. In essence, this 
is the rise of the calculable self. It is at the border of the contemporary nation-state where we see 
the dividuated subject manifest itself most acutely, at which ‘sovereign decisions on the 
borderline…simultaneously dissects bodies into granular degrees of risk, such that mobile subjects 
are inscribed with, and carry with them, plural encoded borderlines’ (Amoore 2013, 82). This 
‘dissection’ and ‘inscription’ of the human subject in such instances is the hallmark of the 
contemporary fight against ‘terrorism’; undertaken most vigorously, of course, by border agencies 
the world over. Each dividuated dimension or trace is pored over for value as derived initially from 
a presence of doubt.  
Yet the dividuating process does not isolate these various strands of the human subject, but 
necessarily overlays and intersects them with each other to form what Amoore (2013, 84) calls 
‘mosaic lines’. As such, the dividuation entails two types of lines: the incision and the trace. The 
former separates a whole out into parts, whilst the latter is a record of an activity or performance. 
Once the incision is made, the tracing can begin. When overlain or intersected with other such 
features, the dividuated features form a weave with other such phenomena. The difference 
between pre- and post-9/11 was that these associative calculations could not be carried out in 
advance of any event, only performed after such in order to identify the plane hijackers. In other 
words, that ‘the relationship between two fragments of commercially derived data – an airline 
reservation and a credit card record – [can] become a condition of possibility for preemptive 
security intervention.’ (Amoore 2013, 86, emphasis added). The shift, then, is a temporal one 
based on the anticipatory necessity of carrying out such forms of analysis before the events 
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actually manifest themselves, in order to (a) preempt and (b) ultimately prevent its happening 
(see; Anderson 2010).  
As such, the logic of possibility strikes up a peculiar and particular relationship between the past, 
present and the future – working across the terrain of all three at once. It does so through the 
development and deployment of yet-more novel technologies throughout the ‘diverse worlds of 
risk management consulting, computer science, commercial logistics, and data visualization’ 
(Amoore 2013, n.p.) as well as, of course, global security – whether in state or private forms. 
Indeed, it is within these non-governmental worlds – as much as within state research 
departments themselves – that we have seen the growth of such technologies and strategies. As 
Nathaniel O’Grady (2016, 81) suggests, ‘[e]ngendering anticipatory forms of governance requires 
new temporal arrangements to coordinate the calculative practices by which…risk is made sense 
of’.  Rob Shields’ (2003) The Virtual provides a handy conceptual guide to the relations drawn 
between the past, present and the future in this possibilistic mode of risk. In it he suggests that 
‘risk is always more than concrete danger and calculations of probability because of the 
importance of perception and understanding as ingredients in risk assessment’ (Shields 2003, 
185). As such, calculating risk (in the possibilistic sense invoked by Amoore) involves taking into 
account both future actions and other less concrete elements.  
The first of these, in Deleuzian terms, is called ‘the virtual’; that is to say, the not-yet-happened 
rather than the more common definition as the opposite of the real (as in ‘virtual reality’). Its 
digital manifestation involves the production of what Nunes (2006, 11) calls ‘virtual topographies’ 
which are ‘virtual to the extent that they provide conditions of possibility for an arrangement of 
materiality and semiotic structure through the (re)orderings of lived practice’ (Nunes 2006, 16). 
In short, ‘the performative conditions of possibility’ (Nunes 2006, 17) that a digital world entails.    
The second is what Shields (2003, 29) calls ‘the abstract’; that is, narratives and ways of thinking 
that affect the calculation of risk, such as notions of trust (the ‘ideal’ yet real) or wider security 
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discourses (the ideal yet possible). Neither aspects (virtual, abstract) are tangible, ‘actual’ things, 
yet both comprise the horizon of the concept of risk, playing a part in defining the scope of any 
possible threat or future event. The actual and the virtual combine to form ‘reality’ as we 
understand it – necessarily comprising of past, present and future orientations. The actual is the 
‘now’ of actions and occurrences (albeit as a milieu of temporal instantiations); the virtual, 
possible actions and occurrences to come. This ‘tetrology or risk and security’ (Shields 2003, 195) 
is reproduced on the following page.   
In digital terms the virtual comprises the horizon of calculable possibility. It is not, therefore, a 
dematerialized cyber-world in opposition to the material non-digital world. The virtual is, on the 
contrary, a not-yet realized space with the potential to be actualized and brought into ‘reality’. 
Yet it is no less actual for this lack of now-ness. It is also no less material for its virtuality. As Shields 
suggests, these virtual components still affect decision-making in the actual; despite the 
‘invisibility and intangibility of virtual risks and abstract threats’ (Shields 2003, 197). They not only 
shape and re-shape the perception of risk, but also the execution of calculable practices whether 
these be logistical, visual, managerial or some other kind of digitally-routed practice.    
 
Fig 5.2 | ‘Tetrology of risk and security’. Source: adapted from Shields (2003) 
   
 Real (existing) Possible (non-existing) 
Ideal 
Feeling of security 
Trust 
Virtual risks 
‘Security’ in general, as a business 
Representations of risk as threats 
‘Urban myths’ 
Actual 
Being physically safe 
Danger 
Being ‘at risk’ (probability of danger) 
Risk 
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Although Shields is keen to identify a general ‘risk culture’ made up of a ‘synthesis of the various 
modalities of risk’ (Shields 2003, 204), Amoore considers the most prominent one: the possibilistic 
mode. Moreover, it is presented as serving just one discourse, of sovereign state politics – albeit 
the result of the coming-together of various other worlds from risk management consulting to 
commercial logics. Yet throughout this and previous chapters the conceptual aim has been to 
define a particular disruptive cartographic politics without direct recourse to state practices. The 
next section of this chapter will seek to prove that the possibilistic mode of risk is not a sole logic 
of the state but one defined in relation to the ontological nature of digital technology. Disruptive 
cartography, it shall be argued, also operates through this possibilistic mode, by exercising an 
anticipatory carto-logic that ‘aims to prevent, mitigate, adapt to, prepare for or preempt specific 
futures’ (Anderson 2010, 779).       
 
Risky Territory 
Now it is necessary to return to the concept of territory and the digital mapping assemblage itself. 
The reason for this is because disruptive cartography is premised on the management of risk itself 
through a kind of extra-state arrangement. As I have contended, mapping involves both the 
capture and addition of geographic data in, and into, the world. In this final section I supplement 
this argument by turning to Valérie November et al.’s (2010, 581) notion of ‘risky territory’. In 
short, it describes the entire mapping process – from production to consumption – emphasizing 
the role of the ‘navigational platform’ (November et al. 2010, 583) in new digital mapping 
assemblages. That is, the role of both the computer database and the interface in shaping and 
regulating the practice of cartography.    
November et al. (2010) are explicit in detailing what I will call ‘correspondent risks’; phenomena 
that stand between the successful and unsuccessful mapping of territory. Although this may seem 
as though it is a slight gesture towards an appreciation of the degree of violence inherent in the 
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capturing and utilization of geographic data, there is no intention to expand on this in an ethico-
political way, akin to Agre (1994). The conception of risk that November et al. (2010) utilize is a 
pragmatic one, more intent on documenting the tasks navigators are instructed to proceed 
through in order to find their way. As such, the ‘correspondence’ is not a (static) resemblance 
between map and territory, but a (processual) correspondence between reference points. Whilst 
…the first seems to rely on a resemblance between two elements (signs on the map and 
territory, or more philosophically words and worlds)…the second emphasizes the 
establishment of some relevance that allows a navigator to align several successive 
signposts along a trajectory…Both are depending on correspondence, but one engages 
the mapping impulse into an impasse…while the other allows one to move away from it 
and deploy the whole chain of production that has always been associated with map 
making… (November et al. 2010, 586, original emphasis) 
The correspondence, therefore, is a different one from the usual suspect encountered in critical 
cartography. Instead of a mimetic reading it is a navigational one. Important, of course, is the way 
in which November et al. (2010) define such risks. In short, they are ‘obstacles’ (November et al. 
2010, 587) that require circumvention in the act of navigation; things that get in the way during 
‘courses of action’ (November et al. 2010, 582). It is this quotidian, pragmatic conception of risk 
that drives November et al.’s (2010) intervention. In this there is no reference to the state, no 
reference to institutions, no reference to the expert and no reference to the amateur. Each 
navigational act – comprising of a series of interconnected alignments – is therefore on a par with 
another. It is this ontological parity lies at the heart of a disruptive cartographic endeavour.  
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Fig 5.3 | (Digital) navigation. Source: November et al. (2010) 
Such risks – that is, obstacles in the way of successful navigation – are characterized neither as 
subjects or objects but as ‘quasi-objects’ (Latour 1993, 51–52). As a result, one can say that ‘reefs, 
buoys, tidal information, algorithms’ (November et al. 2010, 587) and other such phenomena can 
equally pose a risk – regardless of their position either side of the supposed line as either objective 
realities or subjective interpretations. In this, the conceptualization of risk morphs into a slightly 
more Latourian beast than we have so far encountered in the work of Joe Gerlach and Louise 
Amoore. In this re-conceptualization of expressly cartographic risk the separation between the 
base map and the overlay is erased. In November et al.’s (2010) marine analogy they suggest that: 
There is no reason to think that reefs pertain more ‘naturally’ to the base map and are 
any closer to the fundamental layer and that risks should be added like more superficial 
layers on top of the first. We want to reconsider the mapping impulse so that reefs and 
risks belong equally to the definition of ‘territory’… (November et al. 2010, 582) 
As such the notion of territory is dramatically widened to include a host of calculative events that 
neither comprise an objective ‘out there’ reality (as the base map supposes), nor a subjective ‘in 
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here’ interpretation (as the overlay suggests). Nowhere is this more apparent than in a protest 
environment where ‘risks’ present themselves as an intertwining of both. Indeed, November et 
al.’s (2010) navigational interpretation of maps tessellates rather well with the notion of the 
‘mapping moment’ (Dodge et al. 2009, 234) discussed in chapter 6. In essence the mapping 
moment straddles the ‘printout’, ‘signposts’ and ‘users’ trajectories’ stages of the model, 
incorporating any provisional cartographic output, the alignment of artefacts and the situated 
activity for which the map is deployed.  
November et al.’s (2010) definition of navigational mapping does not suppose there is, or can be, 
a ‘complete representation of the territory’ nor a mere ‘explication of the plot’, but rather a partial 
and precarious passage strewn with hybrid risks. As the authors attest to, the establishment of 
such relations is a treacherous endeavour. Once again, their marine analogy is best at painting a 
picture of this risky procedure: 
Now the navigator tries to establish some relation between some of the features on the 
map and the warnings shouted at her from the cockpit by her team members whose views 
are made fuzzy by the sea spray, their voices covered by the roar of the waves, and their 
hearts excited by the heat of the race. Even if she had learned her Descartes by heart, she 
would never fancy for one minute that the skipper and the crew live in some ‘outside 
world’ that would resemble the geometric one she is looking at; too many features would 
not obviously fit in this geometrical world: the spray, the waves, the heat, the excitation 
of the treacherous landscape, the skills of the maneuvers. But it would be just as wrong 
to believe that the navigator, because she is down in the cabin looking over the map 
tracing their tacks on paper with ruler and compass, resides ‘in’ a geometrical space  
(November et al. 2010, 585, original emphasis) 
As November et al. (2010) argue, navigation is anything but a smooth, pre-calculated endeavour 
– even with the appropriate technologies and the ability to ‘plot a course even before setting out’. 
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Mapping is precarious. Whilst the digital map may aid in the anticipation of future events, it does 
not do so with this future presupposed. It is this riskiness that November et al. (2010) identify as 
central to the maps-mapping-territory relationship and that which Joe Gerlach argues should be 
a normative demand. Risk, it should be said, is the central pivot of any disruptive cartographic 
project. Fostering or minimizing these risky elements is thus both an ethico-political (Agre 1994; 
Gerlach 2010, 2014, 2015) and a pragmatic (November et al. 2010) tension at the heart of it. Whilst 
an episode of ‘noninstitutionalized disruption’ (Scott 2012, xvii) may conjure up the dissolution of 
order, as well as the collapse in correspondence between signposts in the process of navigation, 
in a cartographic sense it rests on both an ordering and continued correspondence. Between 
capture and addition; geographic data-collection and navigational use; risk and safety.  
 
Conclusion 
Introducing an entirely new concept in the form of ‘disruptive cartography’ may itself seem risky 
business. The theory of mapping is littered with many such terms referring to all manner of 
tactical, radical or counter-cartographic efforts. In order to justify the development of another it 
has therefore been crucial to clarify some points regarding its necessity.  
In chapter 2 I detailed how an array of spatial manoeuvres witnessed during student and anti-
austerity protest events were a direct response to a police tactic known as kettling. This has been 
indicative of a shift to more mobile forms away from A-to-B style demonstrations. In chapter 3 I 
then argued the art and state of ‘disruption’ was a critical dynamic of these manoeuvres – with 
activists and police working to minimize or maximize it at various times and in multiple places. But 
disruption is a precarious, often dangerous thing that requires the careful management of bodies, 
spaces and resources. What this chapter has sought to do is provide a conceptual framework for 
understanding these practices. It proceeded in a number of stages.   
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The first task involved exploring the nature of calculable territory. Few studies have done so 
without reference to the sovereign state. Yet an ever-growing number of extra-institutional actors 
partake in a calculation of territory on an ongoing basis. Moreover, many of these endeavours 
have entailed the deployment of digital platforms, the execution of digital calculations, and the 
production of varying forms of digital data. This includes activists engaged in the live mapping of 
protest events. 
Then, it suggested that greater attention needed to be paid to ‘event-based knowledges’ (Hannah 
2009, 68), of the kind produced repeatedly during protest events, such as navigational information 
regarding the location, direction and strength of police containments. These event-based 
knowledge practices comprise of two particular stages: the making legible of territory and the 
mobilization of knowledge. Without either the production and circulation of navigational 
information during demonstrations remains unrealized.    
At the heart of cartographic disruption, however, is a necessity to manage risk. Activist efforts to 
map the protest terrain follow the same ‘anticipatory logic’ (Anderson 2010, 792) as state border 
officials use in their efforts to apprehend individuals in advance of terrorist attacks. In other words, 
they attempt to calculate future activities on the basis of possible outcomes rendered through 
digital data capture and processing. Yet they do so with a greater emphasis on collaborative data-
collection and the generation, rather than minimization, of disruptive activities.         
Although calls for ‘ever-riskier’ (Gerlach 2014) cartographic practice are not to be dismissed they 
must still be re-articulated as one side of the coin. Whilst a rallying cry for more expansive, 
explorative mapping engagements they nonetheless normatively over-state the possibility for 
riskier practices. Put otherwise, a tension exists between riskier and securitizing forces that can 
never wholly be resolved. The erasure of the tension between risky and ‘safe’ cartographies is 
therefore ontologically impossible. The success of every cartographic project lies the management 
of this tension.  
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Establishing the nature of this tension is therefore a central task if we are to consider how 
disruptive cartographies operate in a digital world. In order to cope with the tension between 
choreographing expansive, un-capture-able practices and securing spatial phenomena, disruptive 
cartographies rely on anticipating future activities. This logic allows for ‘risky territory’ (November 
et al. 2010, 581) to be appropriately managed and, ultimately in this case, made navigable. This 
‘virtual’, un-actualized state, in the Deleuzian sense of the term, is the plane across which such 
cartographic calculations are made. Disruptive cartographies rely on these future-oriented, 
anticipatory efforts in order to generate and circulate navigational knowledges during protest 
events.  
The next chapter provides a metaphorical roadmap for these conceptual elements to be explored 
more thoroughly.  
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Chapter 6 | Methodology 
 
In the following chapter I detail the transition and translation from the conceptual framework I 
have formulated – that of disruptive cartography – to the empirical instantiation of it. The 
subsequent section will begin with a discussion of the general methodological framework I wish 
to employ, based on an automotive metaphor, along with a detailing and justification of the case 
studies and sites selected. The metaphor is a framing device deployed in order to emphasize the 
assembled nature of the digital map. The metaphor has three parts: the ‘engine’, the ‘windscreen’ 
and the ‘wheels’. Each of these, I argue, focus on the different, yet interrelated elements of the 
mapping enterprise. None are elevated above any other, but exist as part of assembled network 
to feed into the rest. In order for the navigational assemblage to work as described, all three parts 
must be functional.  
Yet, like any vehicle, the parts of this methodological framework must be assembled. Here there 
is a longer history – not of the mapping platform itself (this is reserved for chapters 7, 8 and 9) – 
of how the platform came to my attention. Further, of how it came to fit into, or in relation to, a 
number of other activist mapping projects. Along the way there were a number of ‘unexpected 
diversions’ leading me along a path I had not intended to take. Yet, in so doing, the project took 
on a new life, encountering new terrain I had not expected to discover. This is why the background 
and scope of the thesis deserves initial attention.  
Then, I will take each part of the metaphor in turn on approaching the ‘final destination’. Starting 
with the engine, I detail two extended interviews carried out with key developers and strategists 
of the platform. I then go on to discuss the textual analysis of cartographic and non-cartographic 
material produced during the project. Then I continue to the windscreen to detail the interviews 
carried out with student activists after the demise of the platform. These I call ‘second-wave’ or 
‘post-9k’ student activists who have taken to the streets at protests both after Sukey’s death, and 
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after (rather than before) the introduction of £9,000 HE tuition fees. In the final part of the 
metaphor – the wheels – I focus in on two protest events in which I deployed ‘mobile methods’ 
(Hein et al. 2008; Buscher and Urry 2009; Merriman 2014) to explore the navigational nature of 
each. As part of this, I discuss the nature of visual research practice and the necessary ethical 
commitments that are part-and-parcel of research into new digital technologies and activist 
engagements.  
In the final part of each section, I discuss the process of analyzing and interpreting the material 
produced during the empirical stages of this research. As Law (2004, 122, original emphasis) 
suggests, ‘method assemblage is the process of enacting, or crafting bundles of ramifying 
relations’. It is this crafting I wish to expand on now.    
 
Framework  
As Lakoff and Johnson (2003, 6) suggest, ‘[t]he essence of metaphor is understanding and 
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another’. Thus using an automobile metaphor as a 
methodological framework to understand the digital mapping assemblage is a logical manoeuvre 
– both are socio-technical arrangements enabling cognition, calculation, vision, navigation and 
movement.  
The modern motor vehicle comprises of three primary entities that, when working together, come 
to act as the vehicle itself. Separately these are: the engine, the windscreen and the wheels. Whilst 
there are evidently considerable other components that comprise a car (the chassis, exhaust, 
seats, etc.), and thus more fully furnish the metaphor, not all come into play when considering a 
digital mapping assemblage. At least, not easily. Further, the risk is that in pushing the metaphor 
too far one reduces its utility in describing the thing itself. Such work requires, as Marianne van 
den Boomen (2014, 14) would suggest ‘a precious balance between, on the one hand, being able 
to recognize the…compressed metaphoricity that stands in for a complex dynamic machinery, and 
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on the other hand, being able to forget this, that is, reify the metaphor and take the thing in itself’. 
The car engine, windscreen and wheels may be a metaphorical device but it is one that I argue 
possesses an articulative power nonetheless.   
Whilst all interconnected by necessity, each has its own distinct function. The engine is, of course, 
the main source of power in the vehicle and as such ‘drives’ its forward motion. The windscreen 
not only enables the driver (and passengers) to garner visual knowledge out of the front, back and 
sides of the vehicle but also prevents objects from flying in and out. However, the power 
generated in the first, and the vision afforded in the second, is entirely useless without the third 
of these assemblages – the wheels. Without a way in which to transfer power from the engine to 
secondary objects capable of smoothly propelling the mass along, the vehicle fails to move at all. 
Although a chassis keeps all these elements in place and other such objects ensure individuals are 
safe, movement is economized, and key mechanical and electrical components are safely secured, 
it is these three – the engine, the windscreen, and the wheels – that are absolutely crucial to the 
motor vehicles functioning as exactly that.  
Studying the deployment of mobile, digital mapping technologies within any situation is not 
dissimilar. In fact, the metaphor allows the above functions in a motor vehicle to be easily 
translated into a cartographic protest scenario. It also enables us to think about the multi-sited 
nature of mobile, digital mapping technologies. As with the modern motor vehicles, it is critical to 
consider how power, decision-making, and vision become distributed throughout the assembled 
parts and across these interrelations.  
Under the bonnet, the engine provided the capacity to power the whole enterprise. For this 
reason, I scrutinized the material platform features and aesthetics, whilst conducting interviews 
with Sukey developers and strategists. Both cartographic and para-cartographic features were 
critical to powering the navigational engine. Much of this material was produced with reference 
to the platform’s ludic aesthetic. Further, decision-making – on what the platform was designed 
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to facilitate, how it would be built, what its emergent limitations were – resided with those leading 
the enterprise. In short, they provided the ‘fuel’ for the engine. Only a small number of individuals 
were responsible for developing and operating the system, with even fewer responsible to plan 
for future engagements. To continue the metaphor, then, it was only these individuals who had a 
tentative grasp of the correct ‘air-to-fuel ratios’ to enable effective and efficient combustion. It 
follows from this that the map and the mappers act as part of a cartographic engine in the world, 
rather than a cartographic window onto the world.   
The windscreen affords an insight into how people navigated through particular kinds of protest 
spaces. What kind of visual capacity did and would a mobile, digital mapping platform afford 
during an anti-austerity or student demonstration? Although the windscreen affords the user 
visual insight this is a relational process between phenomena and body through which calculative, 
decision-making practices are performed. As an interface, the windscreen ‘affect[s] the way the 
world is perceived and sensed’ (Andersen and Pold 2011, 11), and it is, as Raskin (2000) and 
Farman (2012) both suggest, an interface amongst many in the motor vehicle. In its absence, what 
does the visual affordance look like now? Whilst the windscreen is also as much for protection as 
it is from vision, how did the platform (or its absence) aid or hinder this ability? Moreover, what 
replacement if any has been sought to re-circulate the necessary visual, navigational knowledges 
produced during the period from 2010-2013?                              
Whilst every engagement with a digital map entails the mobilization of these three assemblages, 
it is within a protest event that particular bits of these elements rise to the surface and can be 
scrutinized more easily. Whilst information on the intended use of the platform can be gathered 
from discussing plans, strategies and dreams with the developers and other associated parties, 
the actual use can only be ascertained from scrutinizing the instantiations themselves. Thus, it is 
during a protest event that the wheels of the enterprise can be explored more thoroughly – the 
very manoeuvres that were performed in and through the protest space by activists on foot that 
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came to be mediated, generated and facilitated by the mobile, digital mapping platform. The 
‘wheels’ in this case, were the hundreds and thousands of steps taking by protesters as they 
walked, marched, jogged, ran and sprinted through the city streets – a ‘mediated pedestrian 
mobility’ (Laurier et al. 2016, 1) as aided by a navigational assemblage. Without the right kind of 
cartographic force provided by the ‘engine’ of maps and mappers, and lacking any ‘windscreen’ 
for users to sense, calculate and respond to phenomena, the ‘wheels’ inevitably resulted in the 
protesters drifting, taking wrong turns or ending up impounded.       
The benefits of this tripartite system are manifold. In setting up the case study arrangement with 
three differently oriented elements, the focus is diverted away from a representational focus on 
the map itself and towards the wider navigational assemblages that work to produced, validate 
and refine the map. Thus it ensures that otherwise ‘elusive objects’ (Law 2004, 86) or actors in any 
such cartographic endeavour are properly accounted for. It also allows us to focus on the array of 
decisions that go into the production and ongoing re-production of any digital mapping enterprise. 
As will be explored, Sukey went through three defined versions based on various updates, tweaks 
and changes. These were dependent not only on technical possibilities and constraints but also 
on labor capacity, the dynamics of the event, and emergent and intransigent ethico-political 
issues. 
 
Unexpected Diversions: Background and Scope 
However, the project set-off long ago, with the research beginning in 2010 during a Masters’ 
degree in GIS. At the time there was a growing student movement against a planned rise in HE 
tuition fees – as discussed in the introduction and chapter 1. It culminated in the passing of a 
parliamentary bill that would legislate a rise from £3,290 to £9,000 a year. During planned 
demonstrations a mobile phone application was launched to enable students to stay safe during 
the protests – avoiding police containments and other such dangers. At the time, I was beginning 
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to become interested in the rise of new mobile, digital mapping technologies and so wanted to 
get in touch with the developers. Luckily, a student on an undergraduate course at the university 
knew one of them and put me in touch. In the summer of 2011 I interviewed him on the UCL 
campus where occupations against the bill were first orchestrated. Much of the planning and 
organization of the subsequent student demonstrations occurred in and around UCL, becoming 
the de facto HQ of the nascent ‘anti-9K’ student movement. 
In the year after, I continued to follow the Sukey project as well as the various other spin-off 
projects that members of the team became involved in: Occupy London, Hurricane Hackers, Sukey 
New York. In 2012, as a new, updated version of the Sukey platform went live, I responded to a 
public call for live testers. As a result, I established contact with another member of the team who 
had become the main developer of the new version. From there I began to have an email 
correspondence regarding the use of the platform for a particular anti-austerity demonstration in 
October 2012. In the days leading up to it, I received a phonecall from the same individual 
regarding my set-up for the event (device, battery, etc.) and tips on what might be useful to record 
in order to help improve the service for future deployments. After the event I responded via email 
with a variety of comments. These included: a note on a particular error message I kept receiving 
whenever I loaded the map (‘geolocation error: timeout’), a suggestion that submitting 
information via Twitter rather than the ‘in-app’ upload function was both quicker and easier, a 
suggestion that different map layers might aid navigation, and that although the switch to using 
OSM over Google Maps was better, I ‘did think the zoom buttons were a little small’.9     
Although I’m sure these comments were well-received, I had no immediate reply. After being sent 
an invitation to a CryptoParty10 in London in December 2012 I had no further direct 
                                                          
9 Personal email communication, October 22nd, 2012.  
10 ‘CryptoParty is a decentralized movement with events happening all over the world. The goal is to pass 
on knowledge about protecting yourself in the digital space. This can include encrypted communication, 
preventing being tracked while browsing the web, and general security advice regarding computers and 
smartphones.’ (CryptoParty 2016, n.p.) 
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communication with the individual or any other Sukey developers. During this time, I doubted 
whether the research project could continue at all. To compound this anxiety, I attended an 
academic conference in London in April 2014 at which the same developer was speaking. During 
the talk they proceeded to tell the audience that the project was, for want of a better term, dead. 
At this point my doubts were confirmed.  
This was the primary reason that the scope of the research project was expanded, and two 
particular exercises were undertaken. Although it was always to involve a multi-sited approach 
taking into account the ‘engine’, ‘windscreen’ and ‘wheels’ of the mobile, digital mapping 
enterprise, I now decided to include other foci besides the platform itself that would aid in 
grounding and connecting this main case study. Like much of my initial scoping I came across one 
possible new site online. During March 2014 I saw a link to a forthcoming exhibition entitled 
‘Disobedient Objects’ due to be held at the Victoria & Albert Museum (V&A) from July 2014 – 
February 2015 on ‘the powerful role of objects in movements for social change’ (V&A 2014, n.p.). 
Fig 6.1 | Disobedient Objects exhibits  
| 143 
 
As I blogged at the time, it was these objects – from banners to barricades – that I thought 
comprised the ‘”augmented reality” of protest events’, allowing ‘protesters and activists to test 
the limits of opposing forces’ whilst operating as ‘tactics for expressing beliefs’ (Hind 2014a, n.p.). 
It was this ‘augmented reality’ that I wanted to explore in more detail in order to understand how 
the digital map enrolled itself into much wider navigational and activist assemblages in order to 
affect change during protest events. As a result of this discovery, I endeavoured to visit the 
exhibition on multiple occasions in order to comprehend the kinds of objects on display, their own 
impact on navigational and activist assemblages, and their ability to affect change both in and out 
of protest events.   
On these occasions, I took a large number of photographs of the exhibits and their descriptive 
labels. The aim for these visits was to establish a general milieu in which the digital mapping 
platform might sit. Many of the objects and projects included in the exhibition contained a 
cartographic, navigational or wayfinding element or purpose to it. Others still were disobedient 
objects for deployment within the type of protest event I wished to explore. An example of the 
former included the ‘Acampadasol Map’ created to help ‘people find their way between the 
different committees within the camp in Puerta del Sol, Madrid’ (see image above) during the 
height of 15M in 2011. An example of the latter included a pair of ‘inflatable cobblestones’ made 
from aluminium rooftop foil as used by protesters during May Day demonstrations in Berlin and 
Barcelona in 2012 (see; Hind 2015a, n.p.). Those that were selected for their cartographic, 
navigational or wayfinding features went through preliminary analysis for their significance, 
relevance and relation to the primary case study. Aspects of their operation, execution and design 
were noted whilst in the gallery space itself and built on afterwards with the aid of photographs 
captured at the time. The reason for this initial exercise was to establish the boundaries for the 
investigation; what kind of movement does the platform generate? Is this especially new or novel? 
Have previous and/or non-digital objects or tools done similarly? This exercise was critical for 
establishing the uniqueness of the mobile, digital mapping platform under scrutiny.          
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Fig 6.2 | 56A maps   
During the summer of the same year I also stumbled across an article written by activist-scholar 
Rhiannon Firth (see; Firth 2014) based on research carried out at the ‘56A Infoshop’. 56A, as it is 
colloquially known, is a social space and radical archive in Southwark, south London. Amongst its 
many books, pamphlets and other ephemeral material on a multitude of radical political subjects 
lies a map archive called The Map Room. Although in reality The Map Room is a large chest of 
material it is no easier to navigate for it. Inside there is an array of physical maps, plans and guides 
covering local radical histories, plans of festivals and camps, as well as future maps comprising of 
dystopian and utopian visions of London and elsewhere. Inside the chest there are also some 
familiar and well-known counter-maps including those designed by Hackitectura and the Loiterers 
Resistance Movement. Many of the maps within the archive are also derived from a 2005 festival 
entitled ‘You are Here but Why?’ in which members and associates of the infoshop hosted a ‘Free 
Festival of Mapping’ (56a Infoshop 2011, n.p.). The physical remains of various cartographic 
exercises performed on the day are deposited in The Map Room.  
Of particular interest within the collection was a series of protest maps designed and distributed 
for anti-capitalist actions in London over the last 15 years. The two most famous of these are the 
‘Squaring up to the Square Mile’ map produced for the J18 event in the city of London in 1999, 
and a similar ‘Weapon of Mass Construction’ map produced as an ‘action guide’ for the 2003 May 
Day protest. Both of these maps highlight the location of capitalist enterprises ranging from 
merchant banks and exchanges to law firms multinational head offices. On both occasions their 
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production and dissemination lead to considerable fear amongst the police and businesses that 
particular locations would be targeted by activists during these events (Hind 2015b). These maps 
were the closest physical, non-digital manifestations of the Sukey platform. As a result, they 
provided a relatively direct antecedent example of its tactical efficacy. Much like the visit to the 
disobedient objects exhibition, scrutiny of these protest maps within The Map Room archive 
provided the basis for thinking about the connections to previous disruptive cartographic 
endeavours. As such they were both integral to understanding the main case study sites.      
 Site Dates Location Theme Features 
Sc
o
p
in
g 
Disobedient Objects 
exhibition, V&A 
November 
2014, January 
2015 
west London, 
UK 
Non-cartographic, 
playful 
Sprawling, global focus; 
pervasive DIY ethic; notable 
digital objects + projects 
The Map Room, 56A 
Infoshop 
November 
2014 
south London, 
UK 
Non-digital, activist 
Many conceptually-driven; 
localized political efforts; 
iconic protest maps 
C
as
e
s 
En
gi
n
e 
Developer interview 
(developer X) 
February 17th 
2015 
Mainland 
Europe; online 
Decision-making, 
design, ethics, 
future 
Original designer and 
programmer 
Strategist interview 
(strategist X) 
May 3rd 2015 
Washington DC, 
USA 
Strategy, design, 
failure 
Later involvement, advice + 
future possibilities, pragmatic 
W
in
d
sc
re
en
 Student activist 
interview I (activist 
X) 
December 2nd 
2014 
University 
campus, UK 
Practice, risk, 
navigation, 
knowledge 
Involved locally, took more 
‘risks’ 
Student activist 
interview II (activist 
Y) 
February 24th 
2015 
University 
campus, UK 
Practice, risk, 
navigation, 
knowledge 
Involved nationally, took 
fewer ‘risks’ 
W
h
ee
ls
 TUC demonstration 
October 18th  
2014 
central London, 
UK 
Manoeuvres, 
navigation, risk 
Spatially-restrictive, A-to-B 
NCAFC 
demonstration 
November 19th 
2014 
north + central 
London, UK 
Manoeuvres, 
navigation, risk, 
failure 
Spatially-expansive, 
‘rhizomatic’ 
 
Table 6.1 | Scoping sites and case studies  
One of the main difficulties with researching protest events is their fixed nature. This meant that 
any missed opportunities or moments during the events would be hard to rectify. Preparing for 
the demonstrations, therefore, involved considerable planning. Much of the experience in how to 
prepare for a protest event has come from the last five years of actively attending demonstrations 
both in a research and social capacity. Since 2011 I have attended the ‘March for the Alternative’ 
(2011), another TUC-organized demonstration ‘A Future That Works’ (2012), an anti-G8 
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demonstration otherwise known as ‘J8’ (2013), and a ‘Stand Up to Racism’ event (2014), all in 
London. I have also attended the international ‘Nuclear Security Summit’ in The Hague, 
Netherlands (2014); as well as two separate anti-austerity demonstrations during the 
Conservative Party conferences in Manchester (2013, 2015). I have also actively followed and 
participated online for numerous other protest events including the NUS’ ‘Demo 2012’ (2012), the 
‘Million Mask March’ (2014) and the most recent NCAFC ‘Free Education’ demonstration (2015). 
Nonetheless, I remain reluctant to call myself an activist, even less so an ‘academic-activist’ 
(Maxey 1999, 199) or any similar conjunctive. Still, it is the knowledge garnered from each – both 
on the streets and online – that have given me the confidence to conduct myself in the field.  
  
Final Destination: Case Study and Sites  
But as well as expanding and deepening the research project to include a search for non-digital 
‘disruptive cartographies’ alongside non-cartographic ‘disobedient objects’, I also decided to re-
appraise the apparent demise, death and ‘failure’ of the Sukey platform. Instead of an empirical 
dead-end I started to understand it differently as an opportunity. Investigating the rise and fall of 
a technological project would, it was hoped, generate a markedly different set of conclusions as 
to one focusing plainly on its rise. Understanding, therefore, how the Sukey project came to an 
end would situate how it came into being. Few, if any, research projects that take a form of digital 
technology as its central case study focus on their failure. This project aimed to attend to this gap 
in existing research.  
But as a result there were methodological problems. How could a framework be devised that 
could appropriately investigate the impact of a mobile, digital mapping platform that was no 
longer functioning? Despite engaging in a previous research project that was able to capture its 
use in protest events, the timing of this one would mean that the opportunity to analyze its 
deployment on a demonstration would not arise. As a result I decided to approach the project 
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from a number of different angles in a ‘multi-sited’ ethnography (Marcus 1998, Saukko 2003). As 
discussed previously, the inclusion of supporting sites allowing me to investigate both non-digital 
and non-cartographic projects gave me a greater breadth. However, in lieu of being able to track 
the use of the platform during actual protest events, I had to devise an alternative methodology 
that still allowed me to go ‘deep’ into the project itself.    
This meant that I had to look to how the project was not only initially conceived but morphed over 
the years of its operation and beyond. Rather than focus rather exclusively on the technical nature 
of its design – how it worked – it entailed a socio-technical investigation into how it had come into 
being in the first instance – and for what reason. It also, necessarily involved asking why its fleeting 
existence had come to a relatively premature end.        
 
Engine 
A ‘material semiotic’ (Haraway 1988; Law 2004, 2009) analysis of cartographic and non-
cartographic material produced during the project, alongside two interviews formed the ‘engine’ 
site of the research. As Sukey was a project spanning across and beyond the digital map itself it 
became important to track and capture evidence of its evolution. Assessing this evolution involved 
taking into account the platform’s aesthetic components as well as its navigational ones, 
evaluating the migration from one mapping provider (Google) to another (OSM), for instance. The 
work of Christian Bittner et al. (2013) are foundational in this regard, in the way they deploy a 
material-semiotic ANT framework as a way of ‘tracing [the] contingencies’ (Bittner et al. 2013, 1) 
of a digital mapping assemblage. As Bittner et al. (2013, 6) further suggest, this is an approach that 
does not look for (nor validate) ‘discrete empirical objects’ but, instead, approaches such elements 
as part of a broader, distributed reality through which objects become aligned and in relation.       
In order to structure this, it also meant adopting Wood and Fels’ semiotic terminology of the 
‘perimap’ and the ‘epimap’ (Wood and Fels 2008, 8-12). The former of these two terms refers to 
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features directly framing the map itself; whilst the latter to all material beyond the confines of the 
map, nonetheless integral in shaping it. Comprehending the digital map as part of a wider 
navigational assemblage meant that it was critical to analyze default mapping styles, video output 
and published ‘survival guides’ all designed to enhance the digital mapping experience for users. 
In this, the digital map can be said to have gathered together a number of important allies that 
supported its efforts as a navigational tool. Acknowledging their power in sustaining the mapping 
project is therefore vital.  
It also meant paying prominent attention to the aesthetic development of the project over the 
duration of its existence. As I referred to in chapter 4, ‘the interface is now a central aesthetic 
form’ (Pold 2005, n.p.). Accordingly, one must deal with how the interface invites or affords 
particular gestural actions (taps, strokes and double-taps) as well as imposes a strict visual 
framework governing these actions. But doing so demands that one interrogate the coming-into-
being of these visual elements. Mobile interfaces are small and space is at a premium. Adaptations 
made to the Sukey platform were based on user feedback and testing. Thus, treating it as a fixed 
object such as a non-digital photograph did not suffice. Instead, I had to account for it being a 
‘fluid technology’ (de Laet and Mol 2000, 225) subject to alterations and fixes that would ever-so-
slightly tweak its form and interactive nature. Establishing an ‘aesthetic trajectory’ through these 
iterations, therefore, was critical to ensuring iterations of the platform could be evaluated.       
One interview took place in mainland Europe with a computer programmer/’hacktivist’ whose 
name and gender will remain anonymous. They will be referred to as ‘developer X’ throughout 
this thesis for privacy reasons and to avoid implicating the individual should particular comments 
be traced to them. I re-established contact with the individual in December 2014 and to my 
surprise they responded swiftly. We agreed to meet in mainland Europe in February 2015. This 
would be a different interview to the kind conducted with another of the original developers 
during the previous research project. 
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Table 6.2 | Paramap. Source: adapted from Wood and Fels (2008)   
Developer X was involved in the Sukey project directly from its inception in 2010 to the decision 
to end development on it roughly sometime in 2013. Ostensibly, the ‘interview’ amounted to far 
more than this, comprising, primarily, of a visit to a prominent hackspace, launched in the 1990s, 
and home to various digital, hacker and new media-related organizations and initiatives. The 
‘interview’ itself was spread across two weekdays at the hackspace and other locations.      
At the same time, I also initiated contact with a design strategist previously involved with the 
project. Luckily enough I received another quick, positive reply and we agreed to meet in April 
2015. As the individual was based in Washington DC, USA I timed the interview with an academic 
conference I was planning to attend in the same month in a different city. Their inclusion within 
the project stemmed from the desire to expand the confines of the research to include those not 
necessarily present at the beginning, and to understand the Sukey project as a series of iterative 
platforms in the plural. They will be referred to as ‘strategist X’ in this thesis, again, for reasons of 
privacy. Their name and gender, therefore, will remain anonymous.  
Strategist X was involved in the Sukey project indirectly between 2011 and 2012, having met one 
individual involved in its development at an internet festival. During this short period, they 
Paramap 
Perimap Epimap 
Titles 
Photographs 
 
Illustrations 
Charts, graphs, timelines 
Legends, scale bars, north arrows, other 
standard cartographic elements  
Callout text, blurbs 
 
Credits 
Borders, decorative elements 
Accompanying article(s) 
Advertisements that refer to the map  
Marketing copy 
Letters from the editor 
Letters to the editor about the map 
 
Behind the scenes info (how the map was 
created)  
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provided organizational, strategic and developmental assistance to Sukey, desiring to extend the 
project beyond its original scope as a protest communication platform. The interview took place 
in several locations generally spread around a burgeoning, post-industrial district in central 
Washington DC across one Sunday morning in late spring 2015.     
Each can be considered as a ‘mobile interview’ incorporating elements of the ‘walking interview’ 
(Evans and Jones 2011, 849), but falling short of a full ‘go-along’ (Kusenbach 2003, 463) 
ethnographic approach. Whilst each participant took me to locations they were familiar with, 
neither occasion could necessarily be considered as part of a ‘daily routine’ for either; the usual 
criteria for establishing a go-along. The broader term ‘mobile interview’ is preferred to ‘walking 
interview’ for the simple fact that not all of either interview took place whilst walking. Further, 
elements of each interview took place whilst both parties were entirely sedentary, with multiple 
places frequented during each.11 Some were intended and set-up before, whilst others were 
agreed on-the-fly as specific destinations, and a plethora of further locations the result of being 
in transit to get to both. Employing the more general category of mobile interview, therefore, 
reflects this variance in place, mode and interaction.       
These mobile interviews provided immeasurable opportunities limited during the conduction of 
more sedentary, time-limited conversations. As Crang and Cook note, ‘[i]nterviewing “on the 
move” can enable people to situate and recount complex and fluid events and memories’ (Crang 
and Cook 2007, 65), and it is this sentiment I sought to channel. Further, echoing Sarah Pink (2009, 
85) that ‘the interview is not simply a verbal conversation that can be audio-recorded’, in which 
neither ‘interviewer [or] interviewee…need to be sitting down, immobilized and simply speaking’. 
Whilst these were not necessarily personal choices thrust upon the interviewees from the 
                                                          
11 These included, but were not limited to: the communal area of the hackspace, the underground work 
area of the hackspace, an outside area of the hackspace by a river, on the route to a subway station, on a 
subway train, sat down at a Turkish café, in various locations inside a green enterprise space, in the lobby 
of an apartment block, on the walk to a gentrified market, and on the pavement outside of the same 
market. 
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beginning, they nonetheless emerged as more comfortable situations both for the researcher and 
subject. Indeed, as they were suggested by each of the interviewees, along with the locations, 
there was a considerable shift in power from the researcher to the subject. Neither interview felt 
like an imposition of conversation topics onto the interviewee. Whilst there was a considerable 
degree of preparation involved in both interviews neither were scripted so to speak. As such the 
interviews felt, at least to myself, as free-flowing, light-hearted yet necessarily intense occasions. 
A broad sweep of topics was covered in both interviews, much of which were directly relevant to 
the thesis, some of which were marginally of relation to the thesis, and others of which, although 
far removed from the content of the thesis, were entirely necessary to the smooth running of the 
interview.       
As the mobile interviews did not involve the direct recording of the conversations had with both 
developer X and strategist X, the interpretative stage of the analysis did not involve a routine 
coding of words and phrases uttered by each. Instead, the secondary documents as drafted by 
myself in the follow-up to each meeting were interpreted for more general themes threaded 
through, and driving, the conversation itself. Indeed, a large degree of this work was done in a 
preliminary sense in this initial writing-up phase immediately after each mobile interview. The 
‘analysis’ itself, therefore, was folded into the descriptive and contextual elements of the 
interview evaluation so that they came to be, in a sense, much more like an ethnographic diary – 
albeit a more intensive one focused on one particular individual during a single, sprawling 
conversation. Although particular themes certainly guided these interviews, their analysis was not 
limited to such. Many topics emerged from the conversation that were not scripted nor expected. 
Maintaining this openness to possible responses was critical to the success of the interviews and 
allowed for a more flexible interpretation.  
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Windscreen 
Two further interviews were scheduled with student activists who had attended an NCAFC 
demonstration on November 19th 2014. These comprised the ‘windscreen’ site of the research 
that looked to established how activists calculated risk and gained navigational knowledges during 
Sukey-less protests. I deploy the work of Agre (1994), Gerlach (2014) and November et al. (2010) 
to detail how this navigational knowledge was captured during such events. Like the section 
before, I combine these interviews with a material semiotic appraisal of the Sukey platform.    
Interviews were undertaken on the campus of a UK university and conducted with two separate 
individuals affiliated to local and national student organizations - one an on-campus campaign for 
‘free education’, another the NCAFC – both of whom were present at the student demonstration 
in November 2014. Neither were old enough to have participated in what can be called the ‘first-
wave’12 of free education activism in 2010/11, but can be considered to be part of a resurgent 
second-wave of student activism in the UK, centered on a number of relevant issues to HE and 
university campus life.13 I refer to each as ‘student activist X’ and ‘student activist Y’.  
However, neither of the interviewees had participated nor aided in organizing (whether locally or 
in national committees) a student protest event before November 2014, although both had been 
aware of such efforts before – especially those in 2010/11 in London. As a result, the student 
demonstration in November 2014 served as an eye-opening introduction into the world of street 
politics. The reason for wanting to interview those involved in this particular second-wave of 
student activism was manifold. Firstly, neither had prior experience of participating in a protest 
                                                          
12 This is not, of course, to suggest that prior to 2010/2011 there was no student activism in the UK. Far 
from it – the UK has a rich student activist history and legacy. However, I argue that this was the first-wave 
of digitally-mediated student activism in the UK distinct from previous incarnations thanks to the rise of 
nascent social media platforms, and new ‘connective’ forms of activism (see; Bennett and Segerberg 
2012).  
13 Whilst some on-campus actions have focused on police brutality (University of London, 2013; Warwick, 
2014), others have taken basic pay and conditions for university staff as a key issue (‘#3Cosas’ campaign, 
2013), and more recent demonstrations have centered on the impact of the UK border regime on 
international students (NCAFC demonstration 2015). 
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demonstration away from a university campus and as such had not gathered a kind of ‘operational 
knowledge’ of what to expect. As a result, both students had taken part in pre-demonstration 
workshops not only to discuss practical details such as transportation and safety details such as 
the university’s ‘buddy system’14, but also to assist in banner and placard creation. These elements 
became important in gathering an understanding of how digital technology played and plays a 
role in the practical and tactical aspects of a protest event. Secondly, in connection to this, neither 
had a spatial knowledge of how big protest events play out – especially in London itself. This is 
much the similar situation as during the first-wave of student activists in the 9K era – few had an 
adequate navigational knowledge of the city.  
Sukey, therefore, played its part in ensuring they had sufficient near-live information of such – 
especially as events were unpredictable and navigational instructions were likely to change at a 
moment’s notice. Thirdly, neither had been present during the deployment of the Sukey platform 
during the first-wave of student activism in the 9K era. As such, they became critical subjects for 
how student protest events in a post-Sukey space operated. Whilst some of this insight would be 
garnered from an auto-ethnographic presence at the same demonstrations, only by interviewing 
others present would a greater interpretation of these navigational predicaments be possible. As 
Crang and Cook (2007, 60) suggest ‘interviewing can by no means be treated as a separate 
method’, so as such, this integration of interview data with auto-ethnographic data was vital. Then 
fourthly, each student had a slightly differing personal, geographical and academic background 
that allowed certain positions to be considered in opposition to the other. Whilst one was familiar 
with London as a whole, the other was not. One was beginning to get involved in national student 
politics, the other marginally less so. One had stuck to the pre-arranged demonstration route, the 
                                                          
14 This so-called ‘buddy system’ ensures that each student is paired with another ‘buddy’ with whom they 
must remain with throughout the day. This is common to fieldtrip health and safety regulation across 
Higher and Lower Education institutions in the UK. Usually the buddy system relies on the pairing of a 
more experienced student with a less experienced one. In this case, a student with prior participation in a 
protest event.   
| 154 
 
other had decided to err from it. Whilst far from representative of the 10,000 students who had 
attended the NCAFC demonstration in November 2014 (indeed, without ever intending to be), 
these two students were typical of those straddling the line between organizer, activist and 
interested/engaged student.  
In order to secure these interviews a general call for participation was placed online. This was 
done firstly through the creation of a blog entitled ‘Playing with Protest’ on which the details and 
intentions of the research project were outlined, ensuring an emphasis on the ‘impact of mobile, 
digital mapping technologies on protest events’ (Hind 2014b, n.p.) was made clear to those visiting 
the site. The homepage itself contained the call in bold with a short description of what would be 
required of participants, reproduced in the Appendix. Once the TUC demonstration had passed 
the call was adapted to refer explicitly to the upcoming NCAFC student protest. It was also 
enlarged and further emboldened in order to attract those who had found their way to the 
website. Another section of text gave a little more context to the project and assured possible 
participants that beyond the attendance and recording of their experience little would be required 
of them (see Appendix).  
From here, a number of posts were made through personal social media accounts in order to 
advertise the project call, with targeted messages sent to the TUC Young Workers, Student 
Assembly Against Austerity, Young Greens, NCAFC, and False Economy Facebook pages. General 
Twitter messages were posted on three occasions prior to the TUC demonstration (via 
@samhind10), and a further three times in advance of the NCAFC demonstration. A number of 
these messages were retweeted by relevant organizations including the official TUC 
demonstration account (@PayRise4Britain) and the co-organizers of the student demonstration 
(@TheStudentAssem). Through this, a number of conversations were initiated both in regards to 
the TUC demonstration and the NCAFC protest via email and private messages. It is from the latter 
communications that the two interviews with student activists were secured.  
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However, despite concerted and continued efforts, no interviews were undertaken with 
participants on the TUC demonstrations. Gaining access to those within this camp proved difficult 
despite repeated attempts to do so. Although alterations were made to the website text in order 
to tone down the ‘academic wording’ that a TUC demonstration organizer noted in an email 
correspondence, no individuals got in contact.15  
The sedentary interviews entailed a slightly different approach to the mobile interviews, involving 
as they did a verbatim transcription of the conversations had with student activists. This meant 
that a tighter analysis of the content of the interviews was possible, through which the occurrence 
of particular words and phrases concerning risk, navigation and manoeuvres could be analyzed 
for their importance. The framework employed during these interviews was deliberately 
chronological and based on each activists’ experience on their respective protest demonstrations. 
Using this chronological format allowed me to closely tie the moments experienced by each in 
with the auto-ethnographic material produced during the same demonstrations. This allowed me 
to corroborate certain events during the day. It also allowed the interviewees to be comfortable 
in their responses knowing they were pinned in relation to a sequential format.16 As a result, the 
interpretative stage of the sedentary interview analysis followed the same process as the 
interpretative stage of the auto-ethnographic protest event analysis; both oriented towards the 
explication of moments and manoeuvres during said demonstrations.  
Nonetheless, this was not an attempt to form some kind of ontological universalism but, in fact, 
to probe for an ‘ontological multiplicity’ (Law 2004, 137) stopping short of a full investigation into 
                                                          
15 One particular comment in the same email is perhaps telling of this failure, however. Despite retweets 
from a personal account, the TUC organizer had thought better of doing the same with the official TUC 
demonstration account because he ‘guessed [I was] more interested in grassroots generated technology 
rather than anything from us [the TUC]’; perhaps serving as a neat, albeit anecdotal, representation of the 
distinction between the organization and architecture of the respective demonstrations. Personal email 
communication, October 13th 2014.            
16 Doing so allowed the conversation to flow more smoothly despite the overt presence of this temporal 
framework. Without this I was worried each participant would perhaps be too nervous to elaborate fully 
on events, and instead simply provide me with what Crang and Cook (2007, 69) refer to as the ‘short, 
snappy, conventional, rehearsed versions’ of events.     
| 156 
 
any possible ‘ontological disjunction’ (Law 2004, 134) between protest event experiences. That 
these experiences might differ somewhat from my own was not, methodologically, a problem in 
itself but merely a fact of attending and immersing oneself in such an event with multiple angles 
and aspects.           
 
Wheels  
An auto-ethnography of two protest events comprised the ‘wheels’ site of the research. This 
approach was taken in order to, as David Butz and Kathryn Besio (2009, 166) suggest, ‘trace the 
intimacies of…flows and formations from the inside out…’. Triangulated with the prior interviews 
they allowed me to participate in the dynamics I wished to explore – the worldly phenomena, 
navigational knowledges and spatial manoeuvres generated during a demonstration – as well as 
being able to reflect on the positionality of being in the midst of these events (Anderson 2006). 
Although short of the kind of immersive, auto-ethnography practiced by David Graeber (2009) in 
relation to activist groups, it was nonetheless an approach built upon five years of attending, 
participating in, and navigating through such demonstrations.    
The events were a TUC demonstration on the October 18th 2014 and the NCAFC demonstration 
noted in the last section. The TUC are a UK trade union umbrella organization comprising of 52 
affiliated unions and over 5.5 million members (TUC 2015, n.p.). Founded in 1868, the TUC is the 
UK’s largest trade union body and represents the majority of trade unions in the country. 
Alongside regular campaigns regarding workers’ rights, they also organize routed demonstrations. 
The largest in recent times was an anti-austerity demonstration called the ‘March for the 
Alternative’ in London in 2011. NCAFC, on the other hand, is a ‘network of student and education 
worker activists’ founded in 2010 in response to the rising issues of ‘tuition fees, education cuts 
and wider cuts to public services’ (NCAFC 2015, n.p.). Demonstrations in 2010 and 2011 against 
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the rise in tuition fees – out of which they were born – brought over 90,000 students out onto the 
streets.  
However, the Sukey platform was not live for either of the scheduled TUC or NCAFC protest 
events, as discussed previously. Therefore, executing this particular arm of the research project 
would demand a peculiar, innovative approach. Instead of focusing on the platform itself – an 
impossible task in light of its demise – it would attempt to shine a light on the kinds of spatial 
manoeuvres the platform was oriented towards that were still being practiced in 2015. In other 
words, it would look towards the cartographic effects rather than, exclusively, the mechanics.      
In order to comprehend how geographic knowledges are captured cartographically, ‘mapping 
moments’ (Dodge et al. 2009, 234) are generated, and spatial manoeuvres executed, it is 
necessary to say a little on the tools and techniques deployed in the field. These comprised of 
what Hein et al. (2008, 1267) call ‘mobile methods’. In other words, ‘methods where the research 
subject and researcher are in motion in the “field”’ (Hein et al. 2008, 1267). This section will seek 
to detail these authors’ conception of mobile methods to expand upon its utility within a protest 
event. Further, it will also work to detail how the so-called ‘research subject’ can be re-configured 
through mobile methods to take account of how events comprising of multiple, collective bodies 
– human and non-human – can be captured. 
What is important to mention here is the extent to which the deployment of mobile methods is 
dependent upon a litany of mobile and often, but not always, expressly digital technologies. Three 
devices are central to the ability to record particular kinds of data flows during protest events: the 
video (or, ‘action’) camera, the GPS receiver, and the smartphone. Some enabled the intermittent 
recording of visual data (video camera), others allowed for the continuous tracking of geo-
locational data (GPS receiver), and further devices ensured that textual communication was made 
possible (smartphone).    
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There are a number of considerations to take into account when deploying a small, discrete 
‘action’ camera. Protest events are heavily surveilled, temporary spaces in which many activists 
and police seek to evade identification and recognition. ‘Walking with video’ (Pink 2007, 240), 
therefore, produces a number of ethical concerns that must be considered not only in advance of 
going ‘into’ the field, so to speak, but also during the encounters themselves. As such, one must 
constantly be aware of possible ethical missteps not limited to: the direct filming of protesters 
themselves (including faces, identifiable clothing and other objects, signs of affiliation or friends), 
the direct filming of the police (including FITs, EGTs, Territorial Support Group [TSG] officers, and 
liaison officers), or the recording of possibly illegal activity (criminal damage, trespass, assault, 
public order offences, etc.).  
However, this is not to say that filming during protest events is ethically contentious on the whole. 
Where the video camera is directed often defines the extent to which the activity in question is 
ethically debatable. The use of video cameras to record incidents during protest events is 
common-place. Often they are used as a necessary mode of ‘witnessing’ in order to record the 
actions of protesters and police as well the interactions between them, in case of future incidents 
such as criminal charges. In recording these incidents they form the backbone of a ‘tertiary 
memory’ (Stiegler 1998, 2008) of the wider event; allowing it to live on far longer than they would 
do merely in the minds of those involved. Indeed, in providing ‘concrete evidence’ of their 
occurrence – due to the greater confidence people have in video footage than mere human recall 
– this form of witnessing lends greater currency to the captured events.  
Nonetheless, there are still a number of steps that have to be taken to ensure that individuals 
recorded taking part in particular manoeuvres have had their identities removed from published 
content. In the screenshots produced from the original footage, the faces of protesters have been 
blurred to avoid visual recognition – regardless of whether they have committed an offence. This 
ensures that the identity of those participating in such events is not compromised; countering 
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doubts expressed by the likes of Davies (2008) as to the compatibility of photographic methods 
and participant confidentiality. As such, their blurring does not presuppose illegality, but preserves 
their anonymity in any case.  
Alongside the video camera, the GPS device is also a critical element in the methodological 
assemblage. Unlike the video camera the GPS exclusively records the user as opposed to a subject. 
Whilst the video camera is an attempt to capture external moments and activities, the GPS device 
is introspective and intended to provide a recoverable memory of movements. Although video 
footage demands an active recording of particular moments during a demonstration, and photos 
give an even more selective but nonetheless indicative active snapshot of events, a GPS ‘trace’, 
once set-up correctly, allows for an extensive, accurate, passive record of all movements 
throughout the extent of an event. This is reason why the GPS device is considered a vital tool.          
Using a smartphone during such protest events also became a necessity – providing access to 
primary, public social media platforms such as Twitter. Although far from all communication is 
routed through the platform, Twitter nonetheless becomes a digital space on which a range of 
forms of communication are generated (see; Gerbaudo 2012, Juris 2012, Nunes 2014). During the 
demonstrations Twitter often turns into a tactical platform through which photos and messages 
of particular flashpoints and interactions between protesters and police are sent, as well as 
pictures of banners, signs and other material objects that come to signify a street protest (see; 
Monterde and Postill 2014, Rodriguez-Amat and Brantner 2014). Although Sukey is the object of 
the study in this thesis, the use of Twitter also became a methodological approach. In other words, 
it was often only through the platform that it became possible to orientate myself towards 
particular moments within the demonstration that were of tactical importance. Even when not 
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present at some demonstrations (‘Demo 2012’, NCAFC ‘Free Education 2015’, etc.) the use of 
Twitter can still be vital for those attending – especially if messages of a tactical nature are sent.17 
There are, however, particular practical drawbacks associated with deploying such a heady array 
of tools, not least the ever-present need for batteries and a consideration of alternative power 
sources. Although these might sound like banal, even common-sense considerations they 
continue to exert considerable effect on the capacity to capture events. During some moments it 
becomes necessary, for example, to continuously film in the expectation that something might 
occur. That this might not be known at the moment the researcher decides to start filming 
obviously produces an uncertainty to proceedings. A particular shot, therefore, may last anything 
from a couple of seconds should a particular moment or ‘flashpoint’ arise, or last into double-digit 
minutes should it be necessary to track an unfolding event such as the storming of a fenced public 
square. In either case quick decisions need to be made as to whether it is more necessary to record 
such events or to conserve battery power for future moments.  
In total I shot 17 individual videos during both the TUC and NCAFC demonstrations. Analyzing 
them, following the likes of Brown and Laurier (2012), entailed an initial close reading of each in 
order to determine particular moments that could be characterized as the formation of a spatial 
manoeuvre. At this stage the categories for determining what would count as a spatial manoeuvre 
were deliberately loose and relatively unknown besides pertaining to some kind of movement 
(collective or otherwise) or communication (verbal, gestural, written). A lack of either was also a 
stimulation to provide a description, although in practice this was more difficult to identify for 
obvious reasons.18 
                                                          
17 An example is a tweet sent by myself during the NCAFC ‘Free Education’ demonstration in 2015. I had 
been following the events during the day and reports came through that students had been kettled. As a 
reminder I tweeted that students need not ‘hand over personal details as a condition of release’ (Hind 
2015c, n.p.). It was also embedded within the Guardian’s live report of the protest (Smith and Tran 2015, 
2).    
18 Special attention was paid to particular groupings (black bloc), police officers (TSG, EGT, FITs, liaison 
officers), locations (Whitehall, Parliament Square), banners (Occupy Democracy), sounds (drums, rattles, 
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In general, therefore, I paid attention to ‘emergent, fleeting moment[s]’ (Soukup 2013, 228) of the 
protest event writ large. The guiding framework for identifying these micro-moments was the 
notion of disruption and disruptive cartographies. In essence, any of the above that exercised a 
disruptive logic or alternatively, demonstrated a distinct lack of disruptive capacity. An example 
of the former might be the physical action of removing one of the metal barriers lining a protest 
route in order to make an escape. An example of the latter might be the gesturing by an event 
steward towards a protest ‘bloc’ to instruct them to stop moving. In either case a spatial 
manoeuvring of some kind is played out. The former illustrates a physical disruptive action, whilst 
the latter exemplifies a gestural non-disruptive action. It is the identification of these activities 
that was central to the preliminary video analysis phase.        
On each occasion I witnessed a valuable moment, I noted the time at which it occurred within the 
particular video, and drafted a short description of the activity.19  After this, I returned to the 
source videos to corroborate what had been identified in the transcript and to select video frames 
for screenshot collation. The intention here was to devise a multi-frame selection of frozen 
moments within the manoeuvre I wished to explicate. In essence, they would provide a visual 
sequence of images that would hopefully illustrate the moment in action, akin to the frames in a 
graphic novel.20 For this, Eric Laurier’s comic book methodology was a vital reference point 
(Laurier 2014, Laurier et al. 2016).21 Using the transcript and the source footage in tandem, I 
identified the extent of each particular moment and began to select particular frames 
                                                          
whistles, loudspeaker announcements), gestures (pointing, sweeping motions) or playful activities 
(costumes, ‘mini-dramas’). 
19 No specialist soft or hardware was used besides a default media player and a word document. The 
routinization of this task – of playing and stopping footage, toggling windows, renaming video files, and 
writing descriptive text – was established iteratively in a trial-and-error format. The use of a large, 
widescreen monitor enabled the window arrangement, ensuring that visual detail could still be seen at a 
high-resolution whilst the descriptive log was still in view. 
20 For previous visual analysis of graphic novel material, see; Hind (2010).  
21 For a spectacular, meticulous undergraduate thesis deploying Laurier’s methodology, see; Spooner 
(2015).  
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exemplifying each stage. In total, I identified five moments from the TUC demonstration and a 
further four from the NCAFC protest.22 
Fig 6.3 | Analysis setup  
These sequences were set alongside maps of each particular tracked manoeuvre, in order to 
situate each moment geospatially as well as visually. This occurred in two stages. Firstly, data from 
the GPS device was uploaded to a free, proprietary, offline mapping platform (Garmin Basecamp). 
This tracking data was then overlain on an open-source basemap to ascertain accuracy and to 
correct any errors (loss of signal, false elevation data, etc.). Once assured of the validity of the 
track data I uploaded onto an open-source, web-based mapping platform (Mapbox) in order to 
produce a more aesthetically-pleasing set of maps.       
                                                          
22 The number of raw images selected to exemplify each moment ranged from six to 22 individual shots. 
Once the frame had been selected it was then captured as a screenshot, copied, and cut in photo-editing 
software before being saved in an appropriate image file type.    
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Map 6.1 | Basecamp (top) and Mapbox (bottom)  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to connect the conceptual literature used to inform the notion of 
‘disruptive cartographies’ to the empirical efforts that comprise this thesis by describing the 
methods employed and explaining the rationale behind them. At present I argue there has been 
a failure to comprehend the spatial, performative nature of digital map use during protest events. 
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Along with this conceptual lacuna there is also a lack of appropriate methodological approaches 
and tools to research such practices in the world itself.  
As a way of wrestling with the former of these concerns it has been necessary to deal firstly with 
the non-cartographic and non-digital precursors to mobile, digital mapping technologies. 
Establishing a genealogy of activist mapping projects thus allows a more comprehensive 
interpretation of more recent cartographic evolutions. In the scoping of the Disobedient Objects 
exhibition at the V&A and the 56A Infoshop, this was made possible. These scoping efforts can be 
considered as precursor activities informing and considerably re-constituting the direction and 
focus of the main research sites.      
In order to correct the latter, it has been necessary to develop a multi-sited research methodology 
to interrogate the worldly phenomena, navigational knowledges and spatial manoeuvres 
generated during protest events. This has entailed the deployment of an automotive metaphor in 
order to sketch the design of such an approach. In comprehending the digital mapping enterprise 
as a fully-functioning vehicle comprising of an engine, a windscreen and a set of wheels, these 
variously oriented cartographic features can be incorporated into the overall research 
methodology. The driving force behind this is the epistemological understanding and, indeed, 
ontological reality, that the digital map and its attendant practices are manifestly reliant upon 
numerous actors and sites, human and non-human. This multi-site approach seeks to deal with 
this reality.  
Nevertheless, despite the design of a multi-sited, interconnected research methodology no one 
particular set of methods or tools necessary follows. Moreover, many existing techniques for 
implementing multi-sited research are incapable of dealing with the production of event-based 
data. Digital life itself is defined in, and through, the generation of real-time data. Therefore, any 
research framework that attempts to shine a light on the digital must take this into account. As a 
result, a novel mobile methods approach was developed that took advantage of a suite of mobile, 
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digital technologies including ‘action’ video cameras, GPS devices and smartphones in concert 
with typical ethnographic tools such as the notebook and pen. The development of a ‘mapping 
moments’ (Dodge et al. 2009, 234) framework allowed particular spatial manoeuvres to be 
witnessed, captured and brought (back) to life through these various technological appendages. 
In a sense, to pin down what Law (2004, 86) calls ‘elusive objects’.    
Moreover, to account for the ethico-pragmatic nature of conducting interviews with those 
working with digital technologies and to digital concerns over privacy and security, novel 
ethnographic techniques had to be employed in order to ensure the smooth running of such 
encounters. These conditions, rather than imposing an unwanted and difficult framework on the 
researcher, engendered a rather more reflexive, delicate and, in hindsight, highly necessary 
approach to dealing with the ethical demands of research participants in a digital world. In other 
words, they re-shaped the research methods for the better.    
From here we can now move on to consider how exactly the calculable, risky nature of such 
disruptive cartographies played out for real.  
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Chapter 7 | Under the Bonnet  
 
Following the conceptual argument in chapter 4, the notion of a ‘ludic aesthetic’ is brought into 
empirical focus in this chapter. This aesthetic is a necessary focus because of the way in which it 
‘drove’ the project on; affording different navigational interactions and manoeuvres based on 
platform updates. Therefore, this chapter is a charting of this evolution as the platform came into 
material being, morphed and pivoted its way through a messy activist reality. Sukey did not appear 
out of thin air. Instead, it was carefully crafted into existence with the ideas of those who 
developed it and set out its strategic future. The raw material for its production, therefore, must 
be explored – as well as the continuing supply of ‘fuel’ to the project throughout the years.    
8-bit culture – in which pixelated graphics, ‘chiptune’ audio and animalistic characters take 
prominence – is central to a kind of ‘coherent aesthetic’ (Galloway 2012, 46) that has proliferated 
through protest-related digital projects, from Increpare’s simple flash game Kettle (2010), to 
Leonard Menchiari’s indie simulator Riot: Civil Unrest (2016). Unlike in Lev Manovich’s (2001) 
reading, these titles are not emblematic of a slick, modern aesthetic led by the interface of the 
Apple computer and aped by other technology companies for a variety of operating systems, 
software and computer games. Instead, they possess a DIY ethos that is embodied in these 
material traces. Aesthetic links between all three suggest that Sukey resonated in the same, broad, 
design discourse as either Kettle or Riot – one rooted in a counter-cultural gaming world, and 
driven by a kind of re-valuation of so-called ‘retrogames’ (Rehak 2012, n.p.).      
However, rather than an in-browser flash game or independent videogame, Sukey was a fully-
functioning protest application. As a result, there are significant differences between Sukey, Kettle 
and Riot: Civil Unrest. But these differences do not manifest themselves in an otherwise coherent 
aesthetic register that extends through each. Instead, they are generated in regards to its 
interactive possibilities. As such it becomes necessary to support the above material analysis with 
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a consideration of why particular design decisions were taken during the project, and moreover, 
why some weren’t.   
As a set-up to the next chapter, this articulation of aesthetic choices slides into a discussion on the 
platform’s navigational capacity. Unlike Kettle and Riot, Sukey was designed primarily for a mobile 
application (whilst being supported by desktop users). Through its mobile integration – as a 
‘navigational interface’ (Lammes 2011, 5) – interaction with the application takes place in a 
markedly different fashion without the use of keyboards, joysticks or computer mice. As a result 
of being embedded within activism as opposed to the gaming community, Sukey is oriented 
outwards towards the facilitation of protest manoeuvres rather than game moves.   
The key driver of this navigational capacity is the platform’s reliance on user updates regarding 
operational phenomena. In order for this capacity to be maximized, however, instructions on how 
to compose tweets and texts were routinely posted through social media and other material. The 
importance of sending the ‘who, what, were, when’ of every incident therefore aided in 
smoothing the parsing and verification of navigational data, following the distinctions made in 
Philip Agre’s (1994) capture model for each ‘unit’ of data to be indivisible, unique, replicable and 
compoundable in order for it to be put to use.     
I therefore argue in this chapter that Sukey acted as a ‘pivot’ between the ‘inward’ interaction 
with a digital, mobile device and the ‘outward’ generation of manoeuvres. This is the key 
distinction between Sukey as a protest mapping application and mere protest simulators such as 
Kettle and Riot: Civil Unrest.  
 
Video Aesthetics  
This 8-bit aesthetic is visible throughout the Sukey project from inception. Three examples will be 
explored here: two introductory videos released during the opening months of the platform’s 
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public release, the iterative Sukey logo as updated, refined and re-designed over the entirety of 
the project from 2010-2013, and a ‘survival guide’ released with a later re-launch of the platform 
in 2012. Each of these include the development of the 8-bit graphics across the project’s video, 
image and textual output. Or, what Denis Wood and John Fels (2008, 192) refer to as the 
‘paramap’. That is, the extent of material that shapes the map’s reception. Moreover, each of 
them bear aesthetic similarities to the two protest-related games/simulators introduced above – 
Increpare’s Kettle (2010) and Leonard Menchiari’s Riot: Civil Unrest (2016).  
Fig 7.1 | Online flash game Kettle. Source: Increpare (2010)  
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Fig 7.2 | Protest simulator Riot: Civil Unrest. Source: Menchiari (2016)  
In the first video (Sukey 2011a) introducing the application to potential users, the Sukey web 
address is revealed by a green 8-bit T-rex to the sound of an unidentified ‘chiptune’ track. In the 
following 1 minute and 30 seconds a narrator introduces the platform by detailing what it is (‘a 
personal newsdesk for demonstrators’) and what it is intended to do (‘to keep protesters safe, 
mobile and informed’). In order to illustrate its intended use a series of animated scenes play out 
complete with different dinosaur species – including T-rex and Stegosauruses. In the first, a 
bespectacled newsreader (the T-rex) is positioned in front of a script as protesters (Stegosauruses) 
with placards walk past a building on an inset screen. In the second, a number of these protesters 
are once again shown to depict the crowdsourcing of information, whilst another (a T-rex) is 
pictured tapping the keyboard of a desktop computer, depicting the flow of traditional news 
media. In the second video (Sukey 2011b) the practice of kettling is introduced for those unfamiliar 
with the tactic. Again, the Sukey web address is revealed by the T-rex mascot to the sound of the 
same chiptune track. Like the first video, animated dinosaurs are also used; this time to show the 
effect of kettling on protesters. But unlike the first, Ankylosaurus (police) and Echinodon or similar 
(protesters) are used to depict the protest situation. An animated containment is also used to 
draw the same connections between the act of boiling water and containing protesters.  
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Fig 7.3 | 8-bit Sukey 1.0. Source: Sukey (2011a) 
 
Fig 7.4 | Sukey ‘newsdesk’. Source: Sukey (2011a)   
It was through these videos and other material (memes, costumes, flyers, etc.) that the green T-
rex became the official mascot of the Sukey platform, and thus the official face of the project itself. 
Although the videos themselves were viewed and shared liberally throughout their time publically 
available, it was through the T-rex itself that the project gained traction and visibility. As the 
screenshots show, the animations themselves were not shot in a pixelated style but in a 
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contemporary, informative aesthetic. Although the pixelated graphics cement Sukey’s playful 
identity in various materials that constitute what Denis Wood would call the ‘epimap’ (Wood 
2010, 273), a switch to a more informative aesthetic is made when direct communication is 
required. In other words, in Sukey’s case ‘all the material not physically part of the map that 
shapes the map’s reception’ (Wood 2010, 273, original emphasis) was a combination of both an 
8-bit and informative aesthetic. However, the reasons for this will be made clearer later on in this 
chapter.  
Nevertheless, the one continuity between these styles is the presence of the Sukey mascot 
variously assuming the role of newsreader and desktop user. Although the T-Rex was a fearful 
predator, it is somewhat ridiculed in internet culture. Dinosaur Comics (North 2016) and the ‘T-
Rex Trying’ (Murphy 2016) tumblr are just two prominent examples of their comic potential – 
especially due to their respective aesthetic styles. The depiction of the T-rex in the two videos 
shares a similar comic interpretation. In another widely distributed image, the Sukey mascot is 
pictured holding a kettle in front of a London backdrop in a slightly more serious fashion. This 
picture was used in various news articles on the platform, as well as to promote talks and events 
the Sukey team held around the UK and Europe. Even when the Sukey website was down for 
maintenance, the T-rex was still visible – this time as an ASCII design. In all, the Sukey T-rex appears 
in myriad, but usually comic, forms.    
Further, the chiptune song that soundtracks the opening frames of both videos not only emulates 
the synthesized electronic tracks created for early microcomputers and video gaming systems of 
the early 1980s, but also directly references the start-up screens of those early systems also. Both 
console manufacturers (Sega, Nintendo) and games manufacturers (Capcom, EA Sports) have 
exhibited remarkably similar start-up screens involving a sweeping ‘reveal’ of a manufacturer logo 
as well as an accompanying chiptune track; many of which have now become iconic (see; Nintendo 
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2013, Capcom 2012). In aping the audio-visual dimension of these start-up screens – first 
emergent in the 8-bit era – Sukey once again takes its cues from early computer culture.       
Fig 7.5 | How kettling works. Source: Sukey (2011b)   
 
Fig 7.6 | London Sukey  
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Fig 7.7 | ASCII Sukey  
 
Logo Iterations  
From the launch of the original protest map (Sukey 1.0) to a re-designed platform in late 2012 
(Sukey 3.0), Sukey had a logo. Alongside the T-rex mascot, it adorned a wealth of material from 
event flyers to social media accounts and blogs. Most importantly, though, it was used across all 
iterations of the mobile and desktop application. Like the T-rex it took multiple forms across the 
length of the project, dependent upon the material. In all cases it was comprised of two parts: a 
textual element and a variant of the T-rex discussed above. Sometimes both parts appeared in 
concert with each other. This is evident in the promotional and informational videos discussed 
above. On other occasions the Sukey text would appear alone, such as on social media accounts. 
On particular parts of the mobile application, only an adapted version of the T-rex (usually its 
head) would appear with no text at all. In any case, at least one of these logo elements was present 
across all aspects of the platform, and at all points in the project. Although these adaptations were 
made in relation to the size, intent or format of the material it was published for or in, the only 
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wholesale stylistic changes were made with the commencement of each new launch of the 
project.    
Fig 7.8 | ‘Sukey in the Thames’ and other variations, including ‘Tea Time is Over’  
Stylistically, the Sukey 1.0 logo emerged from the original Google Maps mash-up23 deployed on 
December 9th 2010 during the House of Commons vote on HE tuition fees. The original inspiration 
for the T-rex mascot came as a result of the use of various standardized icons on the Google Maps 
editor. Although these included useful icons for an array of personnel, including police, mounted 
police and helicopters, one contributor also added a T-rex icon onto the map and into the River 
Thames. This playful addition sought to cement the T-rex as the mascot and icon of the platform 
and the entire project. Its addition on the map itself took the platform into new territory. How 
might users interpret its presence? As a genuine tactical addition aiding safety and navigation? Or, 
as a superfluous in-joke between developers, friends and supporters?     
                                                          
23 Still publically accessible here: 
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=zTI6V5msH5lM.kWXWuAZhTaP8&hl=en with purportedly 
over 16,000 views at present (March 2016). However, a screenshot taken by myself at a much earlier date 
shows there had been over 244,000 views.  
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The first deployment of Sukey 2.0 was during a smaller demonstration at the Egyptian Embassy 
on January 29th 2011 before being tweaked for a major deployment at an anti-austerity 
demonstration on March 26th 2011. As a result of the viral possibility of the Google Maps T-rex, a 
graphic was devised that quickly became known as ‘Sukey in the Thames’ by the developers. It 
was used liberally during the main months of the project for a variety of deployments, public-
speaking events and workshops. It was even proposed by online users that some designs could be 
turned into t-shirts (see; the ‘Tea Time is Over’ graphic). The new, purpose-built platform also 
integrated the same design into the various parts of the application. For instance, the head of the 
dinosaur element was used to emphasize the Twitter feed at the top of each page; as if the 
dinosaur was communicating each tweet itself. The Sukey text itself was absent, with the dinosaur 
head deemed sufficient to allow user identification of the platform.           
Map 7.1 | Sukey version 2.0        
In support of the launch of ‘Sukey 3.0’, a new logo was designed – updating and refining the 
existing version that had seen widespread deployment across all aspects of the project. The reason 
for this was that various team members involved in the main iteration of the project had since 
departed and technical changes to the platform had subsequently been made. As such, it was seen 
as necessary to provide a new branding that played on the long-standing playful aesthetic but 
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could still be seen as a marked new phase in the project. As a result, the Sukey text and the 
dinosaur element were now designed in an 8-bit style – much like the original ‘start-up’ screen 
witnessed at the beginning of the introductory videos. This updated logo saw its first and final 
deployment at an anti-austerity demonstration on October 20th 2012. This version can be seen 
both as a consolidation of previous iterations and also a marked ludic evolution, affording a more 
holistic interaction with the platform. 
 
Fig 7.9 | 8-bit Sukey 2.0   
Once again, it was used across multiple material and in different forms. Like the previous iteration, 
it was decided that the new 8-bit dinosaur element would also be used as a header on most pages 
of the application; from the ‘intro view’ to the landing page. For this update, the Twitter 
functionality was removed entirely from the platform and replaced by a static, textual header 
(‘The Sukey online tactical support team is ready and standing by’) as opposed to a scrolling, live 
update of tweets.   
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Fig 7.10 | Sukey version 2.0 header (left) with Twitter integration. Sukey version 3.0 header with static text 
(right)      
 
Survival Styling  
This final logo was launched alongside a ‘Sukey Survival Guide’ distributed in multiple formats 
(pdf, jpeg) via the Sukey blog in celebration of the re-launched platform (Carlisle 2012, n.p.). The 
guide was intended to give protesters helpful advice when attending demonstrations and using 
the application. All were designed in the same pixelated style.  
An 8-bit video was also meant to have been launched alongside them, according to developer X 
(interview, February 17th 2015). However, due to the labour involved, it did not publically 
materialize. Having met in 2011, strategist X then began to lend advice to developer X, in 
anticipation of the re-launch (interview with strategist X, May 3rd 2015). They then helped to 
provide the written copy for the ‘survival guide’, as a way of expanding the aims and appeal of the 
platform beyond a narrow capacity to help activists avoid police containment (interview with 
strategist X, May 3rd 2015). As much of this labour was unpaid – despite taking considerable time 
and energy to coordinate – the limits of the platform were apparent. The survival guide was thus 
an attempt to put out a coherent promotional message of what the platform could assist in 
providing activists.     
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Fig 7.11 | Survival Guide (p. back-front, 1-2) 
As opposed to earlier videos incorporating various pixelated elements this new release was 
designed entirely in an 8-bit style; edited by the same individual to compliment the survival guide. 
Despite attempts by developer X to show me the video on two separate devices (a desktop and a 
laptop) the video in question remained elusive (interview with developer X, February 17th 2015). 
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However, I have no reason to doubt the existence of such – bearing in mind the dissemination of 
the guide. 
The survival guide itself was intended as a direct accompaniment to the platform – especially for 
those on the ground in a demonstration. Thus, it is worth going into it in some detail – both 
because of its meticulously designed 8-bit style, and for its obvious operational purpose. In other 
words, the guide was not simply a promotional tool for the new launch, but a valuable aid for the 
platform’s use. This marks it out as somewhat different from other such material.  
The decision to use pixelated graphics for the survival guide can be interpreted in multiple ways. 
Although Sukey had deployed various 8-bit graphics throughout the project before, the main logo 
and accompanying dinosaur element were not designed in such a style. Whilst suggesting that the 
Sukey team had long employed an 8-bit style to various elements of the platform, no informational 
content had been produced with such an aesthetic before. As the Sukey team wrote in the guide 
itself: 
We’ve gathered important tips to help you exercise your civil rights and plan for an 
effective demonstration. We cover basic survival – hydration, food, and first aid – as well 
as tips on uploading media, your legal rights, alternative communication, and using Sukey 
to send and receive real-time updates.  
Thus, the guide was indeed to be a comprehensive summary covering all the main aspects of 
protest in the UK; from ‘basic survival’ to communication. On pages 3-4, Sukey inform readers of 
the need to ‘stay hydrated’ and ‘maintain your energy’ during a demonstration; involving the 
drinking of a litre of water ‘for every hour of protesting’ whilst eating ‘bananas, almonds, 
chocolate, or high-energy snacks’ to ‘provide energy over the course of the day’. On pages 5-6, 
the team suggest that activists ‘connect and report regularly’ to ‘keep informed about what is 
happening at the demonstration’, and that the sharing of ‘observations and experiences’ during 
the event will ensure that not all information becomes ‘filtered through others who may not share 
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your values’. ‘This is also where Sukey comes in’ the guide then adds. It is through the platform, it 
is suggested, that ‘we [the Sukey team] help gather and verify information and get it to those who 
need it most’. 
 
Fig 7.12 | Survival Guide (p. 3-4, 5-6)  
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In other words, the guide outlines the essence of the platform to those reading: Sukey is there to 
ensure activists on the ground (i.e. ‘those who need it most’) receive the navigational information 
they need. Importantly, the guide emphasizes the necessity of receiving information beyond or 
outside of particular, ‘official’ channels. Whilst this is left unexplored, the implication is that 
information from the police, event organizers or student unions (SUs) is not necessarily always 
reliable for activists. Sukey’s principle intention, throughout each iteration, was the establishment 
of an alternative, crowdsourced and verifiable information flow outside of institutional 
formations. As the guide further suggests:  
Use Sukey to upload photos and share information about what is going on around you. 
Your photos and reports will feed into a map in real time, informing everyone about where 
the demonstration route is and where trouble could be brewing – allowing you to avoid 
it.  
Although the blurb broadly outlines previous iterations, it also emphasizes the photographic 
features of the new version, suggesting that users can contribute to the activity by sending 
photographs to the team rather than simply tweeting textual updates. As a result of this emphasis 
the following page suggests that users ‘know their rights’ in regards to photographic, audio and 
video evidence. In particular, the guide alerts readers to the illegality of taking photos within the 
Westminster area (that is, in Parliament Square) – and a way around the law: 
…throughout Westminster written permission is required to take photographs or make 
audio or video recordings. Police will enforce these regulations. People with press cards 
are exempt. To enquire about obtaining a National Union of Journalists press card for use 
in the UK send an email info@nuj.org.uk or visit nuj.org.uk to learn more.  
And that: 
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Outside of Westminster, you are not prohibited from taking photographs in public places 
(other than in very exceptional circumstances). Also, there is no prohibition regarding 
photographing public servants – including those who wear uniforms. Police are not 
allowed to obscure their identification numbers (if they do, that’s a newsworthy thing to 
document and share). And police officers may not delete digital images or destroy film.  
These details no doubt allowed activists reading the document to become more aware of the rules 
and regulations regarding photography and other forms of data capture during protest event; an 
issue I was also keenly aware of. Although Sukey had always allowed users to upload images to 
the platform, this was previously only capable via the Twitter functionality. That is, not directly 
within the platform. As the cover page shows, the ‘upload a photo’ feature took equal prominence 
as a specific page on the platform alongside the map and reporting functionality.  
This expansion of the platform’s key features was an identifiable shift in Sukey 3.0; one consistent 
with strategist X’s strategic involvement. Part of their interest was how the platform could include 
other functionalities, serving a variety of situations, seeing as the wider activist landscape had 
evolved since the launch of Sukey 1.0. This desire to explore other functions and knowledge 
capture processes was something touched on with developer X also. They discussed the possibility 
of launching a content-less platform to provide only the architecture for some of the tasks Sukey 
was known for (communication, map, image uploading), so other users could make use of it in 
whatever scenario they envisaged (interview with developer X, February 17th 2015).   
A subsequent page documents the need to bring a first aid kit packed with plasters, bandages, 
antiseptic wipes, spray or cream, painkillers and saline solution; further noting that those with 
‘up-to-date first aid training’ should ‘consider using [their] skills and becoming a demonstration 
medic’. Whilst such aspects of the protest event were ancillary to the Sukey project, the guide 
makes a concerted effort to cover all aspects of attending a demonstration. The guide attempts 
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to cast the platform as a helpful tool amongst many – one with a set of specific, but 
interconnected, functions.  
 
Fig 7.13 | Survival Guide (p. 7-8, 9-10) 
The next set of pages bring the topic back to communication once again. As page 9 mentions, 
spare batteries or ‘USB battery packs’ can help keep any phones and cameras charged up for the 
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duration of the event. Further, ‘[i]f the weather is sunny, a freeloader solar panel charger can keep 
your gadgets functioning during the entire demonstration’. For others, this sort of information, 
whilst seemingly banal, might have made the difference between remaining connected during the 
final hours of a demonstration and being completely out of the loop. As a result, perhaps meaning 
the difference between being contained or not.  
Somewhat surprisingly the guide also suggests that readers bring walkie talkies as whilst ‘Sukey 
loves mobile phones…they are not always reliable – especially in times of unrest – because 
network may become busy and stop functioning’. Walkie talkies, therefore, ‘will help you stay in 
touch with others’. Every other page of the guide is geared to help smooth out the contingencies 
and operational unknowns for activists during protest events. This page is no different; with so 
many people desperate to follow updates over 3G and 4G local networks invariably slow. As a 
result, communications might fail to reach those in need, in time. Just like the carrying of a first 
aid kit, spare batteries and plenty of water, walkie talkies also aid in the maintaining the safety of 
those participating in a demonstration.  
But unlike the other pages, it also presents Sukey as fallible. Whilst legal restrictions regarding the 
taking of photographs in the Westminster area might curtail updates at particular times (although 
this rule is relatively unenforceable en masse), the slowdown of the mobile telecommunications 
networks demands a workable alternative for those wanting to maintain communication with 
fellow activists. This is an aspect of the project that will be returned to in the conclusion.          
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Fig 7.14 | Survival Guide (p. 11-12) 
The final pages of the survival guide focus on an evidently more playful dimension to proceedings 
– offering up some crafty advice to protest attendees. As it reads: 
Bold colours and symbols are important during demonstrations. Many movements have 
their own banners or picket signs. If you’re making your own here are some things to 
consider: 
 Make your banner light and comfortable to carry 
 Bold colors [sic] and symbols will make your banner stand out 
 Get a creative friend to help make your design memorable (are you the 
creative friend? Offer to help others!) 
 Post, tag, and use a creative commons zero license to share so that others 
can use and build on your work (flickr or openclipart.org are great spots to 
post) 
Once again, the platform’s photographic functionality is brought into focus. Unlike in previous 
iterations, Sukey 3.0 ‘emphasized ‘fun stuff like banner rating’ with users who spot a banner are 
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invited to ‘take a snap and upload it via Twitter with #Sukey #banner and the banner text or using 
http://sukey.io/.’ Although similar initiatives were active during previous versions, they were 
primarily limited to side-projects such as ‘Sukey Dating’, rather than integrated into the main 
platform.24  
The pixelated aesthetic is therefore not strictly a game-specific one – as Sukey has shown. Despite 
being used for online flash titles and indie simulators; it was also applied to a navigational platform 
designed to be deployed in the riskiest of situations. 8-bit culture pervades practically all media, 
even into spaces and contexts that might seem anathema, or a ‘distraction’ to, the content of the 
media itself. Even in a so-called ‘survival guide’ disseminated in order to draw attention to the 
features of a demonstration, this 8-bit aesthetic is put to use. In other words, this ludic aesthetic 
is not confined to the world of videogames but is equally visible in non-game contexts – even in 
communications designed specifically to convey critical operational information regarding safety, 
mobility and use.    
 
Navigational ‘Pivot’  
It was suggested in the previous section that the Sukey ‘epimap’ comprised a combination of 
aesthetic styles, rather than being exclusively 8-bit. Despite this, I maintain that the platform 
operated with a ‘coherent aesthetic’ – a term introduced by Galloway (2012, 46). This transition 
between a pixelated style and a more informative, almost instructive aesthetic is perhaps the big 
clue to the difference between the platform and other protest games/simulations. Although the 
survival guide discussed above was designed in a pixelated style the key aspects of the platform 
itself, notably the mapping application retained a default online map aesthetic. Thus, unlike the 
games introduced at the beginning of this chapter (Kettle, Riot: Civil Unrest), Sukey had the 
                                                          
24 Offering the possibility for kettled protesters to hook up with other contained activists, in order to turn 
the otherwise oppressive space of the kettle into a distinctly more amorous one. See the @SukeyDating 
Twitter account for more details.  
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capability to switch between styles depending on form, content and deployment. Most 
importantly, it reserved this default cartographic style for navigational purposes.  
This is because Sukey operated as a ‘navigational interface’ (Lammes 2011, 5) and as such was 
oriented both inwards towards the operation of a digital, mobile device and outwards towards 
the generation of protest manoeuvres. It could be said, then, that the use of the 8-bit style in video 
explanations and other informative material could potentially detract from, or even obscure, the 
instructions themselves. Returning to the survival guide momentarily, one could therefore argue 
that the aesthetic itself fails to articulate the necessity of complying with the various tips offered 
up by the Sukey team. In other words, that with the pixelated style, one could be drawn to thinking 
the content itself – emphasizing the need to drink lots of water and being aware of the illegalities 
of taking photographs in certain locations, for instance – did not need to be taken seriously. Its 
association as an aesthetic wedded to videogame design therefore poses an operational 
challenge: are the tips merely playful suggestions to otherwise enhance the ‘game’ of protest? Or, 
in fact, do they alert readers to essential practical information? In any cases the pixelated aesthetic 
was chosen to convey this operational (but not navigational) information.  
Yet this is not an aesthetic choice of ‘either’ 8-bit or a ‘clear line’ style. As evidenced, they exist in 
tandem yet also in also in tension with each other. An 8-bit aesthetic is no necessary barrier to 
information flow – cartographic or otherwise. Indeed, I argue it has been used as a way to entice 
them into reading operational information prior to a demonstration. Its playful design, therefore, 
only enhances the delivery of the content rather than distracting from it.    
No such aesthetic decisions were taken with the map itself. However, this was not a decision made 
because of a perceived lack of integrity with the 8-bit style, but due to the technical limitations of 
available mapping platforms at the time. Each iteration of the Sukey platform was designed with 
a different digital mapping backdrop. In version 1.0 it consisted of a Google Maps mash-up. In 
version 2.0 – now a fully-functioning web application – a Google Maps layer comprised the 
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backdrop of the platform. For Sukey 3.0, Google Maps had been substituted for an alternative 
layer by OSM. In each case, regardless of the proprietor, the default mapping style was selected. 
In Google Maps this allowed users the option to use one of two styles: either standard map or 
satellite imagery. In OSM the user is given the option of 5 in-browser map styles or ‘layers’: 
Standard, Cycle Map, Transport Map, MapQuest Open and Humanitarian; the latter of which was 
launched after the Sukey project became operational, in September 2013 (Wood 2013, n.p.). 
Whilst there are variances in detail, colour and emphasis all layers in OSM and default options in 
Google Maps show road names and types; in other words, the most important of navigational 
features.     
Map 7.2 | Sukey version 1.0  
Only in recent years, with the rise of platforms such as Mapbox, have non-default mapping styles 
become more widely available. For example, on Mapbox alone there are 15 custom pre-set map 
styles ranging from ‘Streets’ (to emphasize street types and names) to ‘Run, Bike, and Hike’ (for 
leisure activities). In essence, these are similar to default Google Maps and OSM styles for varying 
navigational duties such as general reference to commutes. Further, on Mapbox and other online 
platforms (OSM included), there is the option to design your own for whatever desired 
cartographic purpose. The difference between the Mapbox platform and OSM, however, is that a 
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greater number of these custom styles have made their way into the default toolbox for map users 
and editors.   
Mapbox also allows users to pick a number of more playful styles, most notably; ‘Comic!’, 
‘Wheatpaste’ and ‘Pirates’. However, none of these allow users to navigate particularly well using 
such styles. Although the ‘Comic!’ style includes some building labels and all settlement names it 
forgoes road labels altogether. In ‘Wheatpaste’ – a Roy Lichtenstein-inspired pop art style – there 
is a similar lack of detail despite the attractive modern collage aesthetic and intense colour scheme 
incorporating lime greens, aqua blues and electric pinks. Whilst ‘Pirates’ does include street 
names and other such necessary navigational labels the muted green/brown colour that pervades 
throughout makes distinguishing between road types incredibly difficult. Once again, these playful 
styles are of limited navigational use. However, one would suggest that neither of these is 
designed with navigation in mind. Instead, each is intended to be a fun backdrop for custom maps 
designed by Mapbox users. Although cartographic data can still be displayed in such styles, it is 
more for visual and interpretative purposes only.   
Map 7.3 | Mapbox ‘Wheatpaste’ style  
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The reason for this discussion is that Sukey – despite the ludic tendencies clearly evident 
throughout the entirety of the project – maintained a clear, default map style in all iterations. At 
no point did a more playful aesthetic extend into the cartographic plane. The closest any pixelated 
graphic came to imposing itself on the map is in Sukey 3.0; when the dinosaur logo can be seen 
on the intro view and the landing page. In the case of the former, it could be said that it forms part 
of the navigational ‘perimap’, and in the latter, the ‘epimap’, but never the map itself. In others 
words, it may account for the elements that surround the ‘map image proper’ or the broader 
material ‘not physically part of the map’ but otherwise involved in ‘shap[ing] the map’s reception’ 
(Wood 2010, 273). That is, the perimap or the epimap. The exclusion of it from the cartographic 
frame itself is telling of a navigational affordance or duty integral to the mapping platform in this 
instance.         
Map 7.4 | Sukey version 3.0  
The decision to switch from Google Maps to OSM between Sukey 2.0 and 3.0 is further telling of 
the navigational necessity mentioned in relation to Mapbox above: distinguishing between road 
types. As I have suggested elsewhere, ‘[u]nlike in Google Maps, OSM is able to render ten road 
types, including four where vehicles do not have right-of-way’ (Hind 2015a, n.p.). This I further 
suggested was ‘critical at the time for protesters desiring to avoid police containments’ (Hind 
2015a, n.p.) as the distinction between A-roads, side-roads, park paths, cycle routes, alleyways 
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and arcades could invariably facilitate a greater suite of pedestrian manoeuvres during a 
demonstration. The use of Google Maps where such distinctions are either (a) not made at all or 
(b) made aesthetically ambiguous or imperceptible therefore result in a far less effective mapping 
platform designed to facilitate mobility. Indeed, as I argue in chapter 9, they actively hamper the 
use of side-roads and alleys in central London when ‘splintering’ from A-to-B protest routes. 
The navigational interface, therefore, is the point at which this ludic tendency ‘pivots’ between a 
playful aesthetic (pixelated graphics), and a choreography of protest manoeuvres. The utilization 
of default mapping styles is absolutely integral to this pivot and enables the facilitation of 
pedestrian movement. To reiterate, however: this was not an ‘either/or’ scenario in which an 8-
bit aesthetic was sacrificed for a more utilitarian design, but one precipitated by a situational need 
as it presented itself. The shift from Google Maps to OSM further facilitated this movement, 
ensuring that those who used the application were able to distinguish between various road types 
that would enable egress from possible, emergent containments and ensure the safety of those 
participating in the protest.    
Still, consider for a moment if the aesthetic had continued into the map itself. As Greg Elmer (2012, 
n.p.) has previously argued, Sukey’s reliance on a number of technological features already poses 
significant navigational challenges: 
GPS and its common map interfaces routinely offer incorrect or frustratingly imprecise 
locations, which the developers of Sukey themselves note commonly extends upwards of 
50 metres. Given the narrow corridors and cramped urban environments that police 
commonly harness for their kettles and dead ends, a map-only interface could prove to 
be a disaster in the loud, tense and cramped conditions of urban protests. As new versions 
and code have emerged, Sukey has sought to integrate aggregated Twitter reports to 
provide text based updates and tickers with warnings to individual users, thus lessening 
the reliance upon maps. 
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Thus, the integration of such features with a pixelated aesthetic – anathema to the clear, modern 
design style of contemporary computing – is a recipe for navigational failure. At least, it was at the 
time with few other workable ludic options. This is before any consideration of the risk involved 
in navigating a protest event: navigation becomes impossible in the first instance with the 
integration of pixelated roads, buildings and other imprecise but nonetheless coherent elements. 
8-bit, it might be argued, is not a navigational medium. This ‘invitation’ (Lammes 2016, 6) to 
interact with the map, whilst ostensibly ludic, would not amount to a navigational invitation. In 
such a case, the platform fails in choreographing movements and/or manoeuvres for the purposes 
of participating in a demonstration. Put otherwise, it does not operate as a navigational interface. 
Maintaining the default cartographic style ensures that the interface affords navigation, rather 
than inhibits it.       
In order to provide a little more context to this navigational ‘invitation’, I will end this chapter with 
a brief detailing of the desired message structure users were encouraged to send information in. 
This constitutes another aspect of the Sukey ‘engine’ alongside the map and paramap materials.   
Consider the following tweet from a demonstration at which Sukey 3.0 was live: 
Mounted police behind a couple of rows of police, blocking the way to Whitehall. 
#demo2012 #Sukey  
@Shakteh 13.45 PM – 21 Nov 201225  
As Philip Agre (1994) would suggest, for a ‘unit’ of data to be theoretically operational it must be 
indivisible, unique, replicable and compoundable. Without such it ceases to impose itself on an 
activity. In this case, on the act of navigation. At present – as a single, composite message – the 
above is not indivisible, unique, replicable or compoundable. The first step, therefore, is to take 
                                                          
25 The @Shakteh Twitter account is no longer publically accessible. Manual retweets such as those by user 
@superfurryandy, however, do remain accessible (Bear 2012). Original tweet content and metadata 
derived from a Twitter scrape request of all tweets containing #sukey on November 21st 2012, using the 
now-defunct ScraperWiki tool.   
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apart the above so that this process of identifying the units can begin. At present, the message is 
a single whole. It comprises, simply, of one tweet. Although the content can be read and acted 
upon without much thought by a human, in order for it to be parsed by a computer and accurately 
depicted (if necessary) on a digital map, the tweet above has to be taken apart.    
As part of the platform’s promotion, and in order for this structuring process to be performed 
more efficiently, the Sukey team instructed activists desiring to submit information to do so in a 
particular format. This was primarily communicated through social media accounts in the run-up 
to a deployment, and was the same for each iteration (for example, see; Sukey 2011c, 2011d, 
2011e). Tweets composed in the correct format were able to be read, parsed, verified and 
communicated back to the crowd more easily than those poorly formatted. In short: they could 
be captured by the platform. The abstract units can be easily summarized as: who, what, where, 
when. The above is an example of a near-perfectly structured navigational tweet as it contains all 
of these elements: who (mounted police and police), what (blocking the way), where (way to 
Whitehall) and when (13.45pm). The only issue is that the user has not specified which way the 
mounted police are blocking to Whitehall. However, as this tweet was sent during ‘Demo 2012’, 
the last student demonstration fully-organized by the NUS, it can be reasonably assumed that ‘the 
way to Whitehall’ is the protest route itself. As a result, this absence of detail does not, on its own, 
cause an issue for the Sukey team.    
Some of the navigational information is derived from the tweet content; such as the who, what 
and the where. The remainder is derived from metadata attributed to the tweet (when). Although 
Twitter users have the option of geolocating their tweets many do not – especially during 
demonstrations where privacy issues pervade. In a study of a college basketball riot in the US, only 
0.2% of tweets referencing it were geotagged out of a comprehensive total of 12,590 (Crampton 
et al. 2013, 134). In general, geotagged tweets consist of a very small percentage of all possible 
tweets (usually between 2-5%), thus resulting in sampling issues concerning volume, populations 
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and representation (see; Hind 2012, Zook 2012, Steadman 2013). In many cases a simple 
geolocation cannot and should not suffice for the wealth of possible geographical dynamics at 
play in every social media-ted event, hence why Crampton et al. (2013, 132) suggest we need to 
go ‘beyond the geotag’ to explore the ‘multiplicity of ways that space is implicated in the creation 
of such data’. Such ‘fixations’ on geotagged data ‘undergird falsely universal claims about the 
world and the people who inhabit it’ (Leszczynski and Crampton 2016, 1), thus, a  
…more critical and relational approach to using geotagged social media data requires 
grappling with the data in a way that doesn’t assume that the data, and in particular its 
explicit geographic reference, speaks for itself. It is important to not take the wealth of 
data contained within each individual data point – or…tweet – for granted by over-
privileging the fact that each point can simply be placed on a map. (Shelton 2016, 7)  
What is also needed in this case, then, is a direction. Deriving both location and travelling direction 
from the tweet content is possible – a geotag cannot give us anything more than a (supposedly) 
accurate geographical location. Thus, the Sukey team encouraged users to incorporate not only 
geodata into their tweets, but also directional data too. In doing so, this aided the team in being 
able to code safe exit routes around particular known incidents such as police containments. 
However, this was not always adhered to. Such messages therefore retained a lesser operational 
importance with this detail missing. This dynamic will be discussed at length in chapter 8.   
If the tweet was missing several of the unit details it might have been markedly useless. Consider 
another interpretation of the above situation: 
Two lines of polices causing problems on the protest route near Downing Street. 
#demo2012 #Sukey 
Can the same units be determined? Yes and no. The who (police), the what (‘causing problems’), 
the where (‘on the protest route near Downing Street’) and the when (also derived from 
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metadata) are all present but in vaguer forms. No reference is made to mounted police, who 
present a different navigational obstacle to protesters and demand a different approach to 
movement, welfare and tactics. The what makes no reference to the nature of the issue being 
tweeted; in this case a blocking of a particular kind and direction of movement. The where is 
entirely devoid of a street name or proximal landmark, only obliquely mentioning a location ‘on 
the protest route near Downing Street’. The when remains functional so long as the Twitter 
metadata is correct. Thus, the work required to parse the message for operational and 
navigational clues is either markedly increased or the message itself is operationally useless, for it 
can provide no direct use to those requiring navigational information during a demonstration. In 
other words, the moment cannot be appropriately captured.   
By their nature these four components – who, what, where and when – are meant to be indivisible, 
unique, replicable and compoundable. In reality this is perhaps less true. Social media data is often 
defined by its ‘fuzziness’, with the who, what, where and when of every navigational tweet difficult 
to capture definitively. Yet, as these units are relational forms easily combinable with other such 
units, their indefinite status does not necessarily cause operational problems for those desiring to 
capture the events in question. Nevertheless, as the above examples show, vague and incomplete 
data ordinarily requires more data analysis. As a result, the capture and mapping of such moments 
becomes increasingly inefficient and unresponsive to otherwise fast-moving, time-critical events. 
The parsing, verification and communication of such information is therefore nothing without an 
effective data capture procedure. In the midst of a protest event this becomes evidently 
problematic for users of the Sukey platform reliant upon it to keep safe and mobile.  
The above can, therefore, be considered a kind of ‘territorial articulation’. The Twitter message 
parsing system enabled the Sukey developers to comprehend tactical communications without a 
hitch. The only reason why this worked, however, is that the activity unit-series structure had been 
determined. This is a critical part of making territory legible – an integral part of the navigational 
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engine. What is historically unique about these efforts is that ‘these practices’, of capturing and 
verifying navigational data, ‘break from conventional science models in which the legitimacy of 
the information is in part meant to be assumed because of its delivery or production by an 
“expert”’ (Elwood and Leszczynski 2013, 552). In Sukey’s case, this ‘expertise’ was derived from 
an array of on-the-ground sources, as well as the developers of the platform.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to draw connections between different elements of the Sukey 
platform. In essence, it has been to argue that Sukey maintains a ‘coherent aesthetic’ throughout 
many distinct iterations of the project; doing so in order to advance an ‘incoherent politics’ 
(Galloway 2012, 47) through the generation of spatial manoeuvres during protest events. 
This coherent aesthetic, I have argued, revolves around a graphic style referred to as ‘8-bit’. This 
directly references a suite of motifs common in videogame development during the 1980s, and 
taken up again by indie games developers. Both Increpare’s Kettle (2010) and Leonard Menchiari’s 
Riot: Civil Unrest (2016), for instance, use an array of pixelated features in their titles to depict 
characters and landscapes. Similarly, in video and textual material produced for promotional and 
operational purposes, Sukey employed chiptunes, pixelated start-up graphics and animated 
characters to create a coherent aesthetic around Sukey as a platform.  
Nevertheless, on many occasions this style was substituted. Most importantly it did not see use 
as the default map style. I argue that with 8-bit communicational clarity is lost – particularly 
important for a navigational platform designed to aid in the mobility of those who use it. However, 
its use in an operational ‘survival guide’ designed to give activists helpful tips on what to bring 
with them to a demonstration, how to conduct themselves and what to avoid, promoted the 
platform as playful tool offering users an array of interactive features.   
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Thus, these pixelated elements only extend as far as the ‘perimap’ and the ‘epimap’ (Wood and 
Fels 2008, 192) – the material that shapes the communication of, and interaction with, the map 
itself. Instead, ‘default’ map styles are deployed – despite the prevalence of more ludic layers on 
other online mapping platforms such as Mapbox. However, upon interrogation, it becomes 
apparent that these styles are similar in navigational capacity to an 8-bit aesthetic in that they 
operate poorly for those desiring to use any such digital map in order to navigate the real-world. 
Instead, such styles are better for data visualization and aesthetic experimentation.  
The shift from using Google Maps to OSM was further predicated on this navigational necessity. 
Although default styles label many different types of roads (A, B, paths, etc.), OSM has a much 
finer granularity. As such, it is better suited to protesters navigating city streets on foot. Further, 
that distinctions between park paths, cycle routes, alleyways and arcades allow for the generation 
of a much larger suite of possible protest manoeuvres, otherwise stunted by the lack of 
representation and distinction on the map itself.  
Lastly, in detailing how a Twitter message to the platform is ideally composed and parsed, a little 
more on the nature of navigational communication is garnered. This will be taken up in more detail 
in the following chapter as the absence of an extra-institutional navigational knowledge flow is 
explored. In conclusion, then, Sukey is a navigational interface. It allows for a ‘pivot’ to take place 
between a coherent aesthetic commitment (pixelated graphics) and an incoherent, or otherwise 
open-ended and contingent, generation of protest manoeuvres to occur.  
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Chapter 8 | Through the Windscreen 
 
The previous chapter detailed the aesthetic coherence to the Sukey project, as well as the 
navigational affordances of the platform. Moving forwards, this chapter will consider how 
navigational knowledges were accrued, and calculations made through use of the platform. In 
essence, to explore how users were able to both sense (visually or otherwise) and ‘make sense’ 
(compute, articulate, order) of the moments and incidents mediated by Sukey. This will involve 
contrasting how the practice of observation and articulation, following Agre’s (1994) capture 
model, contributed to the making legible of the protest terrain with the platform active and dead. 
This process demanded that activists paid, and divided, attention to the activities of two sets of 
actors: the police and fellow protesters. This allowed for activists engaged with the platform to 
gain knowledge of particular kinds of manoeuvres (containments, etc.) that would affect their own 
navigational intentions.  
These navigational knowledges can be divided into three temporal fields or ‘anticipatory layers’, 
broadly commensurate with the categories outlined by Rose-Redwood (2008). Each of these 
correspond to a different layer of cartographic information important for the production of 
navigational knowledge during a protest event. The first of these concerns the mapping of the 
built environment/street layout and is commonly performed by major mapping companies or 
organizations such as Google Maps or OSM. The Sukey platform relied first on Google Maps and 
then on OSM to provide this information. The second of these concerns the mapping of temporary 
features (metal barriers, fences) present only for the duration of a protest event. In all 
demonstrations this function was typically performed by a suite of actors including organizers 
(TUC, PA, NCAFC), political parties (Greens) and journalists.  
The third of these concerns the mapping of active phenomena. Unlike the built environment and 
temporary structures, these ‘active phenomena’ consisted of bodily collectives; police, protesters, 
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journalists and officials, as well as the mapping of humans with animals (police horses), humans 
in vehicles (police vans) or humans with objects (signs, banners). It was in this layer that Sukey 
sought to cartographically intervene, attempting to map various manoeuvres and capture 
particular moments that would contribute to the navigational knowledge of activists.          
What distinguishes each of these forms from the other is the degree of anticipation required to 
map them during a protest event. In other words, the lengths to which one must go to either 
‘prepare’ for or ‘pre-empt’ particular scenarios (Anderson 2010, 792). Whilst the built form and 
street layout will change over a period of months, demonstration routes will be publicized weeks 
in advance, and physical additions to the urban fabric will likely be made in the hours leading up 
to a protest event. In the final anticipatory layer, so-called active phenomena are exactly that: 
‘active’. As a result, there is precious time to capture these bodily collectives cartographically to 
be of navigational use to protesters. In theory, the desire was to map such phenomena in seconds. 
In practice, the Sukey platform was able to respond within minutes – a herculean effort for a 
cartographic project with few resources.    
However, what binds these layers in relation to each other – from the perspective of the Sukey 
platform – was the necessity of assigning a risk value to each. Predominantly, this risk concerned 
the possibility of the realization of containment manoeuvres. As such, these ‘risk maps’ – akin to 
Amoore’s (2011) ‘data derivatives’ – became critical to ensuring the safety and mobility of users. 
Central to this risk mapping was the utilization of a three-colour system designed to visualize the 
extent to which junctions were passable during a protest event. Junctions coloured green allowed 
free movement, those in blue indicated movement was partially possible, whilst those in red 
indicated the junction was entirely blocked. If several exit routes were blocked, this would usually 
indicate a containment was in place. Without the Sukey platform active, it was argued, few 
protesters would know definitively whether a route was blocked. With the cartographic evidence 
to prove it, the platform became critical to ensuring the safety and ongoing mobility of protesters. 
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To aid, in other words, in the protesters’ ability to act on ‘emergent and unfolding futures’ 
(Amoore, 2011, 27).        
In the period since the demise of the Sukey platform, the generation of navigational knowledge 
vis-à-vis active phenomena has disappeared almost entirely. I argue that a new generation of 
student activists (the ‘second-wave’) lack the option of using a navigational platform such as 
Sukey. As a result, extra-institutional knowledge regarding active phenomena during episodes of 
‘extra-institutional disruption’ (Scott 2012, XIV) has been left unrealized. Instead, institutional 
protocols – such as buddy systems and university blocs – have become further entrenched, with 
fewer activists being able to produce and disseminate the kinds of navigational knowledges 
required during a demonstration in order to ensure the safety and mobility of fellow activists.      
 
Built Environment and Temporary Features 
Agre’s (1994) capture model contains five stages that comprise an overall ‘grammatization’ of an 
activity. Stages one and two are the ‘analysis’ and ‘articulation’ stages, involving both the 
identification of the logic of an activity and the codification of it. Together, they provide the phases 
in which a particular kind of observation and calculation takes place; through which the activity in 
question comes to be ‘known’ and ‘captured’ in some manner. In respect to the protest events in 
which the Sukey platform was deployed, this navigational knowledge was centred on the 
possibility (or actuality) of a containment being formed. But this is not the whole story. The 
platform did not ‘switch on’ purely at such moments. On all occasions the platform was ‘live’ from 
before the beginning of the official demonstration (usually anywhere between 10am and 12pm) 
and continued well into the evening, should it be necessary to do so (often until 9 or 10pm). 
Although the anticipation of containments was at the heart of the platform, and often comprised 
the bulk of the messages verified and tweeted from the associated social media account, it also 
had a more general function to provide navigational updates and assistance throughout the event. 
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As argued in the previous chapter, the platform attempted to integrate many more of these 
features in updated versions. 
Agre’s model, however, does not consider a plurality of activities or actors. Although he is keen to 
emphasize the non-linearity of the capture model in which some stages may run before others in 
the sequence, run parallel or proceed indefinitely or recursively; he is less keen to highlight the 
hybrid nature of many capture models in which activities are comprised of intertwining strands. 
Applying it to a protest situation requires that it be adapted for such. Thus, the analysis and 
articulation stages, in this case, amount to a kind of divided attention. These articulations feed 
directly into the proximal decision-making of protesters, as well as the scripting of future 
movements in response to the knowledge gained on police activity through these initial phases.  
The difficulty, however, is knowing how to identify particular spatial formations. When this subject 
was brought up in conversation with developer X (interview, February 17th 2015) they discussed 
the notion of there being three possible temporal or ‘anticipatory layers’ to the identification 
process. These broadly adhere to the different elements in Rose-Redwood’s (2008, 289) typology 
of different levels of spatial inscription; from a basic coordinate system to event-based 
knowledges. However, what is key to understand in this case is that each of these layers 
corresponds to the degree of anticipation required by the developers to map such features for 
users. Each of these layers, therefore, involved a differing degree of difficulty when it came to 
observing and articulating the forms included in each.   
To explain, the easiest of these layers to anticipate is the built environment. Despite rampant 
urban redevelopment, central London’s street layout remained the same during the platform’s 
operation. Although new office blocks, residential towers and commercial premises emerged in 
those 3 years, few of these developments resulted in actual changes to street layout – a critical 
foundational element in the mapping of event phenomena. Without an up-to-date record of the 
street layout of central London the Sukey platform would have been of little value to those using 
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it. For example, in a manoeuvre discussed in more detail later on, protesters often took advantage 
of side-roads, alleys and arcades to ‘splinter’ from official demonstration routes. Many of these 
streets take quasi-public forms that are subject to closure or other spatio-temporal restrictions 
regardless of whether a demonstration is live. Ordinarily these restrictions may not have 
considerable impact (certainly not as much as an A-road closure, for example), but during a 
demonstration in which knowledge of the street layout is paramount the impact on movement is 
significant.        
Moreover, much of this cartographic groundwork had already been done by either Google Maps 
or OSM. The Sukey team was not responsible for mapping the built environment. Thus, no 
anticipation of built environment or road layout changes were carried out by the team itself in 
advance, or on the day, of any demonstration. Any inherent errors with either Google Maps or 
OSM would, therefore, make their way into the Sukey platform. However, a shift from Google 
Maps to OSM meant that any of these could be rectified more quickly by lay people so long as 
they had an OSM account and knowledge of how to correct cartographic errors on the platform.  
The next layer involves the mapping of temporary features. Official routes for protest events in 
the UK have to be agreed-upon with local authorities in advance. This is so road closures and 
transport diversions can be prepared and advertised in order to minimize disruption. It also allows 
stewarding and policing levels to be determined, depending on the length, duration and sensitivity 
of the route itself. If organizers fail to notify a local authority of a routed protest it is deemed 
illegal. The police then have a duty to prevent it from proceeding. As well as these administrative 
reasons, it also allows activists to plan ahead. All the anti-austerity and student demonstrations I 
have attended during the last five years have circulated this official protest route via various digital 
and print channels in advance of the event.  
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Map 8.1 | ‘Britain Needs a Pay Rise’ demonstration route  
These official routes were commonly plotted on popular, accessible and widely-used digital 
mapping platforms such as Google Maps. For the ‘Britain Needs a Pay Rise’ demonstration in 
October 2014, the TUC created a simple Google Maps overlay with the main protest route 
visualized – not too dissimilar from the original Sukey Google Maps mash-up. Included alongside 
it was the location of official feeder points for those wanting to walk a shorter route, and for 
disabled protesters. Public and portable toilets were also mapped, as well as the location of the 
main rally stage in Hyde Park. Standard Google Maps icons are used for these static features and 
the map backdrop was the default layer with tube stations (Temple, Embankment, etc.), major 
road names (The Mall, Constitution Hill, etc.) and geographical areas (Mayfair, Covent Garden, 
etc.) all prominent at various scales.  
Like the built environment and street layout before it, anticipating official demonstration routes 
is relatively easy from a cartographic perspective. Changes to a demonstration route are unlikely 
to occur once publicized, therefore mapping it becomes a simple job of overlaying data on top of 
a basemap. However, there are marked differences between mapping the built 
environment/street layout and proposed demonstration routes. Firstly, the routes themselves are 
temporary. Although the minimum period of notice for a public procession is 6 days, ‘organizers 
| 204 
 
should give as much notice as possible’ (London Metropolitan Police 2016, n.p.). Many prepare 
and publicize the route months in advance – including the organizers of anti-austerity and student 
demonstrations. However, the route itself is only realized for a number of consecutive hours 
across a single day. Before this, the route does not exist, except on police documents (Forms 3175 
and 3163 if liaising with the Met), risk assessments (composed by organizers), and in other public 
material (maps, leaflets, websites). As a result of their temporary nature, Google Maps will not 
map it. Although OSM also has an official policy to only map permanent phenomena, this is not 
always enforced.  
 
Map 8.2 | OSRM routing, Somerset floods 2014  
When the UK was hit by heavy rainfall in early 2014, residual flood waters lingered for weeks, 
submerging local roads and severing the rail network. Although it is technically prohibited 
(OpenStreetMap 2014, n.p.), one OSM user at the time mapped the floodwaters from satellite 
data (Hind and Lammes 2015). The watery layer remained on OSM for over 6 weeks, despite its 
gradually-decreasing volume, with open-source routing software diverting users around the 
impassable areas. No floodwater was ever added onto Google Maps and subsequently its 
Directions Application Programming Interface (API) that calculates transportation routes (Google 
2016, n.p.) failed to account for the blocked roads. Instead, it suggested users drive through 
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potentially dangerous floodwaters. What both these cases demonstrate is that standard web 
mapping platforms (proprietary or open-source) are not designed to accommodate temporary 
cartographic data whether it exists for 6 weeks or 6 hours.           
 
Map 8.3 | Google Maps routing, Somerset floods 2014  
Secondly, as a result of their temporary nature, other structures appear in the urban environment 
to facilitate the holding of the temporary event. Physical, interlocking metal barriers line the 
entirety of any protest route in order to separate protesters from non-protesters, whilst 
sometimes being repurposed into ‘box’ arrangements for extra security. On-route stages also 
often appear equipped with PA systems and draped with event banners in order to energize the 
assembled crowd. Further, temporary structures, such as CCTV gantries, are used by police to 
monitor particular areas or parts of the route otherwise invisible to officers; either in the form of 
scaffolding or suspended cherry-pickers. Side-roads and open spaces are also repurposed into 
makeshift parking lots for police vans, outside broadcast vehicles and medical personnel. As a 
result of this, new objects will need to be mapped that do not appear on default maps. 
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Fig 8.1| Box barriers, Parliament Square  
The cartographic work that needs to be performed to account for these new structures mark this 
layer as distinct from the previous. On no occasion did the Sukey platform map any of this detail 
besides demonstration routes. Although developer X revealed that team members would, in 
effect, ground truth before the demonstration in order to gather relevant operational information 
(interview with developer X, February 17th 2015) this did not extend to mapping micro-details 
concerning barriers, gantries, stages or makeshift parking lots. However, some of this information 
made its way into social media updates to compliment the map itself. For example, as reported 
during the 2012 student demonstration (the launch of Sukey 3.0), Parliament Square was said to 
have been ‘all locked down with double fences and sandbags’ (Rikki 2012, n.p.). Although not 
verified or re-tweeted by the Sukey team, it nonetheless was tweeted with the appropriate #sukey 
and #demo2012 hashtags, and was therefore searchable by those following the platform on social 
media.          
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Map 8.4 | NCAFC demonstration route as mapped by a journalist (left) and the Young Greens (right)  
In conclusion, the mapping of this temporary phenomena is dependent on those individuals with 
sufficient knowledge of how to overlay transient data (demonstration routes, floodwaters, 
makeshift structures) on top of the pre-existing built environment/street layout. These are the 
types of individuals that Gerlach (2015) identifies as ‘vernacular mappers’, engaging in a form of 
‘minor mapping’ (Gerlach 2015, 7). Maps were also produced of the protest route in the lead-up 
to the ‘Free Education’ demonstration in November 2014 using simple routing capabilities on 
Google Maps. Once again, neither required the use of professional software or skills. Their 
existence, however, allowed protesters to prepare for, and navigate along, the official 
demonstration route. Whilst some of these efforts were down to Sukey it was not exclusively so, 
with journalists, other organizations and social media users also contributing.    
 
Active Phenomena  
The most difficult feature to observe, articulate and anticipate was at the level of protest action 
itself. Unlike the built environment or temporary features, the mapping of active phenomena 
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depended on being able to predict and pre-empt movements and manoeuvres made by humans. 
Far from a human-centric mapping, however, much of these active phenomena comprised of 
activists with banners and placards, mounted police officers, or members of the TSG riding in 
police vans. Each posed peculiar issues concerning the type and manner of movement. This 
became the crux and the paradox of the Sukey project. In short, it desired to map, with divided 
attention, manoeuvres of both protesters and police officers ideally in advance of their 
materialization.   
This level of anticipation required responding not in months, weeks or hours but in seconds. Unlike 
the previous two layers, the phenomena being mapped was immeasurably more unpredictable. 
Changes to the built environment and street layout are known months in advance. Further, the 
possible addition of temporary structures and objects (fences, sandbags, cones, gantries, stages, 
etc.) to the urban landscape is recorded and detailed in various documents weeks in advance of a 
demonstration (although not necessarily made public), and is materially visible hours ahead of the 
event itself. The phenomena in this action layer do not give its mappers the chance to carefully 
ground truth in advance and update any map.  
Instead, these phenomena consisted of a plethora of contingent movements; sometimes 
undertaken by lone individuals, but more often in a coordinated fashion. As protesters move along 
a specific route, one might be able to predict with some certainty where they will go next and how 
fast they may move. Yet when protesters perform particular kinds of manoeuvres designed to 
disrupt the smooth running of a demonstration, these movements may cease to be predictable 
and therefore mappable. The same can be said for the actions of police officers. The next chapter 
goes into greater detail regarding such manoeuvres.     
Practically, Sukey could only map in minutes. This begged the question: how many mapping 
enterprises could similarly map spatial manoeuvres within such a timeframe? The lack of 
resources to do so made the platform even more remarkable. But much of the required 
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navigational information lay entirely unavailable to those protesters requiring it most. The period 
of time across which the main wave of major student demos occurred in London was a single 
month (November – December 2010). Subsequent actions were more explicitly anti-austerity and 
anti-capitalist events (‘March for the Alternative’, March 2011, etc.) including the event at which 
Sukey 3.0 was re-launched (October 2012). As such, they contained a far greater plurality of 
activists from non-student activist backgrounds. As the general campaign began in November 
2010, many student activists were only becoming aware of the shape, form and extent of the 
containment tactic, and few had access to both general and specific, time-conscious updates 
during such. Only when the Sukey platform was initially launched as a Google Maps mash-up 
(December 9th 2010) and refined as a standalone web application (January 29th 2011) did this 
information become more readily available.     
 
Map 8.5 | ‘March for the Alternative’ (2011) overview, Sukey 2.0    
The ability to map in this temporal register is only something that some mapping platforms are 
now beginning to execute26, despite the fact that major cartographic enterprises such as Google 
                                                          
26 Most notably in relation to automated driving, where the live mapping of road hazards becomes 
absolutely critical for human safety. I would argue that mapping in this temporal register is only now 
possible at an appropriate scale (urban and upwards) thanks to automation. See reported efforts by HERE 
(Miller 2014), Tesla (Perkins 2015) and Uber (LaFrance 2016).  
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Maps and OSM either outlaw or are technologically/organizationally incapable of mapping 
features in existence for hours, days and weeks; far aside from phenomena that has only been in 
existence for minutes or second. To reiterate: Sukey was able to map emergent containments and 
other phenomena usually within minutes, and update social media accounts in seconds. No other 
crowdsourced mapping project has been able to do this during a protest event either before or 
after its existence. That this was performed by a small, volunteer team with no prior digital 
mapping experience was an especially unique feature of the project.   
In interviews with second-wave protesters (activists X and Y, university campus, 2014-2015), this 
lack of knowledge had an obvious effect on the capacity for protesters to remain safe during a 
demonstration, as well as providing the space for ‘disruptive’ activities. Put simply, they did not 
fully know the ‘terrain’. Protest events can be rather daunting occasions. Their intensity, coupled 
with the possibility of confrontation with the police, and alongside the fear of getting lost or 
missing transportation back to campuses, can add up to a great sense of anxiety. These are all 
concerns of a geo-cartographic nature involving various navigational practices: moving within a 
mass of bodies, coping with a large-scale event, and familiarizing oneself with the local, urban 
environment. They require a general attention to generative (perhaps unforeseeable) moments, 
as well as towards objects, locations and people. Further, they necessitate the development of 
manoeuvres in order to cope with these oft-unruly dynamics.   
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Map 8.6 | ‘March for the Alternative’ (2011) containment I, Sukey 2.0    
During major demonstrations the platform was able to assign risk scores in relation to emergent 
or already-occurring containments. This formed the central function of Sukey 2.0 and enabled 
people to act on the accessibility of any roads or junctions within the vicinity of a protest to ensure 
they did not walk straight into a containment. Desktop screenshots of the platform from the 
‘March for the Alternative’ demonstration in March 2011 show the mapping of large swathes of 
central London using a three-colour system: green, blue and red. Green indicated to activists that 
roads and junctions were entirely passable, with protesters free from any imminent or actual 
containment. Blue (as seen at the intersection of Oxford and Regent Street to the north of 
overview map) indicated that roads and junctions were passable but partially blocked. Red 
indicated that movement along the street, road or junction coloured such was entirely blocked. A 
collection of red lines gathered around one particular location (say, at a junction) would indicate 
a containment was in place.  
Although rudimentary in design this simple quasi-traffic light system enabled activists to keep 
abreast of possible changes to road access around the protest area. It also alerted users to any 
active kettles. This resulted in two possible responses. In the first instance, the platform would 
alert protesters to the location of a containment in order to prevent them from unknowingly 
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wandering into danger. In this sense, Sukey operated as a caring, navigational tool attentive to 
the risk involved in attending a demonstration. Yet in the second instance, it also allowed those 
present at a demonstration to track the flashpoints or key incidents of the protest itself, not in 
order to avoid it, but in fact to pinpoint its location in order to amplify any possible disruptive 
action. Whilst appearing to make a ‘concise statement about risk’ (Leese 2016, 149), the quasi-
traffic light system did not offer a definitive, navigational instruction; but multiple, navigational 
possibilities. Both responses follow what Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg (2012) would 
call the ‘logic of connective action’. In other words, that the platform radically transformed the 
nature of communication, mapping and movement during protest events by providing the 
navigational conditions for action.   
Map 8.7 | ‘March for the Alternative’ (2011) containment II, Sukey 2.0   
In many cases, this split function of the platform was knowingly utilized by protesters – including 
myself. On numerous occasions, rather than use the platform exclusively to steer clear of a 
mapped containment by, say, retreating to an area with a high density of green-labelled roads, I 
would use the platform to navigate towards the areas where a greater density of red-labelled 
roads and junctions could be found. I thus argue that this reveals a rather less obvious dynamic at 
play during its use: that the management of personal risk had the potential to play out in less zero 
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sum ways. Users would not necessarily seek to escape particular areas displayed on the map in 
red if the ‘reality’ differed. That is to say, if the terrain itself did not express the risk as mapped 
through the interface.  
Yet, when I expressed this to developer X, they seemed a little surprised (interview with developer 
X, February 17th 2015), suggesting that the platform was designed with the express desire to 
guarantee the safety of others during demonstrations. This was also a view shared by a colleague 
in my department, familiar with the platform.27 Yet personal experience of using the platform, 
coupled with knowledge of how occupations, splinters and rhizomatic manoeuvres are 
performed, would suggest that the platform did also aid those in navigating to key flashpoints 
during a demonstration. At no point did the platform instruct protesters to navigate towards or 
away from a location, but with this navigational knowledge, users were able to make a more 
informed decision taking into account the visualized risk levels.        
In any case, as Elwood and Leszczynski (2013, 553) suggest; 
This resituating of geovisual epistemologies involves the use of interactive geovisual 
interfaces to frame an exploratory engagement with content, rather than primarily for the 
purpose of cartographic abstraction or cartographic representation. Strategies for 
asserting the legitimacy or credibility of the information or knowledge claims made via 
these interfaces are cultivated not foremost through demonstrations of conventional 
norms of science or disciplinary cartography, but through practices of transparency, peer 
verification and witnessing.   
It was through the platform itself, that users were able to assess the ‘legitimacy’ or ‘credibility’ of 
the navigational information presented to them. It has resulted in what Elwood and Leszczynski 
(2013, 555) further contend is a ‘resituating of digital spatial knowledge politics’, in which 
                                                          
27 Personal communication, June 26th, 2015.  
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‘individualized interactive/exploratory ways of knowing’ are prioritized. To sum up, the Sukey 
platform operated across all layers; working to provide navigational information to protesters in 
each. However, it would only actively be involved in observing and articulating details at the 
second level (temporary features) and close to all of the third (active phenomena).    
 
(Unrealized) Navigational Knowledges 
For a crowdsourced platform, the presence of attentive individuals was therefore vital. Firstly, in 
a technical-operational sense, so users were able to send messages to the team in the appropriate 
format (the who, what, were, when discussed in the previous chapter). But also, secondly, in a 
risk-sense to ensure the wellbeing of the protesters engaging with it. The production of 
navigational knowledge was thus integral to the security of both of these entities (platform and 
protester). For the former this was dependent on ‘populating’ of the platform with useful data. 
For the latter, it meant the ability to anticipate future manoeuvres of institutional (TSG, etc.) and 
extra-institutional (activists) bodies. The real necessity of the platform within the protest spaces 
created during the student and anti-austerity activism of this 2010-2015 period is only analyzable 
now the platform is no longer active. With this absence, it becomes possible to address the lack 
of navigational knowledge being ‘captured’ (in the Agre-ian sense) by a digital mapping platform 
such as Sukey.      
In conversation with one activist, it was made clear that knowing what a protest event entails was 
far from obvious. Much of what to expect on the day comes from campus briefings prior to these 
distinct spectacles. It is primarily through these that activists circulate ideas and develop thoughts 
around what to expect on protest marches, how to respond accordingly to them, or indeed, how 
to avoid them. Often they are organized by SUs, but commonly also by independent activist 
groups. As the same activist describes: 
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[Organization X]28 was set-up at the beginning of this [academic] year [2014-2015] initially 
with the march in mind. We knew that the demo[nstration] was coming up and one of my 
friends – who has links to NCAFC who is one of the organizers of it came and set-up this 
group. And yeah, that was my first experience proper organizing. It was fun but it was 
quite tiring because we were out every single day basically. We did tabling, we did flyering, 
posters, stickers, hall-runs. All online stuff. So we really did a lot of work. And it worked – 
we managed to mobilize around 100 students for [university X] to go so we negotiated 
with the SU and managed to get coaches and people only had to pay £5 to get to London 
and back which was pretty good. I think we filled about 80 coach spaces and we also met 
some people in London, and we were told that was, like, even bigger than the group that 
went in 2010 which was a lot bigger demo. So it shows that the mobilization techniques 
we used did actually work. (Interview with activist Y, February 24th 2015) 
As they further acknowledge, this was far from work they undertook independently. In fact, much 
of it involved ‘following in other people’s footsteps’ (interview with activist Y, February 24th 2015). 
Although fear and anxiety often define these initial experiences of protest events, they also act as 
radicalizing force for those involved; bringing politically like-minded people together. When asked 
about the reasons for this, activist Y said: 
I think it’s to do with the size, it’s to do with, for me it’s just a kind of, like, all the cheesy 
clichés to be honest but…it is…very, very powerful to be part of something so big. And to 
be kind of stepping out of the uni[versity] bubble, particularly the [university X] bubble. 
You know, just like marching with people you’ve never met before but you kind of have 
this like instant connection, marching for the same thing. (Interview with activist Y, 
February 24th 2015) 
                                                          
28 I’ve anonymized the organization in order to prevent identification.   
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But not all of the knowledge-building occurred in the months before the initial protest activist Y 
went on in November 2015. Indeed, some of it only happened the night before the protest and 
even on the organized coaches to the demonstration itself. Much of this focused squarely on the 
practical nature of participating in the protest. As activist Y explains: 
So basically we got on the bus, and at this point it was still a very official thing. We had 
quite a few sabb[atical] officers came, which was nice. It was nice to have the sabbs there 
but you know it was because the coaches…put on by the SU and was quite formulated [sic 
- formulaic] and we had, which I think is always a good idea for a demo, we had a buddy 
system where, like, you always stay with one person; make sure they’re not alone…just 
purely because there’s…10,000 people and you could easily get lost, and it’s in London, 
so. I think quite a few places implement that. (Interview with activist Y, February 24th 
2015) 
In the absence of Sukey this buddy system became the only source of specific, event-based 
navigational assistance for participants. Even still, one would assume the knowledge gained 
through pairing up with another student would not stretch to knowing where temporary features 
were or active phenomena were likely to pop-up. Only that, with a buddy, students might be less 
vulnerable and more likely to find their bearings if lost. More details from the same student reveal 
the build-up to the demonstration: 
So we were on the bus down and that was actually really fun because, again, one of my 
friends had printed out this huge sheet of chants for the demo, so we could practice on 
the coach on the way down, and also we were already quite hyped up, because the day 
before we’d been making banners and placards and stuff and I think we also watched a 
really great documentary called ‘Street Politics 101’…about the student movement in 
Canada. Which is obviously very relevant and it’s such a great documentary and so 
everyone was really hyped up for it. (Interview with activist Y, February 24th 2015) 
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When it came to the actual event, some of these collective engagements continued, although 
there was a clear conflict between those ‘following the route’ and others deciding to take other 
kinds of direct action. As the activist continues: 
 …from my perspective…the demo went exactly as it…planned to I guess. In the sense I 
very much did stick on the route and I went to the rally of speakers that was held at the 
end. But a lot of people didn’t do that, and I think there’s a good reason for that…I kind of 
just went to the rally but there was definitely a point where the march split because there 
were people who carried on going down towards the Houses of Parliament to the rally 
like I did. But then there was an offshoot of people who obviously felt, which I think 
perhaps quite rightly so, that if everyone stuck to doing an A-to-B march that was known 
and planned and accepted by the police then it’s not going to be – it might not necessary 
be – that powerful. (Interview with activist Y, February 24th 2015) 
The divergence of desire here is interesting. At no point during Sukey’s operation did it ‘command’ 
protesters to do anything at all, force them to take any particular route, or engage in any kind of 
action they felt uncomfortable with. Although it has been argued throughout that the platform 
helped to generate the kinds of ‘disruptive’ actions mentioned by activist Y above, especially 
‘splintered’ activities beyond an A-to-B march, it was never exclusively designed for this purpose. 
Many of the concerns highlighted by activist Y regarding safety and navigation are echoed by 
others at the same demonstration in 2014. This was, of course, within Sukey’s remit. Few students 
had express experience of dealing with risky moments at the demonstration itself. In other words, 
whilst they were able to anticipate certain features or aspects of protest event (route, 
atmosphere, comradery, etc.) particular navigational dynamics affecting activist safety were 
elusive.     
Activist X, from the same university as activist Y, was part of the ‘offshoot’ of protesters who 
eschewed the final rally by the Houses of Parliament laid on by the event organizers. They took a 
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slightly different view of the event, suggesting that the same involvement by their institutions’ SU 
somewhat curtailed the freedom of those attending the demonstration: 
…most [university X] people were all together but obviously, didn’t have to stay with us. 
And I guess there was like a couple of sabbatical officers…there cause the SU was kind of 
running the logistics. They had their own set of rules where they were like ‘this is what we 
expect’, you know, ‘if you leave the [university X] bloc’ as it were then you’re not 
representing [university X] any more. ‘If you do anything illegal’ you’re not representing 
[university X]. (Interview with activist X, December 2nd 2014) 
Due to the manner in which many university SUs operate, and the way in which activists often 
have to utilize existing mechanisms and procedures to ensure a high turnout for such events 
(despite perhaps disagreeing with more ‘formalized’ student politics), the above sentiments are 
common. As SUs commonly subsidize travel to such events – and as a condition – send sabbatical 
officers on the coaches with them as official representation, those planning on attending have to 
be made aware of the legalities for both those protesting and the institution they count 
themselves part of. In effect, this acts like a kind of parliamentary whip; students are not forced 
to stay in particular institutional ‘blocs’ and protest in a particular way, but are nonetheless given 
practical advice, navigational information and, indeed, legal guidance that might sway their 
decision-making. In turn, this affects the extent to which students desire to engage in activities 
beyond A-to-B marches. Naturally, this comes into conflict with the more radical organizational 
forms activist X and Y were part of prior to the protest event in 2014. 
Moreover, what Sukey allowed protesters to do was to challenge some of these pre-formed 
expectations and provide a platform for the negotiation of new encounters that heretofore had 
been absent. It provided a framework not to supplement but to replace this existing buddy/bloc 
mechanism. For activists X and Y, the Sukey platform would have enabled them, like the first-wave 
activists before them, to receive up-to-date navigational knowledge operating in the most critical 
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anticipatory layer. Although university SUs could provide students with practical advice on what a 
protest event generally and usually consists of, they could say little on the particularities of each 
demonstration as these moments arose. Whilst one could be minded to always stay with a fellow 
student to avoid getting lost, such advice would fail to provide activists with moment-specific 
information that could assist in the calculation of the emergent risk to them or fellow participants. 
Less still, to participate in the crowdsourced capture of this information.    
Fig 8.2 | The Topshop containment. Source: The Real Social Network (2012) 
As footage from The Real Social Network (2012) shows, the platform provided the basis for a new 
kind of ‘live’, ‘many-to-many’ communication. The sentiments expressed by many of the 
individuals featured in the film are indicative of the excitement and relief at the navigational 
assistance the platform could offer. In one clip a protester participating in the UK Uncut 
occupations during the ‘March for the Alternative’ (2011) jubilantly exclaims that: 
Sukey told us we were about to be kettled at Topshop, so we moved from Topshop. I 
twittered [sic] in saying that we moved off Topshop and the techies [the Sukey team] 
texted back saying “Yes, we know, it’s working!” (Fales et al. 2012, n.p.)    
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This neatly encapsulates the optimism users had whilst Sukey was active. It became a conduit for 
real-time, crowdsourced updates that were responsive to, and in theory in anticipation of, 
developing situations that otherwise would have left protesters endangered. Moments such as 
these captured on camera served as ‘concrete’ evidence of Sukey’s applicability in the midst of 
otherwise unpredictable protests. 29    
Fig 8.3 | The aftermath of the attempted Topshop containment; cat-and-mouse games. Source: The Real 
Social Network (2012) 
Further, as suggested in chapter 4, the platform was not designed for ‘A-to-B’-style navigation. It 
was not, therefore, a vehicular sat-nav to ensure a destination is reached. Put otherwise, it was 
not a route planner. At no point would users be able to navigate from a point A to a point B using 
the information as verified, provided and mapped. Instead, when the update concerned the 
formation of a containment, users were only ever informed of a specific location, or locations, to 
avoid. As the Twitter screenshot shows, navigational commands were often simple: “Move!”. Even 
then, however, for those not familiar with places on the map and locations, street names or points 
                                                          
29 Thanks to the individual who gave me full access to the film.  
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of interest mentioned in social media updates, these simple commands became just as tricky to 
respond to.    
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to explore the navigational knowledges produced by three cartographic 
layers during protest events, each loosely corresponding to Rose-Redwood’s (2008) established 
categories of spatial inscription.  
The first of these layers concerned the built environment; including the mapping of individual 
buildings and the street layout. Historically, this has been a task for national mapping agencies, 
but in recent years has been carried out more expansively in the public realm by Google Maps and 
OSM using very different techniques. Sukey did not attempt to map these features during protests 
but became reliant upon their efforts regardless, with users requiring a ‘basemap’ for navigational 
purposes. The second of these layers, as I detail, included ‘temporary features’ such as metal 
barriers, fences, gantries and other objects usually deployed during protest events to control and 
monitor the movement of protesters. This level is not usually performed by mapping companies 
but by event organizers, journalists and other interested parties in the run-up to demonstrations. 
In rare cases this phenomena has found its way onto the likes of OSM despite express instructions 
(OpenStreetMap 2014, n.p.). But without the overlaying of such data during protest events, 
activists found, and continue to find, themselves dependent upon an ‘everyday’ platform using 
data collected and mapped over the course of weeks and months, without the specificity required 
for a single, spectacular event. 
What marked the Sukey platform as radically different, then, is that it mapped what I call ‘active 
phenomena’. The data captured in this layer was done so in minutes and seconds rather than days, 
weeks or months. As such, it requires a great number of resources and labour to be performed. 
These active phenomena are mainly comprised of manoeuvres carried out by activists and other 
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actors, such as the police, during the extent of a protest event. Far from an exclusively human 
category (as opposed to ‘inanimate’ buildings and physical objects), such active phenomena 
routinely included the activities of activists and police officers in concert with other beings, 
technologies and things such as horses, flares, signs, and vehicles.       
This detailing of each particular layer, however, has built on Rose-Redwood’s work to suggest that 
what distinguishes each from the other is not the geographic information collected, per se, but 
the temporality and state of its production. In other words, that each layer demands a different 
level of ‘anticipation’ in order to be generated, with both developers and users operating in 
particular temporal registers demanded by the protest event they found themselves in. Thus, I 
call these ‘anticipatory layers’ in order to distinguish between the degree of anticipation possible 
to map the geographic data. These constituted a ‘resituating of digital spatial knowledge politics’ 
(Elwood and Leszczynski 2013, 555).         
In the platform’s absence the navigational knowledges produced during protest events have been 
lost. Institutional mechanisms, such as buddy systems, designed to ensure the safety of protesters 
during demonstrations have not been able to replace the functionality offered by the Sukey 
platform. This lack of navigational knowledge production has led to a diminishment in disruptive 
capacity during protest events as activists are left without critical information regarding possible 
risks to safety and mobility, such as containments. In other words, that the ‘experiential 
knowledge’ (Elwood and Leszczynski 2013, 555) produced during protest events was no longer 
being utilized, in order to advance navigational aims.      
Yet, as the next chapter will explore, an array of different collective movements have been 
devised, developed and deployed during protest events that continue to be performed regardless 
of the presence or circulation of particular kinds of navigational knowledges concerning the risk 
values of various features, structures, objects and phenomena in the urban environment. 
Nevertheless, that is not to say that the consequences of this lack of navigational knowledge 
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generation and circulation are not severe. In fact, it is much the opposite. With the lack of such, 
the deployment of various manoeuvres designed to disrupt the smooth operation of 
containments becomes increasingly precarious, both for those organizing, and participating. The 
result is an increased risk of containment. With no anticipation of such, there is no ability to 
prepare, avoid or disrupt. This next chapter looks to how these manoeuvres developed.  
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Chapter 9 | On the Road  
 
In this chapter I explore the various manoeuvres undertaken by activists and police during protests 
events. It builds on the previous chapter by providing evidence for how navigational knowledges 
were put into action, during a TUC and a NCAFC demonstration in October and November 2014. 
Further, it draws a direct connection between the aesthetic and interactive nature of the digital 
mapping interface, and the production and circulation of such knowledges. In short, I argue that 
the Sukey platform aided in the management of risk through the performance of such manoeuvres 
during its many deployments. In the absence of such, these risks were either left to proliferate or 
were taken up by different institutional mechanisms.   
All emphasize the tricky process – technologically, tactically and in safety terms –  of capturing 
geographic data for navigational purposes. The first manoeuvre, the occupation, entails a public 
taking of space in order for alternative social demands to be made. It is rather easily mapped 
during a protest event, as in the build-up to an occupation the manoeuvre often maintains a 
relative speed and a known direction, before participants converge on a final location. Invariably 
they are also nullified by particular counter-manoeuvres that attempt to (a) prevent its 
choreography and (b) break-up its continuation. The splinter, on the other hand, relies on the A-
to-B demonstration to be performed by harnessing its energy to form breakaway actions 
‘splintering’ from a main protest route. Anticipating these manoeuvres is difficult as they only 
work with the element of surprise; their disruptive qualities being derived from catching both 
police and organizers unaware.  
The rhizome, I argue, is the most devilish and unruly manoeuvre witnessed during a protest 
situation. Often performed during or after an A-to-B demonstration, it has a spatio-temporal 
unpredictability that derives from the tactical autonomy of its participants. For this reason, I 
contend that the manoeuvre remains largely ‘un-mappable’. The final manoeuvre is the 
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containment. As discussed in chapter 2 it comes in multiple guises – as polizeikessels, 
wanderkessels, bridge kettles, and hyper-kettles – and despite their easily-recognizable form once 
deployed, their coming-into-being presents a notable challenge to both (a) cartographic 
practitioners and (b) protesters. These final two manoeuvres are often in tension, typifying the 
‘cat-and-mouse’ games that have become emblematic of protest events in the UK.    
Each of the moments witnessed during the events were captured by a range of digital, mobile 
devices brought with me on each occasion, as detailed in chapter 6. Accompanying each moment 
is a map of a GPS tracing of my movements, as well as a sequence of images derived from original 
video footage shot during the demonstrations. One manoeuvre (occupation) is evidenced with 
two moments, each with six frames of action. Another manoeuvre (splinter) is evidenced with a 
single moment comprising of four frames. A further manoeuvre (rhizome) is evidenced with two 
moments, each containing four frames. The final manoeuvre (containment) is evidenced with a 
single moment comprising six frames in total.     
The point of establishing the metaphorical coordinates of these manoeuvres is to explore the fault 
lines in the Sukey platform. It does so by exploring some of the manoeuvres witnessed during the 
time of its operation that have continued to be deployed during events after its demise. The 
reason for doing so is to evaluate the efficacy of the platform in generating navigational 
knowledges and stimulating disruptive activities. Were there, as I contend ‘short-circuits’ between 
the former and the latter after the end of Sukey? In other words, in the absence of Sukey, were 
the manoeuvres discussed above carried out more or less effectively by participants? Or was the 
involvement and impact of the platform over-emphasized as I suggest at the end of the previous 
chapter? These questions will be explored in the following chapter with the fundamental failings 
of the platform expanded upon in the conclusion.  
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Occupation: ‘Whose Square? Our Square?’ 
As discussed in chapter 2, an occupation consists of a taking of space. More appropriately, it 
concerns a re-taking of space in order to re-configure the power assumed with the control of it. 
Therefore, each occupation is necessarily a re-occupation in order to assert spatial control. What 
is important to explore is how an occupation comes into being. It does not simply ‘appear’ within 
its chosen space, but physically ‘takes’ it. Two moments from separate demonstrations exemplify 
this process of occupying space.  
The first of these was an occupation of Parliament Square during the TUC demonstration by a non-
affiliated group calling themselves ‘Occupy Democracy’ (OD), committed to campaigning for ‘a 
genuine democracy free from corporate influence’ (Occupy Democracy 2015, n.p.). The OD 
occupation began not with the taking of space but with the following of the pre-determined march 
route. It was only later in the day that the protest took a different turn, leaving the rally location 
in Hyde Park to head off in another direction for an unscheduled protest. After lowering the 
banners to ensure they would fit through a set of neoclassical gates, the protesters then 
proceeded to walk down Constitution Hill.  
Fig 9.1 | Occupy Democracy, Hyde Park  
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Map 9.1 | TUC occupation   
Throughout the duration of this parade from Hyde Park to an as-yet unknown destination the TSG 
followed. On several occasions officers attempted to minimize the disruption the manoeuvre had 
thus far caused. In the first instance they had prevented activists from walking in the opposite lane 
of traffic whilst then attempting to re-direct them off the road entirely. Wise to these efforts, the 
group decided to take a diversion by unlinking a line of metal barriers, to circumvent an improvised 
police roadblock ahead.  
Then, as the activists approached Parliament Square they stepped over a thin, roped cordon, 
ignoring several ‘do not walk on the grass’ signs, and began to occupy the space. Once there they 
began to unfurl a long, green banner with ‘REAL DEMOCRACY NOW!’ emblazoned across it. It was 
at this point that various other materials, items and structures began to be erected; including a 
‘safe space’ sign, designed to discourage discriminatory behaviour. In this example, a safe space 
policy was enacted to ensure that the occupation of Parliament Square remained inclusive to all; 
emphasizing the need to combat non-violent and non-discriminatory behaviour, whilst promoting 
sobriety and shared responsibility between those involved in the occupation. The concept has its 
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roots in the mapping of ‘safe’ gay and lesbian spaces (both public and private) in US cities such as 
Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York (Kenney 2001, Hanhardt 2013).      
Fig 9.2 | Occupy Democracy, Parliament Square  
Whilst a number of speakers began talking on the issue of democracy,30 the TSG had begun to 
make their move, encircling those within Parliament Square. Although they did not immediately 
kettle protesters, over the course of the next few days the Met took steps to move the remaining 
activists who had begun to camp out on the grass overnight (Johnston 2014). The collection of 
sleeping bags, tarpaulin, rucksacks and roll-mats visible were prohibited for use during the 
occupation, as they were deemed illegal under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 
(2011); prohibiting the use of items, objects and structures required to facilitate overnight 
sleeping in Parliament Square.31    
                                                          
30 Including the leader of the Green Party, Natalie Bennett, and comedian Russell Brand. 
31 Under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011, 101) ‘using any tent or other such structure 
in the controlled area of Parliament Square for the purpose of sleeping or staying in that area’ is 
prohibited. As is ‘placing or keeping in place…any sleeping equipment with a view to its use…for the 
purpose of sleeping overnight in that area’. Further, that ‘using any sleeping equipment…for the purpose 
of sleeping overnight in that area’ is also made illegal. Sleeping equipment, for the purposes of the act, 
‘means any sleeping bag, mattress or similar item designed, or adapted, (solely or mainly) for the purpose 
of facilitating sleeping in a place’ (Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, 102).  
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Fig 9.3 Police officers preparing to enclose protesters, Parliament Square 
 
Fig 9.4 | TUC occupation  
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The taking of space in such a way is easily oriented towards a digital mapping platform equipped 
with the ability to track, capture and disseminate navigational information regarding an 
occupation. Returning to Agre’s (1994) and November et al.’s (2010) models (of capture and 
navigation), the process of acquiring knowledge requires the observation and stabilization of the 
phenomena before it can be captured. Only then does it enter a state that enables it to be 
rendered on the cartographic plane. Due to the occupying manoeuvres’ slow speed; in part 
resultant from the unwieldy nature of the bamboo and silk banners, it would have been entirely 
capture-able. Sukey has had no problem in amplifying these such objects whilst operational. For 
example: 
During one demonstration in 2011, protesters were able to keep up-to-date with the 
movements of a Trojan horse effigy, and a hashtag – “FSU” – standing for “Fake Stallions 
Unite” was deployed by the Sukey team to enable protesters to track its location. The MPS 
[Metropolitan Police Service] were concerned enough at its possible impact that they sent 
a tweet urging protesters to continue on past it; its playful intervention providing a 
logistical headache, with its ceremonial burning becoming a focal point for joyful, and 
largely unpredicted, scenes towards the end of the official march. (Hind 2015a, n.p.) 
Protesters at this similar demonstration, then, were able to track the progress of a cumbersome 
Trojan horse effigy as it was ‘fed’ into a main body of protesters, carrying it along, through and 
beyond the official route just as the OD banners were. In this case, every move of the effigy was 
monitored by the Sukey team. Whilst it certainly aided in ‘stabilizing’ its form, it did so not to 
‘freeze’ it, but to radicalize its disruptive capacity.       
In the absence of the Sukey platform, activists produced different ways to deal with the risk 
associated with protest events. The safe space concept was mobilized, in this instance, to inscribe 
the taking of public space with a new set of less risky ethics, in order to mark the ‘boundaries of 
safety and danger’ (Kenney 2001, 11) and provide a ‘physical manifestation’ of otherwise abstract 
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concerns (Kenney 2001, 6). Notably, the concept operated to produce an encampment (a) free 
from drugs and alcohol, violence and discrimination, and also (b) with a shared sense of wellbeing 
and responsibility.  
Fig 9.5 | Safe space 
Yet the semi-permanent taking of space also lends itself to a problem. Whilst it becomes easier to 
capture cartographically, it also, as a result, becomes easier to contain protesters, subject them 
to legal restrictions and to minimize disruption to a wider area. As such any disruptive capacity 
became nullified. This is only exacerbated in the case above by the Police Reform and Social 
Responsibility Act (2011), which prohibits the kinds of items, objects and structures that would 
allow the occupation to take on a quality other such manoeuvres are unable to provide: comfort 
and longevity. Without these necessary objects (sleeping bags, tents, etc.), any occupation fails to 
take hold.  
- 
The second occupation occurred during the NCAFC demonstration. Once again it saw Parliament 
Square taken. However, there were marked differences between both occupations. In the first 
| 232 
 
instance the occupation took place on an official A-to-B demonstration route, rather than off it 
like the previous example. As such it benefitted from the volume of potential occupiers who had 
necessarily walked down Whitehall to Parliament Square. In doing so, it provided a rather different 
spatial opportunity for those involved.   
Further, it took place despite the presence of two sets of fences around the square itself. Both of 
these temporary features had been erected in anticipation of the student demonstration and in 
response to the OD encampment a few weeks previous. In an attempt to prevent another 
occupation (legal or otherwise), the authorities took to fencing the square off completely. The first 
of these was a low, ‘box barrier’ arrangement (as depicted in the previous chapter) involving the 
conjoining of individual fences into a series of square pens. The second barrier consisted of 10ft 
high event-fencing that further prevented access into Parliament Square. The space in between 
the two initially allowed officers to coordinate their manoeuvres, repelling those intent on gaining 
access to the square. However, faced with repeated, committed attempts at a number of points 
around the periphery, student activists were successful in occupying the square. All of the 10ft 
high event fences were then eventually toppled.      
Added to this, the occupation was not designed with longevity in mind. No items, objects or 
structures necessary for sleeping were visible in the area when the occupation began or 
throughout the evening when it remained ‘taken’. As such, the nature of the occupation was a 
more spectacular one designed merely to demonstrate the ability of the student activists to take 
a space. In media reports at the time, it was described as a ‘success’ for the students (Novara 
Media 2014, n.p.). Yet once in it, few steps were taken to ensure it continued beyond the end of 
the day. Whilst flares were activated, chants sung and a general assembly held, no further 
activities were scheduled by any of the activists to ensure that control over the space continued.  
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Map 9.2 | NCAFC occupation   
Finally, as a result of this absence of occupational strategy, in contrast to the OD effort, no safe 
space policy was enacted during the occupation to enable the minimization of risk to those taking 
part. In the absence of such, students returned to the institutional knowledge disseminated by 
their respective unions in regard to the risks possible during the protest event, and activated 
during the occupation of Parliament Square. Much of the information regarding such was 
dominated by a decision by the NUS to withdraw its support for the NCAFC demonstration in its 
entirety, citing ‘significant concerns regarding an unacceptable level of risk’ that the NUS would 
have left its student members exposed to if it had supported the event (Pearce 2014, n.p.). The 
occupation of the square was thus a moment through which this ‘unacceptable level of risk’ was 
realized.    
It is within this moment that it is possible to witness the imbrication of care with spatial practice, 
manoeuvring and the generation of navigational knowledges. In the build-up to the 
demonstration, a series of anonymized emails were publically released by the NCAFC that drew 
attention to this same dynamic. Their contents comprised of ongoing discussions with the NUS in 
regards to a perceived inadequacy of a risk assessment and the lack of public liability insurance 
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for the event (see Appendix).32 As a result of this concern, the NUS pulled its support entirely (see; 
Morgan 2014, Pearce 2014, Young-Powell 2014).  
Fig 9.6 | NCAFC occupation   
As the NUS President, Toni Pearce, wrote: ‘[t]he plans that are in place do not give us confidence 
that the demonstration will be accessible to all students – in particular disabled students’ and, 
further, that ‘[w]e have commissioned and paid for, the best risk assessment possible based on 
incomplete information that we were given by organizers, and it is clear that there are inadequate 
measures in place to mitigate against significant risks in line with our advice posing an 
unacceptable level of risk (Pearce 2014, n.p., emphasis added).33  
                                                          
32 As a NCAFC blog suggested, it was at ‘a meeting of the NUS’s national executive in September’ that ‘an 
overwhelming majority voted to back the national demonstration’ (NCAFC 2014, n.p.) and hence fully 
support NCAFC in their organization of it. Nevertheless, as the email trail (in the Appendix) supposes, this 
support was far from unconditional. 
33 Further, that: ‘[w]e do not believe there is sufficient time between now and the demonstration for 
these risks to be mitigated’, ‘[t]here is no public liability insurance in place’ and ‘[i]t is clear that the 
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The assessment that the NUS undertook found a series of concerns that could not be addressed, 
or mitigated, by the NCAFC organizers in time. Yet, the student activists I interviewed expressed a 
belief that the NUS was a ‘soft-left’ bureaucratic organization, with little time for radical political 
action such as protest events. As one supposed, this difference in stance between NCAFC and NUS 
was indicative of a difference in political orientation. When asked how the former sit in regards to 
both regional and national student politics, their answer centered on its extra-institutional status: 
 [University X Free Education Group] freely associates with NCAFC so most identify with 
their reaction to the…government’s stuff that they’re doing to Higher Education and how 
neoliberal and marketized it is, and their approach to dealing with it is very different to 
NUS. They’re much less institutionalized, formal, I would say. But also more lateral as an 
organization. (interview with student activist X, December 2nd 2014, emphasis added)          
As a reason for withdrawing support for the demonstration, the risk assessment was seen as a 
manifestation of, rather than a mask for, its political agenda. It was through such techniques that 
its ‘managerialist’ approach to politics was most acutely expressed. Without bureaucratic 
calculations – such as risk assessments and the provision of liability insurance – the NUS will not 
allow protest activities to take place. NCAFC, however, were prepared to take particular kinds of 
risks they saw as critical to their disruptive activities.    
In light of the withdrawal, many SUs around the UK, including those from the Universities of York, 
East Anglia, Birmingham and Essex also pulled their official support, resulting in the cancellation 
of subsidized transportation for students wishing to travel to the demonstration (Louise 2014). 
Any students who attended from these universities were therefore forced to do so in an 
independent capacity. As student activist X also recalls, similar discussions were ongoing at their 
university at the time: 
                                                          
concerns of the NUS liberation officers about accessibility, safe space and the ability for liberation groups 
to be involved have not been met’ (Pearce 2014, n.p., emphasis added). 
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You know, they were like “ah, you guys don’t have the right risk assessments in place.” I 
was like “NUS you have so much experience of organizing this kind of thing can you please 
help?” instead of just criticizing…it meant it was easier for them to, or critics to expect 
them to pull out. There was a question at the…ASM [student meeting], someone was like 
“how can we be sure that there’s no risk associated with this?” [And] someone said… 
“there’s always risk associated with this, this is…we’re challenging, you know, the 
Government and their policy entirely. There’s going to be a police presence. There is risk 
associated with it if you attend. And you can’t rule that out. So it’s your decision whether 
or not to go.” (interview with student activist X, December 2nd 2014) 
The difference between 2010 and 2014 was considerable. In 2010, Sukey managed the 
relationship between risk, navigation and personal safety, enabling activists to keep abreast of 
critical moments and ‘active phenomena’ during protests. In 2014, in Sukey’s absence, and with 
the NUS’ withdrawal, students were either (a) forced to rely on buddy/bloc tactics favoured by 
their own institutions, or (b) shoulder the risk entirely themselves without access to navigational 
updates.  
Further, that the Sukey platform derived its power from choreographing disruptive activities 
(coupled with the provision of personal safety), whilst the NUS nullified it through bureaucratic 
means (a risk assessment). In the former, the management of risk concerned a protection and 
facilitation of bodies and collective action, through the facilitation of spatial manoeuvres. In the 
other, the management of risk related indirectly (through organizational commitments) to a 
protection and ongoing facilitation of institutional bodies and resources (the NUS, SUs) at the 
expense of individual and collective activist bodies within the protest.   
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Splinter: The Element of Surprise  
As argued in chapter 2, the splinter involves the breaking away from the main body of a 
demonstration. As a result, the splinter is always smaller than this main body. This splinter 
movement, upon breakaway, and consistent with its naming, penetrates into other entities. In 
other words, it acts as a ‘foreign body’ inserting itself into the wider urban fabric in order to cause 
disruption. It is thus a direct challenge to the minimization of disruption during routed protest 
events. Like was suggested in the same chapter, due to its ‘umbilical relation’ to the main body of 
a demonstration, its protagonists are often able to hide in plain sight as consensual (rather than 
overtly disruptive) activists.    
The moment in question was abrupt. A small group of ‘black bloc’ activists34 splintered from the 
main body of the TUC demonstration and ran down Swallow Street in central London. Although 
small (~30 participants), the splinter was significant. This was the first time during the 
demonstration that any protesters had sought to divert from the A-to-B route. That it happened 
at the same location as a similar splinter at an anti-austerity demonstration in 2012, was, I believe, 
more than just a coincidence. The street that protesters took off down is a small, pedestrianized 
connection between Piccadilly and Regent Street – both of which are main city thoroughfares. 
Swallow Street, on the other hand, is not.  
The splinter provided some striking juxtapositions. Note in the sequence of images the presence 
of an array of different types of people. In frame one we see: protesters (in the top left corner), 
standard police officers, video-camera wielding police officers (EGTs) and shoppers (note the blue 
and pink retail bag). In frame two: public order officers (TSG) and a reporter (green t-shirt, grey 
bag). In frame three: more TSG and, most likely, a tourist (taking the photo). In frame four, with 
members of the TSG in the distance, two businessmen in suits, and a number of other 
                                                          
34 ‘Black bloc’ is a tactic in which participants wear all black clothing to avoid individual recognition whilst 
leveraging the power of collective identity.  
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unidentifiable individuals. Needless to say, it is the presence of these varying peoples in close 
proximity to each other – unseparated by physical barriers – that generates a degree of disruption, 
and a ‘peculiar transformation’ (Sützel 2015, 221) of public space not possible within the confines 
of an A-to-B protest. The splinter, therefore, becomes the radical – in a spatial rather than strictly 
political sense – protest manoeuvre rather than the main body itself. Yet it is for this reason that 
the splinter presented a problem for the Sukey platform whilst it was live.  
Map 9.3 | TUC Splinter  
In order to perform this intervention, it is necessary for participants to act quickly. As the route of 
each demonstration must be agreed and fixed upon in advance by organizers in liaison with local 
officials, any on-the-day deviation from this route is potentially illegal. If protest organizers fail to 
initiate contact, the police are legally able to prevent it from happening, as London taxi drivers 
protesting against Uber found out in June 2014. The justification for this procedure is that it 
minimizes disruption for other citizens, and allows the police and other local authorities to plan 
ahead by re-directing public transport, closing specific roads and notifying others of such changes. 
In the case of the anti-Uber protest, the Met indicated that their reason for imposing conditions 
on the demonstration was that they believed there was a reasonable belief that the assembly 
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would result in ‘serious disruption to the life of the community’ (Garside 2014, n.p.). As such, they 
were able to impose a specific location (Whitehall to Parliament Street), maximum duration (2-
3pm) and a decision on how ‘congested’ the area in which the protest was to be held, actually 
might become. A splinter, therefore, needs to be enacted at pace in order to catch police officers 
unaware. 
Fig 9.7 | TUC splinter  
The agility of such actions must also be maintained. In the sequence of images above the 
protesters who have splintered are far out in front; having made their escape seconds ago. It takes 
a good while before I witness any members of the TSG run past me in pursuit. As I start to fall back 
from the main group I start to focus exclusively on the movements of a smaller number of TSG 
officers ahead of me. At the junction of Regent and Heddon Street the group splits; one half 
continue along the former whilst the other half split down the latter. Only later, upon uploading 
the GPS track to my computer do I notice something awry. Heddon Street leads nowhere. In fact, 
all it does is loop round the back of a row of shops and restaurants back onto Regent Street. Either 
the TSG found a secret passageway linking Heddon Street with Saville Row or, more conceivably, 
their navigational knowledge of London had collectively failed them. I don’t stick around to find 
out, however, chasing the Regent Street group northwards. Like many in pursuit they switch 
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between running, jogging, fast walking and stopping to catch a breath. In splitting – or indeed, 
splintering – the group they have tried to cover as much ground as possible. On this occasion, 
however, they fail to match the protester’s agility.   
 
Fig 9.8 | TSG on the move  
The splinter manoeuvre must always be defined in relation to a principle body. As such, it can 
never fully break away. The red line on the map that runs from east to west is a GPS trace of my 
movements on the day of the TUC demonstration. The splinter radically re-routes it north onto 
Regent Street and away from the A-to-B route along Piccadilly, taking a complete detour through 
Mayfair and down many smaller roads (Conduit Street, New Bond Street, Old Bond Street) before 
re-joining Piccadilly a few blocks from the Green Park underground station. The main march route, 
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in contrast, extends across the full extent of Piccadilly from Piccadilly Circus to Hyde Park. Notice 
that despite ‘splintering’ from the main route and heading off in the direction of Mayfair, the line 
nevertheless returns to be subsumed onto the A-to-B route once again. Many others who were 
either part of the splinter or followed it, did similarly; returning to the main demonstration 
heading towards the final rally point in Hyde Park.  
For the splinter to work, it actually must not be anticipated at all. This is a political rather than a 
technical point, however, concerning the desire to impose of a ‘grammar’ (Agre 1994) onto a 
spatial manoeuvre. It is a dynamic that radically affects the extent to which one can practically 
capture it for navigational purposes. Whilst the splinter may have been decided upon prior to its 
carrying out, its spatial and temporal characteristics must remain invisible to those outside for it 
to act as a disruptive action. In other words, politically it cannot be rendered on a cartographic 
plane as this would curtail the effectiveness of the action.  
In the build-up to the Swallow Street splinter, I’d taken a photograph of a TSG unit heading 
westward on the route towards Pall Mall from Trafalgar Square. I’d also tweeted a similar 
photograph questioning their movements at the time – erroneously supposing they were already 
at Piccadilly. Video footage I continued to shoot shows them walking up along Pall Mall toward 
Waterloo Place, before I overtake them and decide to mingle with non-protesters on the other 
side of the metal barriers I described earlier. All of this was taking place towards the back of the 
march where a number of smaller non-TUC affiliated groups had assembled.  
Only a few minutes after, the splinter had begun and these same metal barriers (shown in an 
‘open’ position in the final frame) had been lifted up and a small body of people had hurriedly 
passed through them. Both the TSG and I had reacted just as quickly as the other. That is to say, 
not very fast at all. Although each of us were aware of smaller groups towards the back of the 
demonstration who possessed the possibility and political persuasion to perform a splinter move 
(judging on their clothing, flags, pyrotechnics and other material), neither had prior knowledge of 
| 242 
 
that exact point at which it was to be carried out. Needless to say, the splinter is a flexible, dynamic 
tactic – one designed to be resolutely of-the-moment. However this needn’t be the kind of of-the-
moment action as defined by de Certeau (1984). The splinter, as the video frames, photographs 
and GPS tracks have shown, emerge ‘generatively’ out of a longer, ‘wayfaring’ line (Ingold 2007, 
75). In representing future movements cartographically, the potential of the action would be 
completely nullified. By its nature it needed to operate extra-cartographically.           
But alongside this tactical necessity of ensuring the manoeuvre remains off the map or ‘extra-
cartographic’, I also contend that the splinter exists at the technical limits of being mapped. What 
would happen if the decision was taken to relay the relevant information on a splinter manoeuvre 
through the Sukey platform? Here we have to think about what is necessary for this future 
moment to be rendered cartographically. Once again, we return to Agre (1994); supplemented by 
November et al. (2010). Consider the first step in the former’s capture model - articulation. The 
activity must be analyzed and comprehended in order for it to then be packaged in a cartographic 
form. How voluminous is the splinter? Where does it begin? Where will it end? When will it return 
to the A-to-B route? The who, what, where, when of the activity that enables its verification, 
dissemination and mapping.  
As suggested above, the key dynamic of the splinter is that the time and place of the activity is not 
to be widely known, otherwise this undermines the aim of the splinter itself – to disrupt. If this 
navigational information was circulated publically, the manoeuvre would lose its ability to act as 
a foreign body thrust into the wider urban fabric in the name of disruption. Yet technically, this 
would simply demand that the two elements are presented on the map itself or in an 
accompanying tweet. Once the time and place were known to all users and filtered through the 
protest crowd, all that would need to happen is that that barriers were opened and the splinter 
would begin.   
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Map 9.4 | Google Maps, OSM and HERE  
Of course, this is somewhat fanciful. Sukey itself was a public platform and every ‘printout’ to use 
November et al.’s (2010) terms – that is, every map, tweet and material update – was publically 
accessible. If protesters were able to see the time and place of the splinter, so would anyone else; 
including the police and other parties intent on preventing the manoeuvre. As such, it would prove 
politically impossible under such circumstances, despite the technical possibility of the 
cartographic endeavor. One would presume the police would simply block the entrance to 
Swallow Street and the activists would be forced to continue along the A-to-B route.    
Nevertheless, a shift from using Google Maps in Sukey 2.0 to OSM in 3.0 was designed to 
proliferate and multiply any possible splinter manoeuvres. Whilst there was an ethico-political 
dimension to this decision based on a desire to utilize open-source map data, it was also based on 
a difference in the cartographic clarity of each basemap. As I have previously identified (Hind 
2015a, n.p.): the ability for protest map users to ‘easily distinguish – through colour, style and 
thickness – each road designation mak[es] for quick, easy referencing when on the move’.  The 
image above is a comparison between three mapping platforms: Google Maps, OSM and HERE. 
Each is focused in on the same street that the splinter manoeuvre was performed along.  
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Consider again the Swallow Street splinter. If one were to calculate the possibility of getting from 
Piccadilly to Regent Street the answer would likely be different depending on which mapping 
platform was consulted. In Google Maps we encounter a problem. Swallow Street is appropriately 
labelled as such, with Vine Street extending east.35 Both are depicted in white like any other at 
this level.36 Problems arise, however, as one approaches the Regent Street end. Due to the 3D 
features in Google Maps, the building that houses the Gaucho restaurant obscures a length of the 
road; disappearing out of sight behind it. Still worse, it then transforms into a non-vehicular path 
as a shadowed line rather than the previous white line as depicted in the lower half of Swallow 
Street. To complete this rather confusing situation the brief shadowed line disappears completely 
underneath a Regent Street building housing more retail stores – never to re-emerge.  
Fig 9.9 | Archway from Swallow Street to Regent Street 
In contrast, OSM makes critical, visible distinctions at these various points. Swallow Street is 
labelled at both the lower, vehicular end and at the higher, non-vehicular end to assert the 
continuation of the designation if not the road style. In other words, to assure map users Swallow 
Street is still Swallow Street. Nevertheless, the change in colour (from white to grey) assures users 
they are aware it no longer allows vehicle access along its upper half. This important distinction 
                                                          
35 Although never used in the Sukey platform, but visualized here for comparison, the HERE map fails to 
even label Swallow Street, Instead, it mislabels the lower portion as an extension of Vine Street. The upper 
portion extending towards Piccadilly is depicted ambiguously as a narrow shaded line. In any case, it does 
not show as a passable street. 
36 In Google Maps all road types are visualized at this level in the same colour (white) with no distinction 
between main roads (such as Piccadilly, Regent Street) and smaller thoroughfares (like Swallow Street, 
Vine Street), beyond line width and overlain traffic flow arrows.  
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allows those to evaluate the benefits of splintering down a route with no vehicle access. What is 
equally important, however, is knowledge of where Swallow Street ends up. Neither in HERE or 
Google Maps is this entirely clear – leading to a significant degree of doubt. In OSM Swallow Street 
is shown as connecting to Regent Street under an archway rather than disappearing out of sight 
as in Google Maps.  
For activists desiring to successfully execute splinter manoeuvres such as this one, details 
regarding access and egress are critical. Navigational knowledges gained through, and mediated 
by, platforms such as Sukey have therefore been integral to their proliferation and multiplication 
during protest events. Yet, with neither version of the platform deployed during the TUC and 
NCAFC demonstrations, opportunities for identifying possible routes were restricted to 
protester’s already-existing navigational knowledge (rather than being presented in cartographic 
form). As such it curtailed the possibility of more splinter manoeuvres being performed, and 
event-sensitive navigational knowledges to circulate.      
However, this opens up a critical issue within the mapping of protest events that will be continued 
in the next section. Firstly, that neither political necessity nor technical capacity necessarily exists 
in order for phenomena to be mapped during protest events. Sometimes things need to remain 
‘off the map’ or ‘extra-cartographic’. In contrast, sometimes things cannot be placed on the map 
because there is not the technical ability to do so. In other words, that the phenomena itself is too 
unruly, too contingent and too unpredictable to be rendered at all. Secondly, that the technical 
capacity and political necessity of cartographically capturing phenomena do not always align. 
Whilst they have the potential to co-exist they often do so in tension. In the above example whilst 
it would be technically possible to map a splinter manoeuvre if details regarding time and location 
were pre-arranged to be mapped, doing so would cancel out its intended effects. That is, to be 
‘unanticipated’ and therefore disruptive.      
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Rhizome: Cat-and-Mouse Affairs  
As outlined in chapter 2, the rhizome exhibits a number of qualities essential to its operation. 
Theoretically it is a rootless, playful and spatially unpredictable manoeuvre. In the first instance, 
following Deleuze and Guattari (2011), it privileges connectivity and heterogeneity, remaining 
open to all sources of strength and growth across the urban environment it finds itself in. It is also 
built on the principle of multiplicity wherein there is no categorical distinction between those 
comprising it. As such, it gains its disruptive strength not through a core power but as a result of 
collective momentum. Further, participants do not regard any ‘rupture’ as a threat to the 
manoeuvre’s existence, but as a generative force. On the contrary, with each break it grows 
stronger. Then, to complete this re-cap of qualities, the rhizome is never a tracing of a previous 
series of moments but an entirely new ‘mapping’. There is, therefore, no template for its coming-
into-being. It is this cartographic contingency that is the rhizome’s greatest strength but also its 
latent weakness, as the following will hopefully reveal.    
I came across one such manoeuvre at precisely 3.41pm during the NCAFC demonstration. 
Predictably, like many of my attempts to capture protest manoeuvres, it had already begun. As 
dutifully confirmed through first-hand accounts on Twitter (Taylor 2014) and live reports on the 
Guardian (Phipps 2014), the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) was targeted by 
protesters, with paint thrown at the windows of 1 Victoria Street, and attempts to occupy it.37 
Once the initial moment had passed at BIS, protesters continued down Victoria Street. Only a few 
strides away, on the same side of the street, lies a Starbucks coffee shop.38 Glimpsing an 
                                                          
37 Although away from the official march route, BIS was targeted for its involvement in facilitating the rise 
of HE tuition fees. BIS have been responsible for making a series of other contentious decision regarding 
HE, according to student activists, including the abolishment of the Education Maintenance Allowance and 
the more recently proposed (and swiftly abandoned) student loan book sell-off (McGettigan and 
Chakrabortty 2014).  
38 During the last couple of years the company had garnered much unwanted attention, after it was 
revealed they had paid ‘just £8.6m in taxes on a reported £3bn in UK sales since 1998’ (Neville 2012, n.p.). 
As such, they have borne the brunt of public anger – especially at demonstrations such as the student one 
in November 2014, and past UK Uncut events.  
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opportunity, protesters decided to target it in much a similar fashion. Once again, paint was 
thrown both at the shop and at TSG officers dispatched to follow the protesters. Press images 
from the day provide an iconic representation of the cat-and-mouse battles between protesters 
and police, depicting the TSG officers both under attack and as somewhat militant defenders of 
private property. 
Fig 9.10 | Starbucks. Source: Justin Tallis (2014)  
Yet both these flashpoints occurred before I was able to reach the area. As the sequence of images 
attest to, the same TSG officers who had just responded to action at BIS and Starbucks had already 
appeared at, and ‘secured’, another scene. This time, the TSG officers were attempting to prevent 
protesters from targeting other retail and restaurant chains along Victoria Street in much the same 
manner as the other two moments. As the images suppose, ascertaining the precise details of 
each incident required a concerted degree of investigation. The rhizome itself had temporarily 
been suspended in light of the actions that had occurred in the previous 15 minutes, and the 
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participants instead had decided to float around a more specific area outside the Leon restaurant 
chain.  
Map 9.5 | NCAFC rhizome I & II   
At this point, another TSG unit can be spotted in frame one. Different from the ones visible in the 
image outside Starbucks, this particular set of officers are more heavily equipped with standard-
issue, public order visors. With the threat of being hit by either flying paint or other such 
projectiles it seems as if senior officers in charge of TSG deployment have sought to equip some, 
but not all, units with the necessary protection. Nevertheless, they remain attached to each 
officers’ belt rather than in use, as the unit remains on standby outside Leon, close to other units 
deployed to gain territorial control outside All Bar One. On this occasion, the TSG officers involved 
have formed a horseshoe formation preventing access to the building, and are denying passage 
to both protesters and customers. During this time, neither protesters nor police show a desire to 
move on elsewhere, both seemingly content with the drop in intensity following a series of 
dramatic, high-speed moments.  
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Fig 9.11 | NCAFC rhizome I  
What is important to note is not only how quickly these flashpoints occurred, but also how 
speedily they regenerated and begun again. The raw video footage from which the sequence of 
images is drawn begins at 3.41pm, as mentioned above. In 3 minutes 25 seconds – after the arrest 
of one individual and the protection of the arresting officers by an entire TSG unit – the protesters 
spot an opportunity and the rhizome once again builds a collective, navigational force. Heading 
even further away from the designated A-to-B route, the rhizome then continued moving west 
down Victoria Street. 
- 
The second rhizomatic moment I managed to capture consisted of a dummy manoeuvre emergent 
from the state noted above. Its occurrence is important because it brings into question the 
contingency of all of the spatial forms discussed so far. Each does not ever appear fully formed as 
complete(d) occupations, splinters, rhizomes or containments – despite the neatness of 
metaphorical, typological categorization – but must emerge through collective construction, from 
a wider environment of potential spatial manoeuvres.   
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At 3.46pm – only 5 minutes on from the beginning of the video footage, and after a lull in which 
the protesters begin to move through Victoria again, although at walking pace – there is suddenly 
an increase in speed. On the footage itself there are shouts from one individual behind the camera 
that provide a stimulation for a change in urgency. Another out-of-shot individual is also heard 
shouting “run, run!”, this time with more clarity, and the protesters in front of me start to move 
with a greater purpose. The second frame shows the big reveal. The reason why the protesters 
are being urged to run is that members of the TSG unit deployed to give chase to the protesters 
have decided to run rather than walk. Although support vehicles can be identified on the right of 
the original footage by their blue flashing lights, positioned to the north of the action on Victoria 
Street itself, there is no direct attempt to contain or apprehend any individuals. Nor is there an 
attempt to block their forward (and evidently disruptive) movements.  
Nevertheless, the police continue their manoeuvre down past Westminster Cathedral towards 
Ashley Place. Yet by frame three the TSG unit are back to a walking pace, seemingly content with 
the impact of their action – despite not having initiated any containment tactic, nor imposed 
restrictions on the disruptive movement of the group. Why, despite the manoeuvre taking place 
through an undesignated area of the city, might the police not be intent on curbing the extent of 
their eminently disruptive movements? Especially bearing in mind the attacks on private property 
only a few minutes previous? As the original video footage rolls on, however, all becomes clear. 
As the road markings in frame four suggest, the pedestrianized area outside Westminster 
Cathedral leads into Morpeth Terrace – right outside a primary school. As the week day 
(Wednesday), date (November 19th) and time (3.46pm) indicate, children are being picked up from 
school. As is again evident in the original footage, and visible in frame two; the TSG officers are 
only jogging.  
Once the police officers exit the pedestrianized area and head onto Ashley Place, they immediately 
stop jogging and resort to a gentle walk – as seen in frame three. The school is directly in their 
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collective line of sight, towards the left-hand edge of the frame. The majority of protesters are 
now beyond them heading down Morpeth Terrace (the road flanking the primary school). 
Whether the police manoeuvre was deliberately deployed in order to provoke the protesters into 
picking-up speed is open to interpretation. However, the factors involved – including a lack of 
command gestures, the speed of police response, the short length of the police manoeuvre and 
the convenience of particular locations – all point towards an attempt to lure the protesters into 
making a threatening manoeuvre.  
Fig 9.12 | NCAFC rhizome II  
What this second part of the example shows is the often amorphous, pulsing nature of a 
rhizomatic manoeuvre that can be characterized as much by decreasing intensity as the inverse. 
The rhizome metaphor is apt for describing it not only because it captures its territorial and de-
territorial qualities, but articulates them as either side of the same coin. That is to say, as co-
constitutive rather than purely antagonistic actions. It is this understanding that pulls apart the 
false distinction between tactical and strategic engagements, as discussed in chapter 3. Tactics do 
not generate purely de-territorial actions, and neither do strategies wholly produce territorial 
ones. One is not decided entirely ‘on the wing’ (de Certeau 1984, xix) with the other decided upon 
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in advance. Such a manoeuvre is an ongoing dance between de- and re-territorialization; between 
‘improvisation and speculative way-finding’ (Gerlach 2015, 8).  
Further than this, it is perhaps clearer now to argue that the distinction between protesters and 
police within a protest situation is equally not one of a difference between tactical and strategic 
possibility – between the ability to perform de-territorial and territorial actions. Instead, the 
distinction relies on the ability to align a ‘series of dissimilar signposts’ (November et al. 2010, 593) 
along a navigational trajectory. In both parts of the rhizomatic manoeuvre it is clear to see how 
such signposts align. In the first instance, the navigational alignment occurs as the TSG officers 
realize another threat is to materialize – this time in the case of an attack on another retail 
property. Once the direction and intensity of the individuals is identified and recognized, it begins 
to be acted upon by the officers; leading to an apprehension of those involved and a securing of 
the location to prevent further possible actions. The sequence of images evidences this 
navigational practice.  
In the second instance, the alignment occurs when officers approach the vicinity of the primary 
school and reduce their speed to a gentle walk. In order for the action to be carried out, three 
signposts have to be travelled between. First, the location of the school is determined either by 
prior tacit knowledge, or by distant sight. Both of these are possible – perhaps even overlapping 
to secure the otherwise precarious knowledge of the other. Secondly, the action is initiated by a 
command – a barely perceptible one to those around – in order to increase speed and narrow 
intent. Then thirdly, the line of sight from the collective group of officers is established with the 
critical location (the primary school) in order to bear witness to the accomplishment of the action. 
That is, to ensuring that the only individuals running at full speed past a school, in full view of 
waiting parents and children, are the protesters themselves.     
Nevertheless, it is only in the rhizome that this co-constitutive de-/re-territorialization occurs. As 
such, it holds the key to understanding the disruptive dynamic. The art of disruption is not one of 
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absolute chaos. It does not generate a lack of order. Within the protest event, disruption is always 
a delicately-balanced performance. Whilst it may be conceived as an increase in intensity, this 
disruptive potential cannot be realized entirely by ever-more frenetic manoeuvres. Instead, and 
in order to gather the force to navigate through various dissimilar signposts, there must be lulls in 
which the rhizome is able to re-generate.   
Yet none of this is entirely evident in the map itself. In fact, much of it lies far beyond the capacity 
of the map. Thus, what is most critical to comprehend is that these micro-political engagements 
remain at the lower-end of digital perception and capture. Whilst it is easy enough to record and 
analyze post-event it is, even in the contemporary era of ‘real-time’ capacity, unerringly difficult 
to cartographically capture events in medias res. That is to say, the technological ability to record, 
validate, map and then act upon such information remains entirely beyond the realm of 
possibility. Even in moments of relative calm – the troughs between the peaks – there remains an 
external, unknown capacity unreducible to a cartographic mode of existence.  
It is the rhizomatic manoeuvre that provides this contingent relation between possibility, 
probability and actuality; hence why in order to combat such, the police resort to a number of 
tactics in order to curtail its effectiveness. Sometimes this involves direct attempts to prevent its 
navigational capacity and foreclose the future, as Louise Amoore (2013) discusses in relation 
sovereign border practices. On other occasions, this involves the apprehension of only the 
apparent ‘ringleaders’ in any disruptive activity. But the rhizome, like all good autonomous 
actions, is essentially (although not absolutely) ‘leaderless’ (Gerbaudo 2012, 13). It lacks an 
identifiable instigator to conduct the manoeuvre itself, and as a result such attempts spectacularly 
misinterpret the spatial form and force of the action in question. The low success rate of 
prosecuting protesters for such public order crimes, especially during the 2010-2014 period, is 
evidence of this autonomy of intent. No individual, or group of actors, holds the organizational 
intent for orchestrating a rhizomatic manoeuvre.  
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Disruptive cartography, therefore, is not always capable of delivering what it desires to achieve. 
Not everything aligns as it should, and not every trajectory is realized. The moments discussed 
here were but two of many tiny dramas that similarly took place whilst Sukey was active. Their 
ability to be captured, then, is always dependent upon an array of unruly factors. This, it turns out, 
is both its undeniable strength and unavoidable weakness.  
 
Containment: ‘In or Out? In or Out?’     
As discussed in detail in chapter 2, a containment is a police manoeuvre entailing the capture of 
protesters within a particular, bounded space. As such, it is not performed by protesters – hence 
why the Sukey platform became known as the ‘anti-kettling app’ during its use. Containments are 
designed to minimize the disruptive capacity of a crowd by denying both individual and collective 
spatial mobility, taking many forms (see; Sørli 2012). In order to do so effectively, containments 
at protest events can occur for a number of hours, until officers are assured no further disruption 
will occur. The manoeuvre also offers ample opportunity for mass data-collection and intelligence-
gathering, operationalizing big data capture for the purposes of anticipating future activities.  
The containment I wish to focus on here began outside Scotland Yard – the Met’s headquarters – 
during the NCAFC demonstration. As a result of the proximity to the march route and final rally 
point, it was already being policed by a high number of officers. It also meant that many were on 
hand to assist with the containment, joining up with the more mobile TSG officers that had spent 
the previous hour following protesters around Victoria. Nevertheless, as seen in the sequence of 
images below, it was still primarily the TSG officers that carried out the majority of the kettling 
itself, whilst their Scotland Yard colleagues maintained their positions. Note the subtle differences 
in uniform. These slight variations signify officer ranks, skills, roles and therefore intent. With this 
in mind, it becomes easier to identify the potential protagonists in the orchestration of particular 
manoeuvres. Unlike in ‘defensive’ TSG deployments, mobile officers do not carry heavy riot 
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protection such as visors or shields unless in severe situations. Commonly, for events such as the 
student demonstration here, officers wear minimal protection including small peaked caps and 
utility vests. The units are therefore more agile, and prepared for anticipated disruptive activities. 
Thus they possess the ability to ‘switch on’ and ‘switch off’ containments in mere seconds.    
Map 9.6 | NCAFC containment  
The kettle on Broadway was a rather straightforward, static containment with similarities to the 
‘bridge’ version as described by Sørli (2012). As can be seen from the sequence of images, the 
street is a relatively narrow side-road; considerably smaller than Victoria Street it branches off 
from. As the commanding officer begins to direct his colleagues into position – ensuring they form 
a secure enough line to prevent the passage of protesters – the solid façade of the Grade II-listed 
St. Ermin’s Hotel comes into view on the left-hand side of the second frame (top right). With the 
temporary metal fencing outside Scotland Yard forming the other side of the containment the 
officers promptly block egress from either end. Their aim, it seems, is to prevent a greater 
congregation of protesters outside Scotland Yard and to split the rhizomatic crowd in two.  
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Fig 9.13 | Uniforms, Broadway  
Yet when a containment comes into being, its form is initially porous; forcing protesters to make 
a snap decision on where to go. As the third frame shows (middle left), the line of officers is less a 
smooth continuous formation and more a zig-zagged interpretation. Yet by frame four, only a few 
seconds later, the officers have begun to close together and face outwards as more protesters 
attempt to rush the forming line. In between these snapshots of an otherwise fluid, contingent 
process, I found myself have to make the same calculation. Nevertheless, I did not make it through 
my own free will. The officer with his hand raised in the following frame (four; middle right) is in 
the process of physically grappling with me whilst shouting “in or out, in or out?” as I weigh up 
the benefits of each, before deciding on “out, out, out” and being pushed back beyond the 
emergent cordon. As the line becomes to solidify, one officer shouts to “hold it across the road, 
facing that way” whilst pointing with both hands back down towards Victoria Street where both 
officers and protesters have run from.    
By frame five (bottom left) the officers primarily face inwards towards those trapped inside the 
kettle. This is essentially because those that pose the greatest threat to the failure of the 
manoeuvre, at that particular point, are those contained within with the desire to break out. Those 
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on the outside, although of possible annoyance to officers maintaining the line, do not possess as 
greater threat to the security of the containment. Still, some have the potential to cause greater 
disruption if they and fellow protesters find themselves literally in-between the line itself. The two 
protesters in the foreground of frame five are in the process of remonstrating with an officer who 
is alleged to have assaulted the protester in the red shirt. As the disagreement continues, more 
officers cement the impermeability of the line and suddenly, the individual in the green shirt finds 
himself inside the containment as the officers seek to diffuse the situation by splitting the 
individuals apart.  
Fig 9.14 | NCAFC containment  
Whilst the Broadway containment bore similarities to both static and bridge containments, there 
were also some considerable differences. The most notable of these concerned the length of 
deployment. In each enacted kettle the commanding ‘Bronze’ officer must ensure that the threat 
of disruption has diminished enough to release the protesters. During many of the events over 
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the 2010-2014 period, the average length of time each containment was deployed varied hugely. 
The infamous Westminster Bridge containment of December 2010 saw protesters contained for 
2-4 hours as Dan Hancox (2011a) recounts. One of the easiest methods of diminishing the 
disruptive capacity of an assembled crowd is to exhaust them. The containment commonly 
operates according to this logic.     
Others, however, are shorter affairs. Indeed, the Broadway containment was a comparatively 
brief one, lasting no longer than 20 minutes. Once officers were assured the threat of imminent 
disruption had diminished, the containment was relaxed and protesters were allowed to continue 
in whatever direction they desired, with no further restrictions on their movements. In previous 
situations this is often the case: protesters, whilst nominally ‘free’, are ordered to disperse in a 
particular direction, usually away from the area in order for the space to be neutralized. In this 
case, protesters were free to go wherever. Most continued their protesting and returned – having 
spent the past hour running through the streets of Victoria – to the now-occupied Parliament 
Square. Whilst the containment was not responsible for the curtailment of the protest more 
generally, it did prevent the ongoing cat-and-mouse activity that was being carried out nearby. In 
situations where Sukey was deployed, this would have been regarded as a tactical failure – 
reducing protesters to immobile, predictable and less-than-disruptive individuals once again 
susceptible to being contained.    
The static occupation continued in Parliament Square, where earlier 10ft-high event fencing 
surrounding the grassy area were torn down and waist-high ‘box barriers’ scaled. Yet, during 
Sukey’s deployment from 2010-2014, any ‘static’, public demonstration was seen as an 
unnecessary risk to the ongoing possibility of police containments. Any occupation threatened the 
safety of those participating. Maintaining mobility – at the expense of protester volume, direction, 
knowledge of action – usurped any of the advantages of a static occupation or protest in the city 
streets.  
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The fact that no direct data-collection was undertaken in the guise of a mass containment and 
arrest does not disprove the claim that the police tactic of kettling during protests is a data-driven 
pursuit. On the contrary, it only strengthens this hypothesis by suggesting that the police maintain 
the possibility of enacting mass data-collection practices at any time during demonstrations and 
other such public disturbances. Such containments are designed to aid not only in the prevention 
of immediate or imminent disruption, but also future disruptions.     
This suggests that the containment does not begin precisely at the moment it is brought-into-
being. A ‘successful’ kettle is not necessarily one that manages to capture activists. In many cases, 
a containment succeeds purely as a result of threatening to come-into-being. This is what Shields 
would call a ‘virtual risk’ (Shields 2003, 195). The containment manoeuvre functions precisely 
because it is indeterminate. The mere possibility of its existence is enough to force protesters into 
taking immediate action, thus justifying the deployment of the manoeuvre. As Shields (2003, 197) 
further suggests: 
Threats are asserted, they are a matter of perception and are feared because they may 
materialize as concrete danger. The intangibility of threat derives from the difficulty of 
calculating the odds, thereby converting it into a risk. Particularly in a situation where one 
does not have the benefit of historical experience or statistical summation, such as a 
personal encounter with a ‘threatening individual’, one faces a highly unstable decision 
line demarcating responses such as ‘flight’ or ‘fight’.    
This echoes the nursery rhyme from which Sukey takes its name. Polly and her sister knew the 
effect such a threat would have on their brothers. It was not the actuality of the tea party that 
forced them to flee, but the mere threat of such. The Sukey platform was designed to ameliorate 
such a threat – turning the containment from a virtual risk into a ‘concrete danger’ that users 
could act upon. It allowed protesters to process the navigational knowledge that gave shape – 
textually, visually and cartographically – to an otherwise unknown, unknowable, intangible force. 
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The ‘decision line’ that Shields mentions is therefore manifested at the brink of a containment, 
forcing a decision to be made: “in or out, in or out?”. Rather than a movement line in the form of 
a ‘trace’ or a ‘thread’, the decision line is a ‘rupture’ in the territorial surface (Ingold 2007, 44). 
With Sukey active, this decision need not be made at the brink of such a rupture, but in advance, 
and in anticipation of it.   
In Sukey’s absence the containment returned to being a virtual risk rather than a concrete danger 
for protesters, allowing the officers performing such manoeuvres to project an idealized (but 
nonetheless real) situation into the protest space (a containment is forthcoming). Put otherwise: 
it reduced the likelihood that protesters would continue to engage in disruptive activities if they 
were not able to calculate the possibility of a containment coming-into-being. The threat of a 
kettle is no less real for it. But as an assertion, and without recourse to reliable, verifiable textual, 
visual or cartographic evidence it nevertheless remains actionable. One cannot ignore a possible 
containment. Yet without the ‘historical experience’ that Shields identifies of attending 
demonstrations, witnessing police manoeuvres, and participating in the crowdsourcing of 
navigational knowledges, second-wave student activists were left with reduced perceptive 
capabilities. Invariably, the result of such a situation is the increased possibility of being kettled – 
and with it, of being subjected to mass data-collection.     
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has sought to extensively detail four kinds of spatial manoeuvres witnessed during 
two kinds of protest events; emblematic of a five-year period from 2010-2015. The first of these 
– occupation – is perhaps the most identifiable, yet during this period, its efficacy was muted – 
especially in light of increasing restrictions regarding the occupation of space in central London 
following the early success of Occupy. The collective taking of public space, therefore, became a 
considerably weaker manoeuvre from a spatial, operational and tactical sense. Each attempt was 
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performed with a different interpretation of risk and safety. In the ‘Occupy Democracy’ effort the 
‘safe space’ concept (Kenney 2001, Hanhardt 2013) was mobilized in order to sustain a more 
inclusive, participatory occupation of Parliament Square. In the NCAFC effort, the occupation was 
carried out in relation to operational knowledges disseminated to student activists by their unions, 
and defined by a fallout between the NUS and the event organizers regarding an incomplete risk 
assessment.  
The presence of a navigational platform such as Sukey would have, based on the evidence 
gathered here, altered these circumstances on three counts. In the first instance, an occupation 
of a single, well-defined public space would have most likely been discredited due to the increased 
risk of containment. Secondly, if performed, the continuation of any occupation would have been 
informed by, and mediated through, the Sukey platform and as such might have curtailed its effect 
due to the desire for more mobile forms of protest. Thirdly, the Sukey platform would have 
replaced any existing institutional knowledges regarding risk and safety in the NCAFC 
demonstration, ensuring that participants were provided with navigational knowledges otherwise 
entirely absent.   
The second of these manoeuvres – the splinter – was repeatedly successful in its deployment, 
adding to the disruptive capacity of the protest event in general. Adopting a more mobile 
approach to the occupation, the splinter was nonetheless still reliant upon the volume and unified 
force of an A-to-B demonstration. Yet, in harnessing this, the splinter was able to re-direct 
individuals away from such in order to precipitate a more spatially and tactically radical effort. In 
so doing the manoeuvre came into direct opposition with the Met’s legal responsibility to 
minimize disruption to the local community during a protest event. I suggest that Sukey would 
have again changed things. In this case, it would have allowed for the proliferation and 
multiplication of splinter attempts by providing the cartographic basis for the identification and 
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circulation of navigational knowledges – thus reducing the risk of participants heading down 
unsuitable routes.  
The third manoeuvre – the rhizome – proved to be the most disruptive of all possible protest 
manoeuvres during this period. Differing from the splinter in its independence from any A-to-B 
demonstration, the rhizome provided participants with the opportunity to endlessly disrupt the 
urban environment during protest events by providing a level of contingency otherwise absent. 
Yet such a manoeuvre was dependent upon a collective paucity of navigational certainty – thriving 
instead on an unpredictability of direction that nonetheless was underpinned by an extensive 
navigational knowledge of the city streets. With Sukey live and operational, this spatial 
contingency was only enhanced, with cartographic updates on possible counter-manoeuvres 
generated. Nevertheless, much of the rhizome’s success was predicated on both the speed and 
agility of any deployment, as well as this designed unpredictability. As such, Sukey’s presence and 
capacity would have changed very little; the platform was neither technically able to anticipate 
rhizomatic manoeuvres by mapping their coming-into-being, nor was it political desirable to do 
so. 
The final manoeuvre – the containment – differed from the other three in being exclusively 
performed by the police. Further, unlike the other manoeuvres, it was designed in order to 
minimize rather than maximize disruption. Far from either ‘off’ or ‘on’ – as the nursery rhyme goes 
– the kettle exists in a far more fluid, open-ended state as the example in this chapter shows. As 
such, containment manoeuvres can just as easily morph into another manoeuvre, transition into 
another form of kettle, dissolve entirely, or trick protesters into thinking it ever was, or intended 
to be, a containment. Thus, although Sukey was always depicted as an ‘anti-kettling app’, it was 
always much more than this. As a result of this dexterity and cunning, the process of capturing 
and cartographically rendering them on a mobile, digital mapping platform was fraught with 
difficulty.  
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In the final chapter of this thesis the significance of these qualified cartographic failures will be 
explored. Firstly, as expressed in this chapter, ‘capturing’ manoeuvres during protest events was 
difficult. Secondly, prescriptive aspects curtailed the ability of the platform to seamlessly circulate 
navigational knowledge. In addition to these, another more fundamental ethical concern drove 
the project into dormancy. It was neither premised on the technical challenge of capturing and 
disseminating ‘active phenomena’ in real-time, nor the political undesirability of giving 
cartographic shape to protester manoeuvres. Instead, this altogether more intractable issue I refer 
to as the quest for a ‘crypto-cartography’. It can be defined by its as-yet relative impossibility.  
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Chapter 10 | Failures and Carto-futures  
 
‘The continued tactical resistance of users, whether as temporary ad hoc interventions or more 
sustained organized networks…require an approach found on perpetual experiment “Install, 
update, crash, restart, de-install,” a digital version of Becket’s [sic] dictum “Fail, fail again, fail 
better”.’ 
(Garcia 2013, n.p.) 
‘If we want to deal with the questions of strategy facing the student left then we have to begin 
from a position of failure.’ 
(Cant 2015, n.p.) 
 
Whilst the Sukey platform was in a state of ‘perpetual experimentation’ (Garcia 2013, n.p.), and 
premised, like many digital projects, on an evolving array of ‘intermittent accomplishments’ (Hui 
2012, 206), it can also be regarded as a cartographic failure. This concluding chapter interrogates 
the implication of this failure. Here I specifically look to three particular issues: the difficulty of 
cartographically-capturing unfolding events, the problem of ‘correspondence’ between 
cartographic ‘signposts’ in navigation, and the impossibility of a ‘crypto-cartography’.    
Firstly, then, there were a host of aspects to the platform and its deployment that rendered it 
variously ill-equipped, unresponsive or altogether obsolete for the purpose it was originally 
designed for. As an expressly ‘anti-kettling’ platform, it initially served one purpose. As these 
formations changed throughout the period of use, the nature of the kettle, as deployed across the 
urban terrain itself, morphed significantly. In fact, in most cases, each and every containment was 
entirely unique in form, volume, spatial extent and temporal nature. Moreover, when deployed 
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alongside other public order tactics of the kind explored in chapter 2, the containments became 
integrated tactics of a combined rather than isolated nature. Dealing with these ‘quasi-kettles’ 
therefore became somewhat challenging over time.   
The technical capacity to digitally map containments in ‘real-time’ to be of tactical use, lagged 
behind the operational demand to do so, in order for users to continue protesting, avoid injury, 
avert data-collection or prevent arrest. Only in some instances was it entirely operational. Others, 
however, presented insurmountable cartographic problems for the platform, including, 
somewhat paradoxically, rhizomatic manoeuvres themselves that denied the possibility of 
‘capturing’, verifying and disseminating navigational data. This unavoidable tension – between 
aiding the avoidance of containments and the generation of ‘rhizomatic’ anti-kettling manoeuvres 
– was at the heart of the cartographic enterprise.  
Further, Sukey often failed to provide a navigational ‘correspondence’ for users between event 
phenomena and cartographic ‘signposts’. As mentioned above the platform went through 
multiple iterations – each an attempt to re-articulate the aims and objectives of the project for an 
ever-changing landscape. Yet, the consequence of such, in the absence of the platform, has been 
a return to already-existing institutional forms to provide support in protest situations. That is, 
away from collaborative forms of knowledge-production back towards instructed forms in the 
shape of student union advice, ‘buddy systems’ and other such devices ostensibly designed to 
keep activists safe, mobile and informed during demonstrations.      
Yet these were not the only tensions at play during these events. Another focused more explicitly 
on privacy and security, in which the developers of the platform strived towards developing a kind 
of ‘crypto-cartography’ through which users and collaborators in the digital mapping endeavour 
could be hidden from possible view and anonymized to any degree. The reason for doing so was 
to combat ‘data-driven’ efforts by the police to capture information en masse on activist identities, 
movements, organizational strategies and associations. This particular tension rested on the need 
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to validate geographical and tactical data delivered to the platform, as well as guaranteeing the 
privacy of those that had submitted the information. This resulted, somewhat in contradiction to 
conceptual arguments around openness, in the verification of a far smaller group of contributors 
than one would suppose was integral to collaborative project.  
 
Capture Failures 
Matthew Wilson and Sarah Elwood (2014, 231) argue that ‘[c]apture is fundamental to human 
thought, action, and culture’, extending far beyond more recent interpretations exclusively 
associated with the taking of data by computerized means. As they continue, ‘[t]raditions of 
storytelling aggregate captured human experiences, just as these captured moments enable 
institutions of human knowledge’ (Wilson and Elwood 2014, 231). The acquisition of data has been 
central to many forms of knowledge production throughout the centuries, including, of course, 
the process of mapmaking.  
Philip Agre’s deployment of the term is intended to ‘bring to the surface the connotations of 
violence in the metaphor’ (Agre 1994, 106) that is otherwise missing in strictly computational 
definitions. The ‘capturing’ of elusive or escaping phenomena, therefore, draws distinct attention 
to the ways in which cartographic practices, for example, have historically been complicit in 
instrumentalizing this violence. Indeed, cartography is but one example from a number of 
formalized practices that have, in some way, aimed to capture, define and catalogue lands, people 
and relationships. In this, capturing can arguably be conceived of as a form of ‘imprisonment’ 
(Agre 1994, 106) or incarceration – either in essence or in totality.   
Capturing may involve a gaining of certain key coordinates of the activity or action in question. In 
this sense, the activity still exhibits an ‘excess’ that the capturing/tracking process cannot entirely 
account for. For example, in the decision-making or reason behind a particular action, some 
aspects remain un-captured or even ‘un-capture-able’, despite its openness to further speculation 
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and analysis. The suggestion here, then, is that this capture process is always necessarily 
incomplete. In protest situations, this incompleteness becomes readily apparent.  
The second meaning of ‘to capture’ concerns the capacity for representation rather than the 
express taking of data itself, ‘[t]hus one might refer to the object classes of an object-oriented 
computer program as “capturing” the distinction between standing orders and particular 
occasions on which goods are delivered’ (Agre 1994, 106). In other words, capture in this second 
sense is an abstraction that is able to diagrammatize and operationalize a relationship between 
different entities or dynamic forces. As Agre argues, this creates a common ‘ambiguity between 
an epistemological idea (acquiring the data) and an ontological idea (modeling the reality it 
reflects’ that pervades ‘the vocabulary of computing’ (Agre 1994, 106). This second, ontological 
definition is commensurate with the intentions of many cartographers, especially those who work 
in GIS and are necessarily constrained to working with particular data structures that demarcate 
between ‘objects’, ‘classes’ and ‘types’.  
The point to be made here is two-fold. Firstly, Sukey had difficulty capturing the emergence of 
police containments – as responsive as the platform was, kettles such as the one outside Scotland 
Yard occurred too fast for the relay of time-critical, tactical information through the platform from 
those in and around the area to the operators back to the crowd itself. As the containment images 
in chapter 9 attest to, whilst there may have been a pre-arranged intention to contain protesters 
in, or near the area in question, there was little possibility for this to be understood and acted 
upon by protesters before its occurrence. Only as the gestures are made by the commanding 
officer in frames two and three are the intentions of the mobile TSG units in charge of deploying 
the containment revealed – and only to those in the immediate vicinity or those with the requisite 
knowledge for interpreting such actions.  
Secondly, that in the absence of any kind of integrated digital platform designed to anticipate the 
deployment of such manoeuvres, protesters resorted to more static, less ‘disruptive’ forms of 
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demonstration in an easily—controllable, well-defined and demarcated space such as Parliament 
Square. Thus, it represented the return of the A-to-B demonstration. Sukey is better represented, 
not as a linear, two-point navigation nor even as a linear, multi-point progression from ‘A-to-B-to-
C-to-D’ (Asquith 2015, n.p.) or more conceptually as an ‘A-to-Counter-Power’ as some activists 
have suggested (Cant 2015, n.p.), but more of an open-ended ‘A-to-?’. In this, the ‘A’ is a location 
with some kind of threat to the protester (rather than a nominal start point) and ‘?’ is a mutable, 
shifting ‘safe’ or otherwise opportunistic location as interpreted by the map user themselves, in 
respect to location A.  
In other words, the platform never instructed protesters where they should navigate to – only 
where they should navigate away from or avoid (location A). This is perhaps the most illuminating 
aspect of the Sukey platform and one that makes it distinct from other kinds of navigational 
services designed to offer possible and/or desirable routes towards a final location. This was based 
on the platform generating navigating knowledge of the various threats and risks during a protest 
– most notably in the form of police containments – that comprise a location A. By informing 
protesters on where they should go (any B, C or other lettered point) the platform assumed a 
normative force that otherwise was not present. In other words, the platform merely informed 
users of the location and type of risk present.  
Another point should be made in respect to the ‘data-driven’ aspect of the containment tactic. 
The containment on Broadway, unlike many of the more infamous containments, was not used to 
undertake a mass data-collection of individuals. None of the protesters contained temporarily 
within the kettle were detained for their involvement in the otherwise unplanned direct action 
around Victoria. As such it is necessary to restate, this time in reference to Foucault (1991) that 
surveillance tactics, such as those deployed during demonstrations, do not gain their power from 
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actual evidence-gathering, but from the possibility of evidence-gathering of protester identities, 
movements and organization.39  
This is another critical aspect of the containment manoeuvre. The mere threat to contain is 
enough to spur those into calculating and performing particular kinds of manoeuvres designed to 
combat it. Whilst this does not deny the material, embodied effects of a containment manoeuvre 
on individuals it still nonetheless shifts its impact temporally by throwing it forward. Thus, the 
kettle has force that precedes its coming-into-being. The kettle must not, therefore, be considered 
as if it were only a static form only ever ‘on’ or ‘off’. Instead, it should be seen as an emergent, 
malleable, open-ended force with the possibility of manifesting in a plurality of ways.     
 
Correspondence Failures  
Sukey was forced into a transformation from a simple Google Maps mash-up, into a standalone 
web platform, and then into an OSM-based version, because of shifting navigational 
requirements. Here I contend that it oft-failed to ‘connect the dots’ necessary to aid users in 
navigating during protest events, and that after its death the ability was do so was even more 
lacking.  
As activist X suggests in relation to the splinter manoeuvres that occurred in the aftermath of the 
A-to-B NCAFC demonstration in November 2014: 
I haven’t been on a protest that was that militant…. But it felt very, particularly at BIS 
[Department for Business, Innovation and Skills] for example, it’s a really obvious target. 
Like they administer universities, they negotiate things like TTIP [Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership] and they sort of promote capitalism in the UK essentially. That’s 
                                                          
39 As Foucault says, this is ‘the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious 
and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the 
surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action…’ (Foucault 1991, 201).  
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their job. So, that was sort of an obvious target…I think it just spontaneously arose. I don’t 
know, maybe some people knew it was a good target within the area but…. I know that 
area. I know around Westminster and stuff. I can kind of have my bearings. Which a lot of 
people didn’t. Which was interesting. They were all going ‘where the fuck are we?’ 
[laughs] (Interview with activist X, December 2nd 2014) 
Part of being able to participate in such action is knowing where one might be able to go. As the 
splinter around Westminster continued throughout the afternoon it was evident that – like many 
of these actions – there was no ‘B’ point at all; just a series of fluid transitory points along an 
undefined, collective path. Being able to navigate in such moments helps enormously and, 
ultimately, prevents the possibility in being contained for any length of time. Whilst activist X ‘kind 
of’ had their bearings, many others didn’t.  
Considering maps as ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour 1986), requires a ‘navigational’ interpretation 
(November et al. 2010, 585) of their practical, situated use. The correspondence between 
cartographic ‘signposts’ involves intensive, repeated, enduring work to ensure that the 
connections between each can be secured successfully. The map is only useful in so much as it can 
be used as a navigational tool in, and of, the world itself. In other words, it gains its power and 
strengthens its navigational qualities only through deployment as an object for aiding in location, 
orientation and wayfinding. As such, it is not simply about whether the map is able to strictly 
capture navigational knowledges; but whether it is capable of ensuring the assembled elements 
of the cartographic project remain aligned. As explained: 
Even if [a marine navigator] had learned her Descartes by heart, she would never fancy 
for one minute that the skipper and the crew live in some ‘outside world’ that would 
resemble the geometric one she is looking at; too many features would not obviously fit 
in this geometrical world: the spray, the waves, the heat, the excitation of the treacherous 
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landscape, the skills of the maneuvers [sic].’ (November et al. 2010, 586, original 
emphasis) 
And as they affirm: 
The relation she is looking for is based not on some resemblance between the map and 
the territory but on the detection of relevant cues allowing her team to go through a 
heterogeneous set of datapoints from one signpost to the next: some signposts are made 
visible from the cockpit in the hurly burly world (for instance, a roaring red buoy that the 
crew was desperately trying to tack), and some are visible in the no less hurly burly 
nauseating world of the cabin (for instance, a dark spot on the map with a red tip, which 
is just at the right angle expected by the navigator since the last beacon has been safely 
recognized and pinpointed with a blue pencil). (November et al. 2010, 585–586, original 
emphasis) 
For first-wave student activists there were numerous occasions to become familiar with the local 
urban environment. Many more of the manoeuvres explored in the previous chapter were 
performed during demonstrations of the period. Second-wave student activists – such as those 
above – did not have access to a mobile platform that gave them critical navigational information. 
Whilst Twitter was integral to the Sukey platform’s success, integrated as it was alongside a map 
module, used alone it is incapable of communicating the navigational dynamics of a protest event. 
Whilst one can keep updated with particular accounts or event-specific hashtags, there is no 
cartographic function in Twitter. Whilst one can post navigational updates referring to streets, 
junctions and specific areas relevant to those in a demonstration it cannot then visualize them on 
a map. Thus, it is the integration of these functions that allowed first-wave student activists to 
navigate in ways the second-wave activists were unable to, by providing contextual map updates 
relating to containments.  
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As a result of this, second-wave activists relied on the institutional knowledge disseminated by 
SUs. For the majority of demonstrators, then, the information given to them by their SUs 
(exemplified by activist X and Y’s comments, in chapter 8) was accepted as official and therefore 
the most reliable or ‘correct’ advice on how to safely attend a protest event. Further to this, Sukey 
was a platform designed not only to remove the need for students to consult SUs as to relevant, 
reliable event-based information. It was also developed to short-circuit, and provide an alternative 
stream of navigational knowledge, to those offered by event officials and the police during 
demonstrations.  
But Latour’s concept of immutable mobility fails to consider the fluid nature of navigation. Allison 
Hui’s (2012; 2013) ‘mobile practice networks’ concept, however, draws attention to the 
‘temporary stability’ (Hui 2012, 206) of relations and the ‘intermittent accomplishments’ (Hui 
2012, 206) forged between different, connected actors in navigational situations. Hui’s unease at 
Latour’s concept of immutable mobility is twofold. The first concerns Latour’s obsession with fixity 
and stability. The second, with Latour’s emphasis on objects being able to ‘act…at a distance’ 
(Latour 1987, 222). Both Latour (1986, 1987, 2013; Latour and Hermant 2006; November et al. 
2010) and John Law (1986) use colonial navigation as an example of immutable mobility, with the 
paper map arguably capable of ‘fixing’ territory and ‘acting at a distance’. Latour’s argument, 
throughout, is that maps operate as ‘inscriptions’ producing an ‘optical consistency’ (Latour 1986, 
10) between territory and map. The Sukey platform, on the contrary, was built only to establish 
‘intermittent’ alignments between map and territory rather than any enduring fixity. Hui’s mobile 
practice network concept provides a delicate nuance to Latour’s foundational cartographic work.  
Like the discussion of the Sukey survival guide in chapter 7 suggests, competing knowledges had 
been generated, codified and disseminated by other groups in advance of previous events. This 
was the primary contribution the platform had to demonstrations in the UK during this period of 
time. Participants in protest events were able to make use of a platform capable of synthesizing, 
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verifying and distributing navigational information in an integrated manner, incorporating both 
textual and cartographic content. The knowledges produced in different anticipatory layers did 
not do so. This also included the institutional knowledge disseminated by SUs, as well as that 
produced by Google Maps and OSM, as well as route information publicized by demonstration 
organizers such as the TUC.           
Part of being able to map containments rested on the ability to anticipate police manoeuvres – 
most notably the containment. This attentive focus would then allow users of the platform to 
calculate their own manoeuvres such as splinters and rhizomes (although not necessarily 
occupations). As both of these concern the mapping and dissemination of contingent, navigational 
knowledges, they correspond to the ‘active phenomena’ layer of anticipation. As I detailed in 
chapter 8, Sukey’s mutability arose through alterations and adaptations to the interface. Although 
there was a single design theme extending throughout the project’s lifespan – a so-called ‘ludic 
aesthetic’ – and across all related media, the cartographic platform itself was transformed based 
on a radically changing need to ‘connect the dots’. What worked on one demonstration was not 
necessarily true for another. This constant requirement to re-evaluate the platform defined the 
Sukey project at large.     
Maintaining a ‘correspondence’ between various so-called ‘datapoints’ ‘on’ the map and ‘in’ the 
territory mattered. This is why I argue that this kind of failure was premised on an inability to 
‘connect the dots’ as opposed to merely capturing them. As Sybille Lammes (2016, 2) has 
suggested, the digital map is defined by the mutability and ‘animation’ of the image. Whilst this 
mutability is often to its benefit, the contingency that arrives packed up with this mutability, 
ensures it is even more challenging to ensure the ‘dots’ are connected.    
What this navigational approach does, therefore, is cause the dramatic collapse of the separation 
between otherwise static, mute, and unresponsive symbols on the map and unruly, unpredictable, 
and ‘live’ objects in the territory. This results in the former being enlivened to a greater degree at 
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least on the par of those in the ‘outside world’, as well as corral, capture and temporarily fix 
phenomena in this alleged external world so as to be amenable to a navigational exercise. All that 
matters is that a ‘signpost’ – whether cartographic or phenomenal – assumes a force that requires 
attention at that moment in time to be paid to it by the navigator. Whilst it may be inferable that 
capture failures entail producer-side issues, and translation failures entails consumer-side 
problems it is not quite so neatly separated – especially so in this case as the former involves 
collaborative forms of data capture and the latter necessitates feedback loops between device, 
platform and navigator that elide any producer/consumer framing.   
Further, either cartographic symbols or worldly phenomena can rise and fall in their usefulness. 
Whilst in categorical terms each of these kinds of things are equal, in practice they assume their 
position based on the strength of the allies they keep. It is this talk of ‘allies’ that Latour is most 
fond of (Latour 1987, 31). Once the navigator has passed through a necessary set of datapoints, it 
may be that they are never to be required by that particular map-user for that specific purpose 
again – only of relevance for the one ‘mapping moment’ (Dodge et al. 2009, 234) that emerges 
from the background. Sukey’s efforts to adapt to these radically shifting dots or datapoints were, 
to a large degree, a failure.      
 
Crypto-cartographic Failures 
In January 2011, only a few months after Sukey launched, a post was published on Spy Blog – a 
website dedicated to surveillance technology and privacy concerns (Spy Blog 2011). Unlike much 
of the media attention at the time, it was not celebratory in tone. Instead, Spy Blog 
comprehensively detailed the various issues it had with the platform. It did so by evaluating, line 
by line, each part of a document put together by the Sukey developers in order to explain the key 
functions of the platform. Although the project website is no longer active, I had downloaded a 
copy at the time.  
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Firstly, Spy Blog suggested that if the platform worked as desired – as a ‘tool for non-violent 
demonstrations’ – it would also ‘be easily misused by others’ (Spy Blog 2011, n.p.). As the 
document continued, if the platform was to be successful it would be evaluated in regards to 
criteria that included ‘keeping people safe’, the provision that ‘anyone can use it’, and ensuring 
that a ‘live viewing platform for interested parties’ was provided. Spy Blog’s response was that 
this ‘provide[d] a Communications Data [sic] and data mining opportunity for UK police and 
intelligence agencies, foreign intelligence agencies and corporate spies’ (Spy Blog 2011, n.p.) due 
these open features.  
 
Fig 10.1 | ‘A tool for non-violent demonstrations’  
Spy Blog continues in its analysis by further suggesting that it would ‘[a]llow political organizers 
and manipulators to feed false information to the police, etc. and to manipulate some or all of the 
demonstrators into creating diversions to allow either peaceful media stunts or violent attacks, 
unhindered by the police’ (Spy Blog 2011, n.p.). Moreover, Spy Blog stated that it would aid ‘yet 
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another intelligence source to help to track the demonstrations they are policing or repressing, 
remotely, at a safe distance’ (Spy Blog 2011, n.p.). 
The blogpost goes on to detail many more complaints it had with the platform; from the lack of 
guidance on deleting photo metadata40 (to prevent identification), to the apparent use of 
swarming algorithms for modelling human movements during protest events (difficult even with 
state-of-the-art technologies). As a final criticism of the project, Spy Blog take aim at the project’s 
declaration that ‘your data is safe with Sukey’ by proposing that: 
It would be much more reassuring if the Sukey.org people mentioned exactly which 
encryption algorithm they were using, instead of making speculative claims about its 
alleged strength. The fact that they have not done so gives rise to the suspicion that they 
have attempted to write their own encryption software, an approach which is fraught with 
danger for the users of Sukey.org (Spy Blog 2011, n.p.) 
Similarly, that 
It would be more impressive, if the Sukey.org team with their “attention to detail” had 
actually demonstrated their commitment to the use of strong encryption, by running a 
https:// session encrypted version of the Sukey.org website. However there is currently 
no Digital Certificate installed. (Spy Blog 2011, n.p.) 
With these damning critiques just about done with, Spy Blog end with a warning: ‘if Sukey is not 
(yet) suitable for the streets of London, then it would be positively dangerous to deploy it or 
anything similar, in trouble spots like Tunisia or Egypt…’ (Spy Blog 2011, n.p., emphasis added). In 
                                                          
40 Otherwise known as ‘Exif (Exchangeable image file format) data’. It can consist of a range of tags, such 
as: the date and time a photograph was taken at; camera settings such as model, shutter speed and focal 
length, copyright information; and GPS logs. Metadata removal tools exist to enable the wholesale 
deletion of the above.         
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other words, that a digital mapping designed to keep activists ‘safe, mobile and informed’ (Sukey 
2012, n.p.) would have the opposite effect.        
These are what I call ‘crypto-cartographic failures’. In short, they were shortcomings, errors, issues 
or mistakes not emergent from a failure to capture data, or the difficulty in triangulating between 
cartographic ‘signposts’, but from the failure to protect users and collaborators engaged in the 
mapping process. This emphasis on the privacy of users as well as the security of the platform is 
one heavily supported by those partaking in ‘hacker cartography’ (McConchie 2015, 885).  
The notion of the ‘hacker’ has a long genealogy, yet it is inextricably bound up with a host of issues 
around digital rights, access, freedom and ethics. As Gabriella Coleman (2013) explores, hacking 
is split along a number of legal, political and aesthetic lines that as well as incorporating and 
challenging ethical issues also possesses a distinct ‘craft’ to its operation. In a more reflexive turn, 
as Coleman explains, ‘[t]he language hackers and geeks frequently invoke to describe themselves 
or formulate political claims include words and expressions like freedom, free speech, privacy, the 
individual, and meritocracy’ (Coleman 2011, 511; emphasis authors'). In other words, a liberalism 
rooted in, and advanced through, digital politics.  
For Alison Powell, however, this liberal ethic divides into means and ends with two strands 
emergent: 
…one, a valorization of participation, both as a feature of governance and as a mode of 
engagement with institutional power and, two, an evocation of a transformation of 
knowledge production and accessibility, extending from technical to scientific knowledge’ 
(Powell 2016, 4) 
Thus whilst hacking brings forth a new kind of political action – one premised on direct 
engagement and extra-institutional power – it also pushes a transformation in how knowledge is 
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sought and discovered. It is consequently both at once about the practice of hacking and the 
products of hacking.    
Crypto-cartography switches the focus towards the effects of visibility, security and privacy that 
are not immediately conjured up in reference to a hacker cartography. What a hacker cartography 
does not necessarily do is draw attention to the practices of maintaining anonymity across digital 
interactions. In so doing it removes all reference to creative re-use (or mis-use) of existing 
technologies for the purposes of ‘opening’ and ‘exposing’ people, organizations, processes and 
platforms. Instead, it draws attention to the proactive, preventative and intensely ethico-political 
decision-making that go into ‘closing’ and ‘protecting’ these interactions in the act of 
simultaneously championing a more open politics.     
Unlike capture-related failures, crypto-failures are generated not from a failure to connect the 
dots, but from a failure to protect particular dots from being connected. One of the most powerful 
capabilities of new digital analytics platforms is the capacity to connect various de-individualized 
event-based knowledges in order to form more complete, interconnected personas. In other 
words, to form what Louise Amoore (2011, 27) calls an ‘ontology of association’. Unwittingly, 
therefore, digital mapping platforms predicated on public interaction (through social media sites) 
fuel these correlative techniques. For developers desiring to ensure the (relative) anonymity of 
cartographic collaborators there are considerable hurdles to jump.  
As discussed in chapter 2, police forces such as the Met routinely consider protest events as prime 
opportunities to collect data on individuals. They do so in order to anticipate and prevent future 
disruptions, even if attendance of such events is entirely legal and the actions undertaken by these 
individuals do not contravene any public order laws. As mentioned in the same chapter, the largest 
mass arrests ever to have been conducted in the UK have been undertaken by the Met across 
central and east London in the last five years. This follows the same logic as that that underpins 
the narrative of big data: capture it all. The common tactic for doing so is the deployment of a 
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containment. Very few of those detained during such procedures have been charged with 
anything other than minor public order offences or ‘secondary’ offences such as obstructing a 
police officer or resisting arrest.  
GeoTime, for example, is a digital analytics platform developed by US firm Uncharted Software to 
enable users to visualize, map and correlate event-based data such as individual movements, cell 
phone calls and financial transactions. In the company’s own terms, it is ‘[t]he industry’s only 3D 
mapping and analysis tool, capturing time and space’ and [‘c]urrently used by HIDTA’s [High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area] program, fusion centres, national defense [sic] organizations and 
law enforcement agencies worldwide for criminal investigations, intel analysis, surveillance 
operations and courtroom presentations’ (Uncharted 2016, n.p.). In 2011, it was reported that the 
Met had purchased the software (Gallagher and Syal 2011a), using it to collect information on 
activists in order to disrupt future protests. In the time since, ‘predictive policing’ software such 
as PredPol (see; PredPol 2015, The Economist 2013, Wall Street Journal 2016) has enabled officers 
to predict the likelihood of future crimes being carried out in particular locations, by using similar 
analytical techniques. This is the rise of data-driven policing as detailed in chapter 2.      
Seen in this way the Sukey platform was thus not only a service for aiding (a) the safety of 
protesters and (b) mediating more disruptive actions, but also for maintaining individual 
anonymity during such protests. That is, in avoiding being kettled, protesters also avoided the 
threat of being arrested and having their personal details such as home address, occupation, 
name, age and gender being taken down. For some who were contained this also has meant the 
imposition of particularly severe bail conditions that restrict attendance at, or proximity to, future 
demonstrations. Many of the 182 cyclists detained for participating in a critical mass event at the 
Olympic Park, for example:  
…were made subject to bail conditions preventing them from entering the London 
borough of Newham on a bicycle, or from going within 100 metres of an Olympic venue. 
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In this way they were effectively prohibited from going anywhere near the Olympics even 
though ultimately they were not charged with any offence. (Brander 2012, n.p.) 
An investigation by the Guardian in 2014 further revealed that ‘around 85% of those barred from 
protesting when bailed have not been subsequently charged with any crime’ with ‘at least 732 
people…banned by police forces in England and Wales since 2008 but then never charged’ 
(Rawlinson 2014, n.p.). The police force responsible for the majority of these pre-charge bail 
conditions was the Met – with a total of 569 banned from attending demonstrations. The City of 
London police have also banned another 45 people since 2008, according to the Freedom of 
Information (FOI) request. When Spy Blog suggested in 2011 that the platform could prove 
‘positively dangerous’ to those using it, they no doubt were referring to these such incidents in 
which activists, users and collaborators of, and with, Sukey might have their online identities 
exposed and their right to protest at future demonstrations severely restricted.      
Despite the advantages the platform gave to protesters on-the-ground at demonstrations – 
whether student or anti-austerity events – in helping to keep them ‘safe, mobile and informed’ 
(Sukey 2012, n.p.) as the slogan went, there were many more disadvantages that led some to 
approach the platform with caution. Much of the distrust over the use of it was based around the 
necessarily public and visible nature of its operation. In other words, the Sukey platform was not 
designed to be a private, backchannel messaging service. Neither was it developed as a closed 
network – digital or non-digital – comprising only a small, select group of individuals all of whom 
had been vetted for their integrity and truthfulness beforehand. This tension – between public 
and private, collaborative and closed – was never fully resolved.  
 
Carto-futures I: Paranoia and Anxiety  
There were many aspects to this visibility question. The first of these involves the identity of social 
media users. Although it is possible to have avatars and a certain degree of anonymity on Twitter, 
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most people are aware that their credentials can be ascertained by anyone willing to spend a little 
bit of time making connections between content, metadata and details such as IP addresses. As 
activists are aware, police ‘intelligence’ often involves little more than this. Moreover, with the 
labour capacity, technical infrastructure and legal framework, police forces such as the Met have 
an even greater ability to ascertain the personal details of those involved in the communication 
of protest information in advance of, during, and after an event. This capacity was something that 
was always at the forefront of the Sukey developer’s minds when creating, adapting and running 
the platform.  
As developer X said in conversation, this ability – operational, infrastructural and judicial – is what 
led them to leave the UK and head to mainland Europe where data privacy laws are more stringent 
(interview with developer X, February 17th 2015). Doing so gave them more ‘breathing space’ to 
practice the kinds of things they enjoyed doing; programming, designing and building. In the same 
conversation they offer up the usual cases that have defined the atmosphere around digital 
technology culture in the UK that swerves from official proclamations about ‘silicon 
roundabouts’41 (The Economist 2010, n.p.) on the one hand, and enforced hard-drive destruction 
(Rusbridger 2013) on the other. In other words, the UK is not a safe place for those wanting to 
practice and hone their programming skills. One of the overarching themes of the conversation 
with developer X was the general geopolitical atmosphere that has pervaded since large-scale 
security stories had broken: particularly those of WikiLeaks (2010) and the Edward Snowden 
National Security Agency leaks (2013).  
For self-identifying ‘crypto-anarchists’ such as developer X, these stories have only made it harder 
for programmers to continue the work they may have started in the UK that concerned any 
element of ‘hacking’ or similar. Although the Sukey project was never explicitly concerned with 
such, it emerged in the early part of this intensified period (late 2010), intersecting with various 
                                                          
41 Now largely considered to be a failure in its own right, see; Herrmann (2015).  
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other activist engagements around the world such as the Occupy actions in London and New York. 
Developer X helped to set-up and maintain the encampment in the former of these locations, 
contributing to various technological projects that were undertaken during its duration from 
October 2011 – June 2012. Projects further afield included demonstrations in New York, and the 
Hurricane Hackers initiative, in response to the devastating effects of Hurricane Sandy in October 
2012. These form a general timeline of projects post-Sukey that were nonetheless still undertaken 
whilst in the UK.  
However, since then, developer X has - whilst not entirely ceasing work on software – shifted 
concern to infrastructural efforts of varying scale including 3D printing, an interest in independent 
web hosting, and a commitment to adding to the Open Source Ecology project (interview with 
developer X, February 17th 2015). The latter of these involves the development of ‘open source 
industrial machines that can be made for a fraction of commercial costs, and sharing…designs 
online for free’ in order to ‘create an open source economy’ and ‘an efficient economy [that] 
increases innovation by open collaboration’ (Open Source Ecology 2015, n.p.). All of these projects 
are driven by an interest in developing not just ‘open’ or alternative platforms or applications 
(such as Sukey) but entirely independent infrastructures and assemblages; from servers to 
payment systems to platforms. 
Yet, even back in 2011, in conversation with another developer involved in the Sukey platform, 
these kinds of concerns were on the agenda. The discussion that was had then centered on the 
desire to roll out ‘mesh networking’ in order to bypass cell tower infrastructures that individual 
mobile phone users were reliant on to send and receive online content (Hind, 2011, 29). In 2014 
– three years after that conversation – a mesh network-based communications platform called 
FireChat hit the news after being used by protesters during the Hong Kong protests (or, ‘Umbrella 
Revolution’). Much like Sukey had been touted as a revolution in communication back in 2010, so 
Firechat was heralded as a solution to state interference in private matters. But much like Sukey, 
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there was no barrier to anyone signing up to the service – and that obviously included the very 
people the protesters were desiring to bypass. ‘To the tech-savvy demonstrators in Hong Kong, 
FireChat…offered the potential to stay connected and organized even if the authorities shut down 
cellphone services’ as Noam Cohen (2014, n.p.) suggested. This was a similar concern that was 
raised by the same developer at the height of Sukey’s deployment. Yet, the necessarily ‘open’ 
nature of the platform, through which anyone can sign up and join in, means that its ability to 
function as a private communication channel bypassing state infrastructure is impossible.      
Further, for the developers themselves, the difficulty was always the validity of the data being 
sent to the platform, and the verification of those submitting the data. This was the second of 
these concerns. The result was a thorough process through which social media users were ranked 
based on the truthfulness of their information. This presents an interesting case in the ‘open’ and 
‘closed’ network debates. Although ostensibly a ‘collaborative’ platform through which any and 
all with a smartphone or a basic device could send the developers operational information, in 
truth, this required a particular hierarchical organization of users based on the veracity of the 
content provided. Those who had provided the developers with a number of useful, time-specific 
and accurate packets of information would be more likely to be trusted in the future. Those who 
had – mistakenly or deliberately – provided the platform with false or inaccurate information 
would have lesser chance of their input being recognized either through the updating of the map 
or the tweeting of new information.    
This may seem to be an implicit critique of ‘open’ and ‘wiki’ technology projects; with OSM the 
most relevant example in this case. However, I contend that analysis on such has consistently 
failed to appreciate the way in which knowledge production and verification in such spaces have 
always been necessarily hierarchical. Claims to the ‘democratizing’ potential of these platforms 
have been largely misunderstood (Haklay 2013, 55). As many who have been involved in the 
launch, development, contribution to, or use of ‘open’ platforms will be aware of, the way of 
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which various forms of gatekeeping seek to splinter the involvement of particular peoples for a 
number of reasons. Key amongst them is accountability and trust. Considering that the Sukey 
project emerged out of a student activist background in which many were cautious of the 
involvement of people whose intentions were unknown, it is little wonder there were particular 
‘closed’ arrangements in which some people had accrued (rather than notionally granted) a 
greater degree of trust throughout the community.42 
To some, this might have amounted to a kind of paranoia. But for those who work on such 
projects, particularly where states are invariably involved, this level of paranoia is a typical and 
entirely necessary response to the ever-present threat of personal identities and correspondences 
being disclosed, projects being deliberately sabotaged, and activist communities being infiltrated. 
Those involved in the Sukey project and the wider student activist community became well aware 
of the capabilities of the Met. In the years since such caution has been vindicated with the 
acknowledgement that members of the Met’s National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) had 
infiltrated environmental activist communities, not only in order to gather intelligence on those 
within, but also to act as an agent provocateur by encouraging others to commit particular crimes 
(see; Evans 2014, Evans and Lewis 2013). The identity of undercover officer Mark Kennedy 
(working under the alias ‘Mark Stone’) was confirmed by the Nottingham Indymedia Collective on 
October 22nd 2010, a mere three weeks before the first of many student protests (Nottingham 
Indymedia Collective 2010, n.p.). As such, the discussion around police infiltration into activist 
groups in the UK was very much on the agenda.  
Connected to this was the possibility that the Met were operating so-called ‘IMSI catchers’ at 
protest events. These devices, now available as small handheld objects, enable operators to 
                                                          
42 Again, this is something that was touched upon in conversation with developer X (interview, February 
17th, 2015). When the platform was deployed in 2010-2011 they were distinctly aware of the possibility 
that even those who were present within the so-called ‘HQ’ were not necessarily friendly to their efforts 
to provide a safe, secure service for protesters.  
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gather the unique identification numbers (or, international mobile subscriber identities - IMSI) of 
all mobile phone devices in a localized area. They do so by acting as ‘fake’ cell towers, and as the 
mobile devices ‘reach out’ for signal stations in the vicinity, they unknowingly connect with the 
IMSI catchers instead of a real cell tower. The mobile devices subsequently reveal their unique 
identification numbers in the process. Once the operators have a log of the devices they can trace 
them to users and other kinds of transactional events, via software such as Geotime.  
The purchase of IMSI catchers by the Met and other UK forces, unlike the Geotime software, has 
never been confirmed, but developer X suggested they and others always worked under the 
presumption that the devices had been purchased, and were in operation during student protests 
when Sukey was live (interview with developer X, February 17th 2015). A recent investigation by 
Sky News adds further weight to these suspicions, after they provided ‘direct evidence’ of their 
use in central London, after enlisting the assistance of a German security company called GMSK 
Cryptophone (Cheshire 2015, n.p.). Similar reports in the Guardian (Gallagher and Syal 2011b) and 
The Times (O’Neill 2014) note the purchase and subsequent use of IMSI catchers during the 
preceding six years. The capacity to indiscriminately capture mobile phone data – and use it to 
triangulate the involvement of individuals within particular protests – was a considerable factor 
in developer X not only abandoning the Sukey project, but also leaving the UK indefinitely 
(interview with developer X, February 17th 2015).  
Thus, guaranteeing the anonymity of those interacting with the platform during such 
demonstrations became increasingly impossible without further technical adaptations. All of 
these concerns suggest that the capture and surveillance models detailed by Agre (1994) are far 
from independent procedures. Instead, each cross-cuts the other at various points – not least 
when the production and circulation of geographic data, user anonymity, digital collaboration and 
platform privacy come into contact with each other. In other words, Sukey was unable to 
operationalize its obfuscatory potential in order to make user data ‘more ambiguous, confusing, 
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harder to exploit, more difficult to act on, and therefore less valuable’ to the police (Brunton and 
Nissenbaum 2015, 46).   
Indeed, the desire to design a ‘crypto-cartography’ in which user anonymity, secure data 
encryption, map privacy and other such precepts would enable activists to safely and confidently 
use a platform such as Sukey, was broadly in response to what Kate Crawford (2014, n.p.) has 
called a ‘surveillant anxiety’ that has arisen with the rise of big data and attendant digital 
discourses. It is this fear – of a ‘capture all’ (Transmediale 2015, n.p.) ethic – that elevates the 
possible risk to those participating in disruptive cartographies. Ensuring anonymity at a technical 
level, therefore, becomes a pressing concern to those developing such platforms, in order to avoid 
both the ‘digital footprints’ and ‘data fumes’ (Thatcher 2014, 5-6) associated with platform use. 
The failure, then, was to provide assurances on the anonymity of cartographic contributions.     
 
Carto-futures II: Speculative Mappings and Epistemological Evolutions  
Yet an even greater integration between the ‘anticipatory layers’ discussed in chapter 8 was 
envisaged by the Sukey developers, with the desire to ‘pre-map’ the risk value of the built 
environment and ‘temporary features’ (i.e. the first and second anticipatory layers) in relation to 
containment propensity (interview with developer X, 2015). In other words, it would have entailed 
the mapping of the urban environment, in order to calculate and assign values to city elements, 
according to their utility in aiding police manoeuvres such as containments. Although not realized, 
this calculative desire was a speculative vision of a cartographic future. This vision was 
characterized by a desire to harness the capacity of both on-the-ground and distant activists in 
order to carry out this work in advance of any protest event.     
However, developer X envisaged a way in which the conditions for their emergence and 
actualization could be mapped in advance of their coming-into-being. In other words, to treat 
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certain aspects of the manoeuvres as being shaped by, and mediated through, first or second-
layer features such as the built environment, street layout, or temporary structures.  
But this would have involved a form of pre-mapping in advance of the protest event in order to 
calculate ‘blockage spaces’ and bottlenecks in the urban environment (interview with developer 
X, 2015). As such, it would not have simply taken the shape of a general, on-the-ground mapping 
project (such as OSM), but a more specific mapping of phenomena for their ‘blockage’ and 
‘bottlenecking’ qualities. This would have allowed the developers to assign each aspect of the built 
environment a particular risk score. In other words, a score assigned based on a feature’s 
propensity to be used as part of a containment manoeuvre.  
Some of the most ‘successful’ containments (in police operational terms) have involved the use of 
various built features and spatial forms in order to facilitate their operation. The containment on 
Westminster Bridge, in 2010, ensured that only a comparatively small number of police officers 
were required to ‘plug’ each end of the bridge. Another similarly infamous kettle occurred during 
the ‘March for the Alternative’ demonstration in March 2011 and took place immediately outside 
of the Fortnum & Mason department store. In this case police officers blocked all exits ensuring 
that activists inside could only walk straight into a waiting containment. The G20 kettle in April 
2009 was facilitated with the aid of buildings and narrow streets in the City of London; once again 
meaning that fewer officers were required to execute it than otherwise would have been the case.  
Pre-mapping bridges, narrow streets, impenetrable blocks and a variety of other features through 
the urban environment would have allowed users of the Sukey platform to move differently and 
more attentively through the city, in order to account for riskier territories. In essence, it would 
have allowed activists to calculate the role these inanimate features might have in police 
containments or other similar manoeuvres. What was arguably most innovative about this 
cartographic function is that it would have forced a greater integration across anticipatory layers. 
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Data produced in one (say, the ‘built environment’) would interact with data produced in another 
(‘temporary features’) in order to affect the most critical layer (movements/manoeuvres).   
It would also have meant Sukey collaborators undertaking a huge cartographic job otherwise 
reserved for major mapping companies or initiatives such as Google Maps and OSM; working not 
simply on the mapping of temporary features and active phenomena, but also the built 
environment. Further, it would have involved a deeper form of mapping involving the assignation 
of risk scores to the entire urban environment. Bridges, narrow streets and those temporarily 
blocked for mass movement (thanks to barriers, etc.) would, following the above, be marked as 
‘riskier’ areas prone to containment. Open areas such as parks, squares and junctions would 
presumably have been marked as less ‘risky’ areas due to the ability to exit any possible 
containment quickly and easily in many directions.  
This speculative cartographic future was by no means inconsequential despite being unrealized. 
Whilst there were many aspects of the Sukey platform that were never developed, launched or 
integrated, this is not to say these technological ‘moonshots’ did not contribute to the 
epistemological force of the project in any way. Indeed, interviews with developers and strategists 
hinted that these features, if not realizable in the present, could in some way be developed and 
deployed in future protest events. In many ways, the near-live capture of active phenomena, 
comprising of a rudimentary risk calculation, and culminating in the visualization of such via a 
mobile, digital mapping interface itself was the most speculative of cartographic projects. Thus, 
desires to roll this function out beyond active phenomena to temporary features, and the wider 
built environment, was perhaps only an extension of an already-existing capability; rather than an 
entirely novel initiative. 
The point to be made here is that a certain ‘failure’ to realize particular mapping capacities did 
not constitute a failure to generate or mobilize particular mapping epistemologies. Thus, a 
technical failure did not amount to some kind of magical erasure of heretofore accumulated 
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knowledge in regards to such a technological endeavour. Nevertheless, the demise of the Sukey 
platform, in relation to UK student activism, resulted in a marked decrease in available, and 
circulated, navigational knowledge such as that generated in relation to police manoeuvres.  
Without such a platform, a vacuum of navigational knowledges during demonstrations has 
formed; with a lack of access to critical, moment-specific data having created new ‘digital divides’ 
(boyd and Crawford 2012; 673), with evident repercussions. In the second-wave of student 
activism in the UK, these were not replaced by identical, alternative, ‘on-the-ground’ information 
flows, but reverted back to known institutional forms governing spatial practice, such as risk 
assessments and ‘buddy’ systems. In the moments I have explored, these substitutions were poor 
replacements, failing to adequately provide ‘live’ navigational assistance to protesters. In other 
words, hope for a ‘new spatial media knowledge politics’ (Elwood and Leszczynski 2012, 13) faded.    
For the reasons outlined in this conclusion I suggest that there will never be another Sukey. As I 
have tried to argue throughout, it was a rather unique platform operating at an extraordinary 
time. In navigational terms it stands alone. This thesis was not intended as a eulogy to the 
platform, or as a lament for a more radical – in spatial, technological or political terms – 
cartographic project. Instead, I have wanted to provide an account of its enduring legacy. Nearly 
six years on from its launch, and another three from its death, there was a navigational story still 
yet to be told. It is that story I hope to have provided here.     
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Appendix 
 
Playing with Protest website: text 1  
The expectation is that (a) participants are committed to attending either or both of the 
above events, (b) they are willing to record their involvement using a personal video 
camera or other device (smartphone, etc.), (c) desire to be interviewed on the footage at 
a later date, and (d) be willing for the recorded data to be used in further analysis across 
the course of the Playing with Protest research project. (original emphaisis)  
 
Playing with Protest website: text 2 
There is no expectation that participants get to grips with any kind of ‘protest mapping 
technology’ they are unfamiliar with. Put simply, the project wants to see how protesters 
move through the city during demonstrations, and witness ‘moments’ during the day. 
Recording this movement with a personal video camera or other device is the best way of 
capturing the kinds of things that make a protest event! If you intend to use a paper map, 
Google Maps, the aid of a steward, your own intuition or the on-street Legible London 
system – all the better! (original emphasis)  
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Demonstration Correspondence 1 
 
| 292 
 
Demonstration Correspondence 2  
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